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1. Rapidly rising oil income since 1991 has made Equatorial Guinea comparatively wealthy, 
although poverty reduction has lagged behind. Part of the reason for this paradox can be traced to how 
far the country has had to climb since the period after independence in 1968, which was marked by severe 
economic contraction and weak institutional capacity. Political turmoil led to population decline, 
economic stagnation, falling social indicators, growing impoverishment, and a truncated private sector. 
When Equatorial Guinea (EQG) began exporting oil in 1991, yearly gross domestic product (GDP) was 
merely US$132 million, or US$330 dollars per person. However, mounting government oil revenues 
during the 1990s (estimated at US$1.3 billion) and an inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) signaled 
that the chronic stringency and dependence on aid that had characterized the country’s economy for 
nearly a quarter century was over. Indeed after 2000 the stream of income grew to a torrent as rising 
hydrocarbon production and soaring global prices brought the state an estimated US$25 billion in 
revenues during the next eight years. GDP growth averaged 22 percent annually between 2000 and 2008, 
with GDP per capita today among the highest in Africa. Meanwhile the current account and fiscal balance 
remain in surplus (Figure ES 1:) even though public spending has vastly expanded. The oil boom has 
spilled over to the non-oil economy, especially through public investment in infrastructure and private 
construction, with the average yearly growth rate of consumption running around 20 percent since 2000. 
Yet indicators of social and human development as well as governance remain low, and Equatorial 
Guinea ranks 127
th
 out of the 177 countries in the 2007/08 United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Human Development Index. Despite the considerable public outlays, the budget structure does 
not favor social investment, with recurrent education and health expenditures in 2008 accounting for only 
11 percent of total current expenditure (0.2 percent of GDP) and 6.4 percent of total current expenditure 
(0.1 percent of GDP), respectively. 
Figure ES 1: Real and Fiscal Data 
 
2. Thus despite nearly two decades of oil-fueled growth, very serious challenges remain, with a 
looming threat that the present pace will falter and fade without new sources of wealth generation: 
 Unsustainable economic policies. Petroleum production will start to tail off by 2013 and is 
expected to run dry by 2035. Current economic policies based on high public sector expenditure 
                                                          


































































cannot be maintained unless the private sector develops and the economy diversifies. While 
efforts to discover and exploit new hydrocarbon resources, if successful, will allow the 
government to maintain current policies longer, the reserves are finite and EQG must start now to 
prepare its economy for the post-oil era. 
 
 High levels of poverty. Despite abundant petroleum revenues, the standard of living of most of 
the population has not significantly budged and poverty is widespread. Indications show that 
nearly three of four people live on less than two dollars per day; and about half the population 
lacks access to safe drinking water or sewage facilities. Furthermore, the contrast between high 
per capita income and high poverty rates and the widening gap in income distribution pose a 
serious menace to social stability in the medium term unless addressed adequately and quickly. 
 
 High unemployment among the fast-growing urban youth population. Structural change in 
the economy has been accelerated by low agricultural productivity and heavy migration from 
rural areas that, with growing immigration, expand the need for urban employment opportunities 
and social services. The demand for jobs is exacerbated by a large cohort of youth funneling into 
the labor force, with 244,000 to 491,000 new workers projected during 2010–20. New jobs will 
have to be created in the non-oil economy since the petroleum industry is capital intensive and 
employs relatively few highly skilled workers, who are often from other countries. 
 
 Weak governance. Rising incomes have not been matched by better overall governance or 
stronger institutional capacity in the public sector, which continues to function in many respects 
as it did before petroleum was discovered. This hinders private sector participation in the non-oil 
economy, which is reflected in the country’s low rank in the Doing Business Index (167 out of 
181 countries). The public sector, financed by high oil revenues, continues to be the main 
economic agent, often operating ineffectively while distorting market incentives and not fulfilling 
its redistribution responsibilities. 
3. To respond to these challenges, Equatorial Guinea has adopted a National Development 
Plan to diversify its economy out of petroleum production and broaden the foundation of its wealth 
by developing the skills and well-being of its people. While the government for some time has invested 
heavily in upgrading the country’s ailing infrastructure, it has started to take additional measures to 
prepare the economy for the transition ahead. A National Development Plan (NDP) was adopted in 2007 
to set a strategy for economic diversification and poverty reduction (Box ES1). Early on, the authorities 
have emphasized large investment programs to implement the NDP and meet public needs. Two 
complementary steps also are under way to ensure that petroleum resources are used to create a more 
positive long-term framework for the economy: (a) a campaign to obtain validation from the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to improve petroleum sector transparency; and (b) a push for 
more sustainable macroeconomic policies, for example by adhering to the Permanent Income Hypothesis 




Box ES 1: The National Development Strategy of Equatorial Guinea 
The National Development Plan (NDP) Guinea Ecuatorial 2020 was adopted in 2007 at an international conference 
in Bata. This plan reflects the government’s view that the recently favorable growth performance belies the fragility 
of present foundations for future expansion since the economy is overdependent on oil production expected to run 
dry circa 2030. The NDP lays out an economic and social vision through 2020 for meeting these challenges. This 
strategy highlights two objectives: (a) transition from an oil to a diversified economy, and (b) the reduction of 
poverty and enhancement of social cohesion. To do so, the NDP emphasizes job creation and labor productivity so 
that the future growth path is inclusive and cuts poverty.  
NDP implementation began with approval of Decree Law 2/2008, which officially adopts the plan and creates the 
institutional framework for its implementation. This framework includes (a) the governing Council ―Equatorial 
Guinea–Horizon 2020,‖ which is formed by the President and other government officials and holds quarterly 
meetings; (b) the National Commission for Monitoring and Evaluation of the National Economic and Social 
Development ―Equatorial Guinea–Horizon 2020,‖ headed by the prime minister and comprising other members of 
government and representatives of the sponsor board, workers and civil society, which oversees the creation and 
operation of sector technical committees; and (c) a National Agency ―Equatorial Guinea–Horizon 2020,‖ for the 
management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the National Economic and Social Development 
―Equatorial Guinea– Horizon 2020.‖ Some of the agencies in charge of implementing various policies adopted in the 
NDP have also been created, such as the National Enterprise for Housing Promotion (ENPIGE) and the National 
Society of Fishing (SONAPESCA).  
 
The NDP identifies potential growth-enhancing sectors: energy, fishing, agriculture, tourism, financial services, 
manufacturing and mining. It also lays out the need to improve several critical areas such as governance and 
corruption, as well as the need to improve the business environment. The latter is perceived to be a major constraint 
in attracting resources and know-how from international investors to the nonpetroleum economy. As a remedy, the 
NDP proposes a broad set of reforms to simplify business regulations, strengthen property rights, increase credit 
access and reduce trading costs.  
 
The NDP does not provide an overall cost of either its implementation, or its distribution among sectors. 
Nonetheless, it proposes two implementation phases. During the first phase (2008–12) the government will launch 
critical reforms in the areas mentioned above, create the institutions and public companies responsible for 
implementing the NDP, and substantially increase public investments for achieving NDP objectives. During the 
second phase (2012–20), the government will continue the reform process, building up institutional capacity at all 
levels of public administration to ensure sustainability of the reforms. 
 
The Government of Equatorial Guinea signed a Services Agreement with the World Bank in 2007 to prepare a 
Public Expenditure Review. This report will provide recommendations to raise public sector efficiency and improve 
public financial management to ensure that the policy objectives laid out in the NDP are translated into annual 
budgets and implemented quickly yet efficiently to achieve results on the ground.  
4. However NDP implementation has been seriously hampered by weak governance, limited 
information and low institutional capacity, yielding few results thus far. It is therefore critical at this 
juncture for the government to increase transparency and engage fully with partners (including the Bank 
and the EITI) to address the low public sector efficiency and poor business environment and broaden 
participation in oil sector income to get the plan on track and moving forward.  
5. The government is eager to accelerate implementation of the NDP by improving economic 
governance in the public sector. While improving the business environment is key for successful 
private- sector-led growth to achieve sustainable economic diversification, the government has decided to 
begin the transformation process by accelerating public sector reforms to improve economic governance 
so that current resource flows can be managed more efficiently for long-term impact. To that end, it 
signed a Services Agreement with the World Bank in 2007 for improving compilation of the national 
accounts and carrying out this Public Expenditure Review (PER) to propose measures for more efficient 
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public spending that raises non-oil sector productivity, facilitates economic diversification and generates 
employment to reduce poverty and improve income distribution in the medium term. 
6. Indeed, sustainable economic growth, job creation and poverty reduction can only be 
achieved through productivity increases in the non-oil economy. The recent decline in world oil prices 
has tempered the sense of abundance that oil revenues had generated up to 2008, and highlighted the need 
to accelerate reforms toward economic diversification. Chapter 2 of the PER shows that the contribution 
of oil revenue expenditure to diversification depends on an efficient budget allocation process, based on 
clear priorities. Chapter 3 shows how this, in turn, requires changes in the institutions and procedures that 
govern budget implementation (notably the investment program that represents 80 percent of the public 
budget). With the first wave of investment spending in large infrastructure projects coming to an end, the 
next wave of budget investment must be implemented not only quickly but efficiently and be oriented 
toward NDP priorities. Thus Chapter 4 reviews expenditure trends in education to understand if the public 
resource flow is sufficient for meeting Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by achieving a 100 
percent primary completion rate, and fulfilling the need to increase labor productivity in the medium 
term. Finally, Chapter 5 reviews whether health sector spending meets the pressing challenges 
confronting the country of reducing the prevalence of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and 
malaria, and extending adequate primary health care coverage to the entire population.  
7. Economic diversification cannot be leveraged simply through investment; it requires 
implementation of macroeconomic policies that counteract the negative short-term effects of high 
petroleum revenues. While oil production has fueled economic growth and lifted key financial 
constraints, it has also distorted economic incentives and worsened overall governance. Equatorial Guinea 
has not been spared the economic problems common to petroleum exporting countries, including limited 
absorption capacity, oil revenue volatility, and fluctuations of the real exchange rate. These call for 
decisive implementation of prudent macroeconomic policies and of structural reforms that reconcile the 
goals of raising petroleum revenues and development of the non-oil economy while promoting 
governance conducive to private sector development. 
Three Critical Needs 
8. This analysis of public spending and fiscal management highlights three critical weaknesses that 
hinder economic governance in the public sector: 
 Lack of adequate information to facilitate effective policy making and implementation 
 Weak procedures for public finance management, notably for administration of the investment 
program  
 Insufficient social sector spending and an inadequate balance between capital and recurrent 
expenditures. 
9. The scarcity of reliable fiscal and general socioeconomic information constrains authorities 
from designing and implementing adequate policies. First, the dearth of household and enterprise 
surveys limits preparation of the national accounts, poverty assessments, and knowledge about the labor 
market. Second, the large and longstanding difference between national and international sources for 
population estimates has not been resolved. While national sources project 1.6 million inhabitants in 
2010, United Nations (UN) sources report only around 700,000. Third, budget implementation data do 
not conform to budget classification, making adequate budget supervision impossible. Filling these data 
gaps require immediate action by the authorities, who could use the recently created National Agency 
2020 to take the lead as part of its effort to increase institutional capacity for planning and improve 
coordination among different agencies and ministries to better supervise implementation of the NDP.  
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10. Incomplete and poor quality economic data has also hindered preparation of this report. 
Often information about a key matter was unavailable, or when available, its coverage, quality and 
usefulness were limited. This was particularly evident for social indicators and population. The 
government has started addressing this problem. As part of the Services Agreement signed with the World 
Bank, upgrading of the statistical system is expected, notably with preparation of National Accounts 
consistent with international standards. Efforts are also under way to initiate a new household survey and 
a census that would settle the population data discrepancies. (Steps to remedy data gaps are discussed in 
further detail in Section C of this summary.) 
11. Even if better data were available, current budget management practices undermine the 
ability to guide allocation expenditure in support of public goals. The 2003 law that regulates public 
finances is not implemented, and customary practices reduce transparency and make the process prone to 
irregularities. Long and centralized budget procedures severely delay budget implementation and lead 
agencies to bypass regular channels, which not only results in poor reporting but in inadequate budgetary 
supervision. Particular attention is needed in the Public Investment Program (PIP), which represents 80 
percent of the total budget but follows ad-hoc budgetary procedures, involves too many actors and 
diffuses accountability. Further complicating the process, extra budgetary spending occurs throughout the 
fiscal year (Figure ES2). This not only circumvents controls, it weakens the capacity of the authorities to 
manage the macroeconomy and achieve longer-term economic and social goals. (Steps to improve 
financial management are discussed in further detail in section D).  
Figure ES 2: Budget Composition and Capital Overruns 
 
12. Finally, the insufficiency of social sector public expenditures is inconsistent with the NDP’s 
stated goals for economic diversification and poverty reduction. Budget spending has focused on 
improving the country’s outmoded infrastructure, mostly roads, ports and airports. However, NDP goals 
require a radical shift of public resources toward pro-poor and productivity-enhancing social sectors to 
boost efficiency in the non-oil economy and cut poverty. Current allocations do not adequately reflect 
NDP priorities, and the authorities need to strengthen the link between public policy prioritization and the 
budget process. A first step would be to increase participation by social sector ministries in budget 
preparation (including the investment program) and implementation. (Reorienting allocation by priorities 
is explored in further detail in section E.) 
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Addressing Information Shortcomings 
13. Given the importance of reliable population data to setting priorities and measuring 
progress toward meeting them, the authorities should strengthen technical cooperation with 
international organizations to reconcile the current disparity in population estimates. The large 
discrepancies described in section B (with national population projections more than doubling UN 
projections) make it impossible to set credible targets for social services, employment and other areas of 
concern; undermine budget allocation decisions; and hinder policy formulation to achieve NDP objectives 
and the MDGs. The authorities should coordinate with international organizations as soon as possible to 
prepare a new population census that follows international standards and resolves lingering uncertainty. 
14. A poverty assessment is required to better understand the impact of economic growth in 
income distribution and the best policies to reduce poverty. The national accounting system is at an 
early stage of development, and estimates of GDP sector composition contain weaknesses, which hinders 
the development of policies to diversify out of petroleum production. Furthermore, limited household and 
firm surveys are available, and social sector information is generally scarce and unreliable since it does 
not conform to internationally accepted methodologies, which also makes international comparisons 
difficult. This information vacuum makes it difficult to design effective efforts to remediate poverty when 
its distribution and characteristics are not known with much precision.  
15. Improvements in the classification and recording of public spending are needed to ensure 
adequate implementation and reporting of disbursements. A pervasive deficiency in the existing 
classification of public expenditures deeply undermines the value of information for various spending 
categories. Actual disbursements cannot be compared with the budgeted appropriations because of 
differences in the reporting formats. There are large extrabudgetary expenditures, and large parts of public 
expenditures are implemented outside of regular budget procedures and are never adequately recorded. 
The authorities need to further improve the quality and consistency of budget reporting so that both the 
government and public can better understand what is actually being spent, without which the much 
needed increases in effective financial planning and budget implementation cannot occur.  
Improving Public Finance Management 
16. Improving institutional capacity to increase collection of non-oil taxes is essential to ensure 
adequate public sector financing in the medium term. Since 2002, hydrocarbon income has generated 
almost 90 percent of public revenues, while nonhydrocarbon sources have been neglected, with customs 
and value added taxes declining in relative importance. This calls for additional efforts to build capacity 
in the Customs and Tax Directorates to improve collection, reduce evasion and ensure equal treatment of 
taxpayers. The current complex system of fees should also be simplified since it constitutes a serious 
handicap for private sector development in the non-oil economy. 
17. Streamlining budget procedures and improving budget classification are prerequisites to 
increasing much needed budget discipline. Information about the legal framework governing public 
finance management is limited, and when it does exist (as with the 2003 Public Finance Law) it is not 
applied. Mandated procedures are time consuming and often circumvented, which reduces transparency 
and accountability. Consequently only an economic classification of budget execution is prepared, with 
no reliable administrative or functional information about spending. This seriously inhibits the 
government´s ability to adequately supervise implementation of disbursements and assess public policy 
impacts. The government should review budget administration to cut red tape, preserving adequate 
controls on the most relevant steps while limiting the use of exceptional procedures and reducing payment 
delays. It should also ensure that the same economic and administrative classifications are used for the 
approved and executed budgets and that an additional administrative classification is introduced in the 
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investment program to differentiate between infrastructure and other types of investment that should be 
classified as current expenditures. 
18. External oversight and transparency of the public sector—notably for petroleum 
revenues— should be strengthened. Information about the national budget and public sector 
performance is not accessible to the general public. There are no external audit reports, and contract 
awards are not published, which reduces the government’s accountability to Parliament and citizens and 
increases opportunities for misappropriation. Petroleum revenues are not formally audited. Rapid 
implementation of the EITI would provide timely and relevant information on the sector. Finally, there is 
an urgent need to raise institutional capacity to oversee the array of decentralized public sector institutions 
and present a consolidated budget. The government should make use of modern technologies and publish 
budget reports and procurement contract information on the Internet to inform the public.  
19. Sector ministries need to participate further in budget preparation and implementation. By 
2008 it was clear that the current project selection and implementation system was reaching its limits, and 
the 1,400 projects in the PIP could not possibly be implemented simultaneously given existing capacity 
constraints. The bottleneck can only grow since the NDP calls for additional financing to be directed 
toward sector ministries to get quick results in poverty reduction. Clearly an adjustment is required. The 
number of projects in the PIP will have to shrink while additional responsibility is delegated to sector 
ministries for selecting sector projects within sector envelopes allocated by the Ministry of Finance and 
Budget (MoFB). This change will also allow better planning for future project maintenance and operating 
costs. In that vein, sector ministry participation should be ensured throughout project implementation to 
ensure adequate planning for transfer of the social infrastructure into service and ensure its sustainability 
after operations begin. 
20. The National Agency 2020 provides a good opportunity to improve coordination across key 
government agencies and improve budget reporting and evaluation. The current dual budget system 
needs improved coordination between the MoFB (which implements the current budget and sets the 
investment ceiling) and the Ministry of Planning (which implements the PIP). This could be achieved by 
setting sector ceilings for current and investment allocations, making use of the same classification during 
budget implementation, and making both budgets more consistent with the NDP goals. There is also an 
overlap in authority and responsibility within the investment program that creates confusion.  Insufficient 
coordination between Geproyectos (which is in charge of investment implementation), the MoFB, the 
Ministry of Planning, and the sector ministries results in poor reporting on actual execution of the PIP. 
Geproyectos does not use the Public Investment Program as a tool for investment prioritization and 
selection; and that, coupled with implementation of non-PIP projects, renders the PIP useless as a tool for 
raising spending efficiency. The recently created National Agency 2020 is an opportunity to overhaul the 
institutional setting and ensure adequate coordination and accountability of all stakeholders, making the 
PIP a relevant policy tool. Creation of a database with updated project information from all participating 
ministries (including sector ministries) would strengthen the process, allowing the National Agency 2020 
to annually report and evaluate implementation of the PIP. 
21. Investment efficiency would benefit greatly from outsourcing critical analysis while 
building up institutional capacity. At present, project appraisals are seldom conducted because quick 
implementation is at a premium given the dire needs of the country. However, expansion of the 
investment budget without project appraisals results in arbitrary selection that cannot ensure acceptable 
returns on outlays. Outsourcing appraisals would ensure adequate technical review of project proposals 
and would raise institutional capacity in the government by training government staff at the same time. 
Also considering the limited capacity in Geproyectos and the Ministry of Infrastructure, further 
outsourcing of project supervision should be considered while resources for upgrading internal public 
sector capacity are focused on better overall supervision of the investment program. Lastly, a public 
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procurement regulatory framework needs to be developed and implemented to raise efficiency in 
investment planning and budgeting through the preparation and use of unit cost databases to assess 
bidding proposals, and institution of adequate controls to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Expanding Social Sector Expenditures and Changing the Budget Allocation 
Structure  
22. Current social sector expenditures need to be expanded to meet growing social needs. 
Current expenditures represent 20 percent of total public expenditures in Equatorial Guinea, well below 
the average of about 66 percent in other countries of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC). Outlays are also insufficient given the low level of social indicators they are meant to 
change and the looming challenges of job creation and poverty reduction. The first priority is to ensure 
that current expenditures in the public investment program (about one-third of the total) are appropriately 
reclassified and implemented through regular budget procedures. The second priority is to reallocate 
expenditures from public administration and defense, which represent 57 percent of current spending in 
2008, toward social sectors that represent only 17 percent. 
23. Subsidies and transfers need to be targeted better, and public employment needs to be more 
responsive to the most critical social needs. While there is scope to increase the wage bill, the 
authorities should ensure that it is done as part of the ongoing reform of public administration so that 
salary increases align with productivity gains and public employment concentrates in the most needed 
social sectors. Transfers and subsidies, which represent almost a third of current expenditure, also need to 
be better targeted and overseen. The MoFB currently lacks the resources to adequately monitor the 
autonomous institutions that receive transfers from the public budget, making it difficult to ensure that 
they comply with their social role. Also, large subsidies that disproportionately benefit the better-off, such 
as those for fuel, should be overhauled. 
24. Implementation of social sector projects needs to be more efficient. With the completion of 
many large transport projects, the NDP foresees a shift in investment toward infrastructure in social 
sectors (education, health, water and sanitation, and housing) that are undersupplied given the dire needs 
of the population. Initial attempts to increase such investments in 2008 had limited success, with only 3 
percent of GDP actually implemented. Parallel attempts to expand social sector investment, such as the 
Social Development Fund established in 2005 with support of USAID, also have yet to succeed. Attaining 
noticeable results in social indicators will require decisive political commitment to accelerate project 
implementation, increased recurrent spending for more qualified staff, and adequate funding of 
operational and maintenance costs. Quick wins, such as implementation of projects already identified by 
the Social Development Fund, are achievable in the short run. In the medium run, reform of investment 
procedures will be required to allow additional participation by social sector ministries in the preparation 
and implementation of the PIP. 
Addressing Macroeconomic Challenges 
25. To avoid spending oil wealth too quickly while ensuring proper management of oil savings, 
public expenditures should be brought in line with recommendations from the permanent income 
hypothesis. The PIH model, although fully endorsed by the authorities, has never been strictly enforced, 
and the non-oil deficit has actually increased since 2007. Despite the country’s economic needs, excess 
public expenditures like these entail serious risks of not being adequately absorbed, generating 
inefficiencies in resource utilization. Furthermore, excess spending reduces savings that can earn an 
additional return to be tapped in the future if falling prices or supply diminish the resource flow. Thus. 
efforts to restrain public expenditure should be complemented by adoption of a strategy to increase 
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returns on EQG’s sovereign financial assets. Such an instrument should be modeled on well-established 
sovereign funds that have successfully outsourced management of their financial assets. Establishment of 
an Equatorial Guinean sovereign fund will require a broad consensus on the institutional setting for 
supervision of its assets and the risk/return mix that should be pursued. 
26. Policies to reduce the impact of oil revenue volatility on the economy need to be 
implemented across the business cycle. The large share of the oil sector in GDP makes the economy 
particularly vulnerable to large and quick swings in international hydrocarbon prices. The government 
must continue its practice of using conservative projections for these prices during budget preparation to 
avoid sharply slashing spending throughout the year if oil prices fall. A better strategy still would be to 
stick to the recommendations of the permanent income hypothesis discussed above, so that windfall 
petroleum revenues are put aside and put to work earning additional funds to counteract future revenue 
declines. Finally, both these measures should be accompanied by efforts to raise public sector efficiency 
to ensure that public expenditures seed growth potential in addition to aggregate demand.  
27. Better public sector governance is needed to limit rent-seeking behavior around petroleum 
revenues and promote private sector development. Equatorial Guinea needs radical institutional 
reform to raise the level of economic governance. The current business environment is unfavorable to 
private sector development (ranking 167th out of 181 countries in the 2008 Doing Business Index as 
previously noted), and the authorities must ensure an adequate system of checks and balances that limits 
opportunities for rent seeking (EQG ranks 171st out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 
2009 Corruption Perceptions Index).
2
 The authorities need to raise overall transparency in governance, 
particularly in management of public resources, and should accelerate implementation of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Achieving  greater transparency will not succeed unless 
institutional checks and balances are built up conflicts of interest are eliminated; tools are introduced and 
enforced for implementing good governance practices, such as modern public financial management 
arrangements; and most importantly, political commitment is ensured. 
Public Spending in Education 
28. Current education policies and institutions hinder economic growth. Equatorial Guinea’s 
educational system is highly inefficient and only one of every two students completes primary school. 
Coupling this performance with the relatively low gross primary education enrollment rate (80 percent of 
the corresponding school-age population) and the high repetition rate (24 percent of students) casts grave 
doubt on the country’s capacity to reach the MDG of universal primary education by 2015. Furthermore, 
educational quality is poor and requires significant efforts to increase the number and quality of teachers. 
It should be noted that educational achievements are critical not only for reducing illiteracy but also to 
creating the human resources needed to diversify the economy. Beyond improving the quality of 
instruction, efforts to improve primary education also will require parallel measures such as a scholarship 
system and the introduction of school meals to boost attendance of children from low-income households. 
29. The educational reform agenda requires better public financial management and an 
effective monitoring and evaluation system with adequate sector data recording. The review of 
public spending patterns and outcomes in the sector revealed important weaknesses. The system to 
monitor and evaluate public expenditure outcomes in education is ineffective, hindering the analysis and 
formulation of sector policy decisions. The volume of budget information is low (for example, some 
critical data were obtainable only through international organizations); and consistent with what is 
happening in the rest of the public sector, the reporting system for the education budget needs to be 
strengthened to achieve meaningful results. 
                                                          
2 See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table. 
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30. Equatorial Guinea needs to increase educational budget allocations, with a focus on 
improving quality and completion of primary education. Public financing of the sector is insufficient, 
given the dire needs, which are particularly acute at the primary level. Shortfalls in public funding have 
been partially compensated by contributions from parents and funding from external donors (that finance 
40 percent of teachers), but the authorities need to increase recurrent expenditures to the sector (rather 
than capital spending) to ensure a stable source of financing to train and hire more teachers and increase 
salaries in line with teacher qualifications and performance. Furthermore, the wage bill is heavily skewed 
toward administrative overhead instead of teaching staff and needs to be adjusted. In addition, public 
spending is geared toward higher education (with expenditure per student 50 times greater than at the 
primary level) and needs to be rebalanced to ensure that a greater share of the population acquires 
literacy, numeracy and basic skills, and gains access to secondary education. This is particularly salient 
for girls, who are much more likely than boys to drop out upon completion of primary education. 
Recommendations from the EFA-FTI framework for development of a sustainable sector plan and 
allocation of resources (increasing the percentage of allocated expenditure and funneling it toward 
primary education) seem appropriate despite Equatorial Guinea’s status as a middle-income country.  
31. Regional inequalities call for additional financial resources to rural education and for more 
decentralized management. Overall, Malabo and Bata have better infrastructure and trained staff than 
do rural areas, which further encourages migration to urban centers. The disparity is particularly evident 
in vocational training since the only available facilities are in Malabo and Bata. This training needs to be 
expanded, including extension to students older than 18 and to areas outside the main cities. Finally, it is 
essential to decentralize educational administration, management and oversight, providing resources and 
delegating responsibilities to district and local levels, including the transfer of funds directly to schools 
for administration by school management committees that include parents. 
Public Spending in Health 
32. Additional resources for the health sector must be directed toward primary health care. 
Increasing budget allocations will not have the desired impact if it follows preexisting patterns of 
distribution, which are unsuitable to meeting the needs of a young and fertile population severely affected 
by communicable diseases. Currently technical criteria are not used to assess budget allocations or 
policies, which results in an inequitable and inefficient distribution of resources that favors delivery of 
curative services in urban hospitals rather than preventive primary care, especially in rural areas. In 
keeping with WHO recommendations, resources must be reassigned to health promotion and disease 
prevention through primary care coverage of the entire population. 
33. Better use of the limited existing resources is essential for greater health system efficiency 
and equity in the short term. Infrastructure investment in the health sector must be complemented by a 
large increase in human capital. This is particularly challenging considering the shortfall in adequately 
trained professionals, and will require better linkage of salary scales to qualifications and productivity to 
hire and retain staff. Staff skills must be enhanced for physicians, nurses and other health professionals, 
either through professional training programs to qualify new staff or advanced and refresher courses for 
those already working in the system. Better coordination between the Social Security and the National 
Health Systems would increase efficiency by pooling existing resources to avoid duplication and 
underutilization and make access to health services more equitable. Finally, allocations for administrative 
overhead of the system should be pared, with savings redirected to the direct provision of health services. 
34. Achieving the MDGs for health will require development of a detailed sector strategy that 
incorporates an effective monitoring and evaluation system. A new health strategy that updates the 
one drafted in 2002 must be implemented, clarifying the sector’s mission and needs. More importantly, 
any additional spending should be guided by establishment of an effective monitoring and evaluation 
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system. Ongoing successful pilot activities, such as the Malaria Control Project, provide valuable lessons 
to the authorities in designing such a system and compiling health databases for national replication.  
35. More-decentralized financial management will better link budget allocation to health needs. 
Progressive decentralization of budget execution toward health care providers will create incentives to 
better allocate resources to the most pressing local needs, foster savings and accelerate budget execution. 
This will require simultaneous strengthening of the financial unit of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Welfare to ensure adequate recording and reporting of collection and use of funds for the sector. The 
decentralization process also will require improvements in how cost recovery is used to finance health 
services. The present system generates inefficiencies in the system and inequities in access, requiring the 
definition of exemption rules for vulnerable groups, better control systems for handling co-payments, and 
a transition away from co-payments toward health insurance programs for treating illnesses. 
Box E1: Cross-Cutting Policy Actions 
and Recommended  
Policy Action 
Expected Impact on Public 
Finance Management and 
Economic Diversification 
Degree of Priority and 
Expected Outcome 
Resolve discrepancies in population data 
and improve the statistical system 
(a) Promotes economic 
diversification  
(b) Builds capacity to set policy 
goals and manage for results  
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  
Capacity to define improved 
poverty policies 
Ability to monitor public 
sector efficiency 
Reduce public expenditures in line with 
PIH recommendations and improve 
management of public financial assets 
(a) Increases public savings for 
future generations 
(b) Increases fiscal space to 
manage petroleum price volatility 




politically feasible  
Expected Outcomes:  
Sustainable macroeconomic 
policy, 
higher returns and more 
transparent management of 
oil savings 
Use the same classification for current 
and investment expenditures while 
developing a functional classification of 
the budget 
(a) Bridges the gap between the 
budget and the public investment 
plan  
(b) Builds capacity for multiyear 
planning and budgeting  
 (c) Creates capacity to track pro-
poor spending  
High, short term  
Expected Outcome:  
Ability to assess sector 
allocation impact on NDP 
and MDG goals  
All public spending recorded 
Streamline budget procedures as a first 
step to increase budget discipline 
(a) Reduces off-budget spending  
(b) Accelerates budget payments 
 
High, short term  
Expected Outcomes:  
Improved budgeting  
Increased efficiency of public 
spending 
Strengthen coordination within the 
government to adequately use the PIP to 
manage the investment program  
(a) Improves oversight and 
transparency of public spending   
(b) Creation of a project database 
with unique project identifiers 
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  
Greater accountability    
More efficient public 
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Box E1: Cross-Cutting Policy Actions 
and Recommended  
Policy Action 
Expected Impact on Public 
Finance Management and 
Economic Diversification 
Degree of Priority and 
Expected Outcome 
spending  
Outsource project appraisal while 
building up institutional capacity in all 
ministries and Geproyectos to carry out 
project appraisal   
(a) Transparent and uniform 
preparation of project studies 
(cost-benefit analysis)  
(b) Builds capacity for multiyear 
planning and budgeting 
(c) Discourages the practice of 
launching unscreened projects 
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  
More efficient public 
spending  
 
Strengthen the audit system and ex post 
evaluation  
 
 (a) Production of monitoring and 
evaluation reports 
(b) Extends budget coverage to the 
autonomous institutions 
(c) Builds capacity to manage by 
results  
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  
Combat of corruption 
Improved reporting and 
transparency 
Better balance capital and recurrent 
spending  
(a) Increases absorption capacity 
of public expenditure 
(b) Reduces poverty 
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  




Scale up spending for social sectors and 
agriculture  
 
(a) Promotes economic 
diversification 
(b) Reduces poverty 
(c) Accelerates implementation of 
MDGs 
Medium-term action; 
politically feasible  
Expected Outcomes:  
Improved service delivery  
Efficient economic 
diversification  
Allocate more resources to primary 
education and to vocational training in 
secondary education  
(a) Expands the educational base  
(b) Increases productivity  
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  
Poverty reduction 
Economic diversification 
Increase resource allocation to primary 
health facilities   
(a) Reduces incidence of diseases  
(b) Increases productivity  
High, short term 
Expected Outcomes:  
Poverty reduction 
Increased productivity  
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CHAPTER 1: MACROECONOMIC AND FISCAL CHALLENGES 
1.1 The Government of Equatorial Guinea seeks to diversify the national economy beyond 
petroleum production and improve the living standard of the general population. Several steps have 
been taken to meet these goals. The National Development Plan (NDP) was adopted in 2007, followed by 
the launch of large investment programs in 2008 and 2009. To facilitate realization of the NDP, the 
authorities also signed a services agreement with the World Bank in 2007 to support capacity building for 
an analysis of public expenditure, implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI), and development of national accounts. This report presents the main conclusions of the public 
expenditure analysis. 
1.2 Lack of reliable data, however, constrains the analysis and impedes policy formulation to 
reach NDP targets in a timely fashion. Reliable information on budget execution is unavailable since 
weaknesses in the public financial management system preclude adequate data recording. As a result, 
budget information used throughout this review will refer to the approved budget although actual 
expenditure often differs. Similarly, sector indicators are rare or do not conform to international 
standards, which translates into large discrepancies depending on the sources being consulted. The lack of 
household surveys precludes poverty impact analysis of public expenditure and makes it difficult to assess 
whether progress toward achieving Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is on course. The 
government urgently needs to fill these gaps by implementing an action plan that builds up institutional 
capacity to gather, analyze, and disseminate key statistical information.  
1.3 Uncertain population data blur definition of clear public policies. According to the 2001 
Demographic Census, the national population was 1.015 million, with 47.3 percent under 15 years of age. 
However demographic projections by the United Nations
3
 put total population in 2000 at 530,000 people, 
with 44.2 percent under the age of 15. Although both sources concur the population structure is weighted 
toward youth, the overall estimates are radically different and have yet to be reconciled, which blinds 
policy making to the size of problems and how resources should be assigned to solve them. For instance, 
using official data drastically reduces GDP per capita, increases the numbers of youth and immigrants, 
and throws into doubt the country’s capacity to meet MDGs on child mortality and universal primary 
education (see Annex I for a detailed analysis of alternative population estimates).  
1.4 What is not in doubt is that the large cadre of youth makes job creation an urgent priority. 
Around sixty percent of the population is under 25 years old, and the structure of the economy does not 
create enough jobs to absorb new additions to the work force and raise productivity and incomes to 
reduce poverty. The oil sector generates most of the wealth but is capital rather than labor intensive, and 
employment in the remainder of the economy is concentrated in public administration (17 percent of the 
labor force), construction, and agriculture. The authorities are therefore concerned about how to channel 
investment and develop the non-oil economy to employ the influx of new workers. Before looking more 
deeply at how that might be done, it is useful to step back and see how Equatorial Guinea’s economy 
arrived where it is today. 
A. National Independence and Attempts at Recovery from a Postcolonial 
Poverty Trap, 1968–89 
1.5 The colonial economy was organized as an enclave around the production of cocoa, coffee, and 
timber that accounted for 90 percent of the value of exports in 1967 (around 40,000 tons). Agriculture, 
                                                          
3 World Population Prospects, http://esa.un.org/unpp/, June 8, 2009. 
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fishing and forestry generated 50 percent of GDP and employed 80 percent of the population. Little had 
been done to promote education, create a civil service, or develop civil society, so that when 
independence came in 1968, the country had low human capital, a weak public administration, and a 
shortage of trained labor. GDP per capita was US$230, and the new country ranked 67
th
 among the 121 
included in the national classification
4
 system current at the time, roughly comparable to other Sub-
Saharan countries such as Senegal. 
1.6 Soon after independence the overall economy collapsed when foreign plantation owners and 
workers departed and cocoa exports fell by half. To restore production, the government nationalized most 
plantations, introduced mandatory labor, and brought large numbers of people from the countryside to 
work on the state-owned estates. However, poor public sector management, inadequate and unmotivated 
labor, and low use of insecticides and fungicides led to further declines in acreage and yields. Exports fell 
to a record bottom of 5,200 tons in 1980.
5
 When the government started seizing harvests without 
payment, cash crops were almost completely abandoned and barter became the dominant form of 
exchange. Basic services in health, education, and water and electrical utilities could not be maintained; 
foreign investment literally dried up; and the external trading system, operated by state enterprises, broke 
down. As a consequence, the population declined by about one-third, the education system closed down, 
and public finances fell into complete disarray. The decade of the 1970s was marked by tragic decline, 
with GDP per capita contracting to about US$170 by 1979. 
1.7 Reconstruction efforts during the first half of the 1980s met little success. In 1980 a 
stabilization program supported by the IMF was launched to promote exports and food production and 
rebuild public administration, and the first formal budget was approved since 1974. However, private 
sector involvement was limited, given the shortage of local entrepreneurs and the weakness and 
inconvertibility of the currency. Most economic activities remained under government control, which was 
unable to provide adequate incentives to rehabilitate the cocoa sector, the main source of foreign 
exchange. To attract foreign assistance, the government presented a reconstruction program to the 
international donor community in 1982 to develop agriculture and infrastructure. To overcome 
institutional capacity constraints and minimize coordination problems in key development sectors (that is, 
petroleum and forestry), the President centralized government decision making within the office of the 
Presidency. Despite these efforts, the economic program achieved little and the private sector remained 
dormant, with GDP per capita totaling US$254 and the country placing 138
th
 out of 156 ranked countries 
in 1985. 
1.8 New efforts to rebuild the economy followed in the second half of the decade. In 1985, EQG 
became a member of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), adopted the 
Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (FCFA) as a currency, and with it a fixed exchange rate 
system to provide a more stable macroeconomic framework conducive to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and private sector development. This was accompanied by a medium-term adjustment program for 1988–
91, which quickly ran into difficulties because of limited administrative capacity and a decline in world 
market prices for cocoa and coffee. By 1990, as a broad consensus would later agree, it seemed that a 
decade of reform programs had come to naught, bringing minimal economic growth and failing to 
diversify the economy out of traditional agriculture exports or vitalize private sector participation. Per 




of 178 countries in the 
classification system. In the beginning of the new decade, two World Bank investment projects were 
undertaken to (a) put reform back on track by diversifying agriculture in favor of food crops and 
nontraditional exports and developing forestry production and exports; and (b) assist the authorities in the 
                                                          
4 See www.nationmaster.com . 
5 Timber production meanwhile declined from 360,000 cubic meters in 1968 to an annual average of 6,000 cubic meters in the 
late 1970s, and coffee and palm-oil production virtually disappeared. See World Bank, ―Technical Assistance Project—Republic 
of Equatorial Guinea,‖ May 1984. 
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nascent petroleum sector. A skeptic could think it was more of the same. But in 1991, a contract was 
signed to start tapping the country’s petroleum reserves, and the stage was set for change. 
1.9 Equatorial Guinea had been caught in a poverty trap that petroleum production would 
offer a way out of. The lack of infrastructure and human capital, a weak political system, limited 
institutional capacity and low domestic savings that could not be offset by sufficient FDI inflows when 
the colonial power left had formed a vicious circle. EQG was unable to create the minimum income level 
to raise savings and sustain much needed investment, which limited growth, further destabilized the 
political system, and deepened poverty. The arrival of petroleum revenues in the 1990s brought new 
income and domestic savings and the opportunity to transform the economy. 
B. The Rise of an Oil Economy, 1990–2008 
1.10 Equatorial Guinea’s economy in the 1990s was dominated by important oil fields coming on 
stream that boosted national income. Production began in 1992, and by early 1997 the value of 
extracted oil was matching the value being produced by the rest of the economy (Figure 1.1). Oil field 
development was very rapid, and by 1999 GDP value from oil was three times larger than from non-oil 
activities, transforming the structure of the economy from one dominated by agriculture (coffee and 
cocoa) and intensive forestry exploitation. The hydrocarbon boom that took off with opening of the large 
Zafiro Field in August 1996 reached a milestone of pumping 400,000 barrels a day in 2005, making EQG 
the fourth largest petroleum producer in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan (Figure 
1.2). Rising world prices greatly increased the value of extracted oil and gas. Real GDP growth that 
averaged 15 percent a year associated to intensive forest exploitation between 1990 and 1995, accelerated 
to 33 percent a year between 1996–2000 due to increasing hydrocarbon production and prices and 
substantial foreign direct investments in the petroleum sector. This growth in the petroleum sector also 
fueled non-oil GDP growth which accelerated from 7 percent on average in 1990–95 to 18 percent on 
average in 1996–2000, mostly through the public administration (Table 1.1). GDP soared after 2000 when 
petroleum prices spiked (Figure 1.11). 
Figure 1. 1: GDP Values for the Oil and Non-Oil Economies 
 












































































Table 1. 1 GDP by Sector, 1990–99 (Percentage of non-oil GDP) 
 
1.11 Private foreign direct investment to the petroleum sector lifted national income that in turn 
has fueled higher capital spending by the government. In the early 1990s, the government was able to 
secure external financing to carry out its investment program, but this effort could not be sustained, and 
investment did not pick up until 1994 when FDI to the petroleum sector lifted gross fixed capital 
formation even above GDP values (Figure 1.3). However, domestic non-oil private sector investment did 
not develop to keep pace, averaging a scant 4.3 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2008. With the 
retrenchment of petroleum sector FDI after 2001 and the limited role of the private sector, the government 
has taken the lead in filling the gap, transforming its high savings from petroleum revenues (on average 
28 percent of GDP between 2001 and 2008) into public investments (12 percent of GDP for the same 
period and rising). 
Figure 1. 3: Public and Private Investment in Equatorial Guinea, 1990–2009 
Source:Energy Information Administration, USA Government
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Agriculture 41.4 41 40 39.2 34.1 39.8 35.5 26.9 35.6 29.1 
Forestry 17.6 15.3 14.8 15.5 28.8 30 35.6 47.9 29.1 38.5 
Fishing 2.9 2.5 1.1 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.9 0.5 
Manufacturing 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.5 1.2 1 0.8 1 0.8 
Utilities 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.7 3.9 3.2 2.7 1.8 3 2.7 
Construction 4.7 6.3 6.5 6.6 5.8 4.9 4.3 3.7 4.8 4.2 
Trade and commerce 10.5 12 12.8 12.7 10.7 8.3 7.6 6.4 8 6.6 
Transport and communications 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.3 1.7 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.2 
Finance and housing 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.3 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.2 
Public administration 7.8 7 8.7 8.6 6.5 5.9 7.6 7.8 11.3 12.2 
Other services 3.8 4.3 4.3 4.2 3.5 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.3 2.9 
Total NON-OIL GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Memorandum items   
NON-OIL  35 36 36 37 47 61 74 95 81 103 
OIL Derivatives  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 OIL  0 0 4 7 13 16 60 197 168 337 
Total GDP  (FCFA billion) 35 36 41 44 61 77 134 292 248 440 




1.12 EQG’s current account has been in surplus since petroleum production started due to high 
exports from and foreign direct investment to the sector. Rising oil production and prices pushed 
petroleum exports to more than US$14 billion by 2008, representing more than 99 percent of total export 
value (Figure 1.4). Imports have also been rising, at first for capital goods to the petroleum sector and 
more recently for public investment, reaching a total of around US$4 billion in 2008. Despite high service 
payments on insurance and freight for petroleum exports (US$1.8 billion in 2008) and sizeable income 
payments on petroleum investments (US$6.5 billion in 2008) since 2005, current accounts have remained 
in surplus. The current account balance also has benefited from a high FDI to the petroleum sector, 
particularly after 2001 (reaching US$1.8 billion in 2007).
6
 The joint increase in exports and FDI led to an 
accumulation of US$7 billion in foreign exchange reserves by the end of 2008, equivalent to more than 21 
months of imports.  
1.13 Changes in the structure of the economy accelerated in 2000, with agriculture and forestry 
exploitation shrinking and the construction sector rising in importance. During the second half of the 
1990s public administration expanded significantly in the wake of increasing petroleum revenues. At the 
same time, two long-term economic trends already under way gathered speed: (a) agricultural production 
declined from 40 percent of non-oil GDP in 1990 to 13 percent of non-oil GDP in 2007; and (b) the 
forestry sector, which had experienced a temporary boomlet (increasing from 18 percent of non-oil GDP 
in 1990 to 39 percent in 1999) following unsustainable logging concessions awarded to foreign 
companies, contracted quickly to 6 percent of non-oil GDP by 2007. New sectors started to grow 
substantially, such as construction that boomed from 4.2 percent of non-oil GDP in 1999 (Table 1.1) to 
nearly 57 percent in 2007 (Table 1.2), reflecting the government’s intense effort to develop basic 
infrastructure. Other sectors (such as manufacturing, utilities, transport and finance) have not been 
affected by petroleum production and continue to represent small shares of non-oil GDP (Table 1.2). 
  
                                                          























































































Table 1. 2: GDP by Sector, 2000–2007 (Percentage of non-oil GDP) 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Agriculture 31.9 28.5 23.8 26 19.4 18.8 14.5 12.6 
Forestry 24.1 17.3 14.5 7.6 8.7 4.8 5.7 6.1 
Fishing 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Manufacturing 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1 1 
Utilities 2.6 3 3 3.1 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.7 
Construction 15.2 21.7 26.3 27.7 39.9 43.4 53.4 56.5 
Trade and commerce 8.7 9.7 10 11 10 9.7 7.6 6.6 
Transport and communications 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.4 1.3 1 0.9 
Finance and housing 1.6 1.9 1.8 2 2.2 3.2 2.5 2.5 
Public administration 9 10 12.6 12.8 9 9.2 7 6.9 
Other services 3.7 4.4 4.2 5.6 4.2 4.1 3.2 2.9 
Total NON-OIL GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Memorandum items   
NON-OIL  153 194 239 269 388 463 668 837 
OIL Derivatives  13 75 92 110 152 259 355 694 
 OIL  700 982 1,142 1,306 2,197 3,582 3,959 4,448 
Total GDP  (FCFA billion) 866 1,251 1,473 1,685 2,738 4,304 4,982 5,979 





1.14 New activities related to the petroleum sector—such as manufacturing oil derivatives—have 
expanded significantly, but likely impermanent. Oil derivatives are a primary spillover of hydrocarbon 
production, and although it technically is accounted for as part of the non-oil economy, the government 
will face long odds maintaining the industry’s viability once the country’s petroleum supply runs out. 
Therefore, this PER treats oil derivatives as part of the hydrocarbon sector. 
1.15 Rapid economic changes such as declining agricultural output and rural-to-urban 
migration may significantly impact poverty. Construction and agriculture (Figure 1.5) provide direct 
livelihood to a large number of people, and are key to understanding the impact that growth may have on 
incomes and job opportunities among the less-favored segments of the population. The sharp drop in 
agricultural production relative to non-oil GDP is partially explained by strong growth in other sectors, 
such as construction, but the relative fall of traditional exports (Figure 1.6) suggests the low level of 
agricultural productivity, which has stagnated for many years.
7
 Although 60 percent of people still eke out 
a living from agriculture, the disparate economic growth rates between towns (with most of the 
construction) and countryside (where agriculture is concentrated) is driving the widespread migration 
under way of people to cities. The authorities will need to confront how these changes impact poverty in 
rural and urban areas, respectively. Low productivity will forestall sustained improvement in rural 
poverty rates unless significant investment and adequate agricultural programs are implemented. 
Meanwhile, the urban population, which is much younger (28.6 years old in Malabo, for instance) than 
the overall population (32.6 years old)
8
 and growing at a faster pace, has large numbers of poor, 
unemployed, and potentially disaffected youth. Urban employment opportunities and better social 
services are urgently needed. Not adequately responding to the pressures/needs for rural development and 
for urban employment and social services may breed social tensions. Thus far, manufacturing, transport, 
utilities, trade and other sectors have not created enough jobs to compensate for the decline in agriculture, 
and significant reforms must be made to bridge the gap.  
1.16 Prudent monetary policy by the Banks of Central African States (BEAC) has helped 
contain inflationary pressure despite the oil boom, although questions about the data make it hard 
to weigh. Figures show the inflation rate declined from 5.1 percent in 2004 to 3.7 percent in 2007. 
However, inflation data have not been collected since 2007, making it difficult to know the actual trend 
line and how it compares with other CEMAC countries. IMF estimates point out that strong domestic 
demand in 2007 and 2008, coupled with rising international food and oil prices, exacerbated inflationary 
                                                          
7 NEPAD, FAO. 2005. Gobierno de la República de Guinea Ecuatorial. Apoyo a la implementación del NEPAD–CAADP 
CP/EQG/2904 (i). Perfil de Proyecto de Inversión Bancable. Programa de Implementación del ―Plan Nacional de Inversión a 
Medio Plazo en Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural‖ 2005. ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/ae612s/ae612s00.pdf 

































































































pressure and were only partially counteracted by tighter monetary conditions, raising the inflation rate to 
6.0 percent in 2008.  
Figure 1. 5: Construction and Agricultural Shares of Non-Oil GDP, 1990–2006 
 
     Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 1. 6: Performance of Non-Oil Exports, 1990–2008 
 
1.17 Public expenditure has not fully translated into non-oil GDP growth, hindering efforts to 
diversify the economy. Hydrocarbon exports between 2000 and 2008 totaled US$52 billion, with oil 
companies receiving US$27 billion and the government US$25 billion. About 30 percent (US$7.6 billion) 
of government intake was kept as gross official reserves, including offshore bank deposits; while the 
remainder of the oil rent for this period has already been consumed or invested. Meanwhile the GDP 
output generated by the nonhydrocarbon sector during 2000–2008 was only US$8.2 billion, half of the 
public expenditure.  
1.18 Oil sector rents seem to finance capital intensive goods in the non-oil sector that may not 
generate the employment EQG requires. Investment grew at an average rate of 36 percent per year 
between 2000 and 2008, and its public component at an even faster rate, 46 percent. Consequently the 
ratio of public to private investment increased from 0.8 in 2000 to 6 in 2008, crowding out private 
investment. This increase in public investment has a large import component,
9
 with imports into the 
                                                          
9 Empirical analysis of oil windfall use in Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela from the 
1960s to early 1980s is provided by A. Gelb, ―Adjustment to Windfall Gains: A Comparative Analysis of Oil-Exporting 
Countries,‖ in P. J. Neary and S. van Wijnbergen (eds.), Natural Resources and the Macroeconomy  (Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 1986): Chapter 2. The main conclusions might apply to Equatorial Guinea. About modernization, the author says: ―[T]he 
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nonhydrocarbon sector increasing by a factor of 24 between 2000 and 2008, notably imported equipment, 
which increased by a factor of 55. The magnitude of this increase in the value of imported capital goods 
suggests that the chosen pattern of growth for the nonhydrocarbon sector is capital intensive and may 
generate little employment. Employment generation, though, is a basic requirement growth that reduces 
poverty in Equatorial Guinea, given the age structure of the population and rapid urbanization. 
1.19 The most striking example of wasteful oil rent use is the huge expansion of public and 
private consumption during recent years. The average rate of growth for consumption in real terms has 
been 20 percent annually since 2000, rising from FCFA 89 billion in 2000 to FCFA 536 billion in 2008. 
Most of the increase was financed from the oil rent, which will not leave any trace unless it stimulates the 
accumulation of physical and human capital in the nonhydrocarbon sector to compensate for the depletion 
of petroleum reserves. Poverty reduction depends upon rising consumption, but its distribution should be 
across the population, while indications are that the recent increase in consumption has not been widely 
shared and that poverty reduction is not yet significant.  
1.20 Equatorial Guinea now faces the challenge of transforming the enormous resources derived 
from the petroleum sector into a permanent improvement in the living conditions of most of its 
people. Although GNI per capita rose from US$410 in 1995 to US$14,980 in 2008 (Figure 1.7), 77 
percent of people still live on less than FCFA 1,020 (US$2) a day, and the 2007/08 UNDP Human 
Development Index placed the country 127
th
 out of 177 ranked countries. Social needs are daunting across 
all sectors: housing and access to water and sanitation is limited (43 percent of the population lack potable 
water), education and health indicators are still below other Sub-Saharan countries (thus, the primary 
completion rate stands at 58 percent, and infant mortality is about 124 per 1,000 live births). Although 
measuring for Millennium Development Goals is hampered by a weak statistical system, growing 
evidence suggests targets will not be achieved without rapid action by the authorities (see Box 1.1). 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
domestic investments through applying market criteria more rigorously [p. 90].‖ About reducing dependence from oil as the 
source of foreign exchange, Gelb adds, ―Events in 1982–84 confirm that the goal of self-sustaining non-oil development is far 
from being attained [p. 90].‖ The recent bubble and collapse of world oil prices are an extreme form of the 1982–84 episode. The 
issue of how to allocate oil rent to the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, consumption, and investment is still debated. 


















Box 1. 1: National Progress toward the Millennium Development Goals 
Equatorial Guinea is a middle-income country that does not need to prepare a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper to 
access concessional resources. Nonetheless, the authorities adopted in 2007 a National Development Plan that seeks 
to reduce poverty in line with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in 2000. Unlike many other 
Sub-Saharan African countries, EQG can tap its oil boom for adequate financial resources to rapidly move toward 
alleviating poverty and achieving the MDGs. However, uncertain statistics remain a cause of concern since 
appropriate and reliable social indicators and sector data are lacking to monitor progress toward those ends. The 
government has carried out some social sector surveys and a household survey in 2007, but the results are seldom 
made public. When they are, the social sector indicators do not conform to internationally recognized 
methodologies, and domestic and international sources often diverge.  
Tentative estimates suggest that the country has made some strides in poverty reduction, but that if no rapid 
measures are taken, achieving the MDGs on time will be difficult. The proportion of the population below the 
poverty line has fallen from 64 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 2000, and is projected by the United Nations 
Development Programme to fall further to 32 percent in 2015.  
Net primary enrollment has decreased from 91 percent in 2000 to 87 percent in 2007, reflecting high repetition.  The 
infant mortality rate reached 124 per 1,000 live births in 2007, and measles immunization has kept stable between 
2000 and 2007 at 51 percent of the population under one-year-old. According to the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS, incidence of the infection in the population between 15 and 49 years old has decreased to 
an estimated 3.4 percent in 2007. However data for the estimates is not solid, and other sources report a much 
higher HIV/AIDS rate. Tuberculosis cases have decreased to 74 percent of people under the directly 
observed treatment strategy (DTOS) in 2007 compared with 83 percent in 2000.  
Limited information is available on gender and poverty. Enrollment of girls in primary education is high but 
decreases in higher education due to early marriages and precocious pregnancies, social pressure, and lack of 
opportunities in rural areas. Maternal mortality is high, with 680 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2007. 
Social infrastructure has not kept pace with population growth, and the proportion of people with access to a 
sustainable source of water and to improved sanitation has remained constant since 1990 at 43 percent and 51 
percent, respectively. Productive infrastructure such as telecommunication services has improved in the last decade 
as a byproduct of the oil boom. Mobile phone subscribers increased to 43.3 per cent of the population in 2007 
compared with 1.2 per cent in 2000; and Internet users increased to 1.6 per cent of the population in 2007 compared 
with 0.2 percent in 2000. Status of the MDGs is presented in Annex V.  
C. Meeting the Macroeconomic Challenges in Equatorial Guinea 
1.21 Government authorities face two different policy objectives when managing the oil and non-
oil economies. On the one hand, the oil economy is characterized by high monopoly rents, limited 
domestic employment, and projected exhaustion of reserves by 2035. Accordingly, policies for the sector 
are geared toward retaining as a high a fraction of the revenues being generated as possible, using three 
tools: (a) a system of exploration permits and royalties/fees to increase proven oil reserves, (b) a rate of 
extraction that makes the present value of proven reserves as large as possible, and (c) production sharing 
arrangements with oil companies to distribute benefits from the hydrocarbon sector. The non-oil economy 
on the other hand employs most of the population and will remain after petroleum runs out. Policy for the 
non-oil sector is geared toward achievement of the MDGs and the programs for growth diversification, 
rural development, and poverty reduction stated in the NDP. The public budget is the main policy 
instrument to translate oil revenues into the non-oil economy to foster the objectives stated in the MDGs 




D. Avoiding Pitfalls in Petroleum Revenue Management  
1.22 Sufficient institutional capacity is needed to supervise rising public expenditure to reduce 
waste of resources. Government expenditure tripled between 2005 and 2008, which in the context of 
very limited institutional capacity to manage the petroleum wealth, may easily lead to overinvestment and 
resource waste. Such explosive growth in public expenditure is difficult to plan and manage following a 
sound spending program that appropriately balances current and investment expenditure for a positive and 
sustainable impact on poverty and infrastructure. Thus stronger expenditure management is needed to 
keep an adequate level of investment, while enhancing public efficiency and effectiveness (see Chapter 3). 
1.23 Prudent management of petroleum income is critical since the oil sector contributes around 
90 percent of GDP and its revenue stream is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, and 
exhaustibility. Hydrocarbon price volatility has been the norm in recent years, with drastic swings that 
make it difficult for the government to prepare a realistic macroeconomic framework. Uncertainty about 
potential oil production and prices also make it hard to adequately plan for implementation of the NDP 
and the MDGs. Oil production data, in particular are disturbing. The Ministry of Mining indicates that oil 
reserves, will be completely depleted in 2035, leaving future generations with only the assets and savings 
accrued during the petroleum era as well as the income generated by the non-oil economic sectors. A 
similar dilemma has confronted other countries, and has become known as the ―Paradox of Plenty.‖ This 
paradox has four components: (a) the so-called Dutch disease, in which appreciation of the real exchange 
rate reduces the competitiveness of non-oil exports; (b) oil income volatility that affects revenue 
predictability and aggregate expenditure, creating real exchange rate volatility; (c) weak governance, 
reflecting rent-seeking politics; and (d) lack of institutional capacity to manage the petroleum wealth that 
often leads to overinvestment and resource waste.  
1.24 Early effects of the Dutch disease are noticeable in Equatorial Guinea.10 Income from 
petroleum exports has spurred imports since the limited domestic supply of nontradable goods cannot 
meet the demand. As a consequence, a real exchange rate appreciation occurs that cannot be compensated 
for by adjustments in the nominal exchange rate since the country is part of CEMAC, a dilemma that is 
evident in EQG’s inflation differentials with the other CEMAC countries. Such imports will become 
unsustainable in the medium term as petroleum exports decline and the current account deficit grows. 
However, in the meantime, the import surge negatively affects the domestic tradable sectors. This is 
noticeable in the flood of food imports, which in 2007 accounted for half of domestic food consumption, 
harming local agricultural production and rural income. It is therefore essential to develop industries to 
foster domestic supply, including food and export-oriented agriculture, as well as other export activities 
that sustain growth once exploitation of natural resources runs out. 
1.25 Ineffective implementation of policies to reduce the impact of oil revenue volatility on the 
economy exacerbates the business cycle. Because the public sector is the main economic agent in EQG, 
large cuts in public expenditure following declines in petroleum prices intensify downturns in the 
business cycle. The authorities have nominally committed to several policies to ensure that price volatility 
does not affect public expenditure disproportionally. First, they endeavor to use prudent projections of 
hydrocarbon prices when preparing the public budget. Second, they follow a permanent income 
hypothesis to save most of the extraordinary revenues to build up a trust fund for the future. Third, they 
are committed to finance current expenditure with non-oil taxes, which ensures a flexible budget that can 
be adjusted to the needs of the business cycle without cutting essential services. However actual 
                                                          
10 In many countries, growth in natural resource exports leads to a loss of competitiveness in other export products. Expanded 
natural resource exports increase income and domestic demand that domestic suppliers of nontradable goods lack the capacity to 
satisfy in the short run. As a result the prices of nontradables rise relative to tradables, and resources (capital and labor) shift from 
tradable toward nontradable sectors that are protected from foreign competition. 
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implementation of these policies is very limited, and when a huge swing in petroleum prices took place in 
2009, the authorities needed to approve a revised public budget that slashed public investment (from 
FCFA 2 trillion to FCFA 0.9 trillion), further exacerbating the business cycle and reducing 2009 non-oil 
GDP growth projections. It is therefore essential that the authorities commit to and implement the 
prudent, anticyclical policies mentioned above to smooth petroleum expenditure over the business cycle. 
E. Investing in Future Generations: The Permanent Income Hypothesis Model 
1.26 The authorities nominally have established a ―golden rule‖ that limits recurrent 
expenditures to non-oil revenues while financing capital expenditures with oil income. Under this 
rule current expenditures, which benefit the present generation, must be financed over the business cycle 
by today’s taxpayers, while investments that benefit present and future generations may be financed by 
debt, or in the case of EQG, by using petroleum proceeds. This simple imperative ensures that petroleum 
reserves are transformed into physical investment but does not provide an adequate macroeconomic 
framework for petroleum producers such as EQG, as it may lead to over- or pro-cyclical investment, not 
taking adequately into account the long-term exhaustibility of the petroleum proceeds. Thus far, the rule 
has not taken effect, and since 2008, current expenditure has been twice as high as non-oil domestic 
revenue (Figure 1.8).  
Figure 1. 8: Non-Oil Revenue and Current Public Expenditure, 2000–2009 
 
1.27 The authorities are attempting to use a Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) model to 
devise a stable medium-term macroeconomic framework. The central idea of the PIH is to ensure that 
a fairly constant standard of living is maintained despite petroleum price volatility and after reserves run 
out. The government only spends a portion of the petroleum revenues generated during the oil booms, and 
saves the extra revenues as financial assets to generate returns that can be used to maintain a sustainable 
stream of public spending in the future when petroleum revenues diminishes or run out. Such a prudent 
fiscal policy will help isolate the level of government spending from price volatility and share income 
across generations.
11
 Three scenarios are considered to analyze the impact of alternative petroleum prices 
on public expenditure between 2009 and 2020 (see the assumptions in Table 1.3). With oil priced at 
                                                          


























US$67.8 a barrel (best-case scenario), the PIH recommends a 12 percent increase in annual public 
expenditure (FCFA 128 billion more per year on average or 1.5 percent of GDP). With oil priced at 
US$40.69 per barrel (worst-case scenario), public expenditure should decline 13 percent to maintain a 
permanent income (equivalent to a yearly reduction of FCFA 132 billion or 1.5 percent of GDP). The 
results also confirm that public spending and GDP are highly correlated since both petroleum revenues 
and GDP increase at a similar rate. See Annex IV for a more detailed presentation of the assumptions and 
results of the PIH modeling for Equatorial Guinea.  
1.28 Commitment to the PIH model now needs to be translated into action. The non-oil deficit 
since 2007 more than doubles the target recommended by the PIH model (Figure 1.9). Previous 
discrepancies have been attributed to the dire economic needs for social services and infrastructure that 
call for immediate public expenditure; but excesses that become routine weaken the process of setting 
priorities and controlling expenditure to conserve petroleum proceeds for later use. Projections show that 
continued public expenditure at the current pace will lead to fiscal deficits starting in 2014, with 
petroleum savings completely used up by 2029. However, enforcement of a PIH-consistent spending level 
will postpone foreseeable fiscal deficit until 2032. 
Figure 1. 9: PIH Non-Oil Deficit Recommendations and Actual Deficits, 2007–09 
 
Table 1. 3: Assumed Variables for Three Permanent Income Hypothesis Scenarios, 2009–50 
  Worst-case scenario Baseline scenario Best-case scenario 
Oil prices  –25% or US$41 US$54.25 +25% or US$68 
Discount rate 1.5% (years 2009–
12), and 2% (years 
2013–50)  
1.5% (years 2009–
12), and 2% (years 
2013–50) 
1.5% (years 2009–12), 
and 2% (years 2013–50) 
Real return
a
 1.5% (years 2009–
12), and 2% (years 
2013–50) 
1.5% (years 2009–
12), and 2% (years 
2013–50) 
1.5% (years 2009–12), 
and 2% (years 2013–50) 
Source: World Bank 
                a Real return rate on the stock of oil reserve savings can rise or fall by 1 percentage point in an additional sensitivity 
test based on the same basic assumptions used for the baseline scenario. 
































1.29 The fiscal envelope requires tightening to ensure sustainability under alternative scenarios 
of the PIH model. A permanent income-consistent spending level would sustain a positive overall 
balance that would not be expected to yield a deficit until 2032 at the earliest for all three scenarios under 
consideration. In addition, if nothing is done, the 2035 budget deficit, according to government budget 
projections, would reach the level of approximately 11 percent of GDP, while the projected deficit in all 
three scenarios would be modest at about 1–2 percent of GDP until 2050. Although high expenditures are 
necessary to develop non-oil economic sectors, careful targeting and management is needed to avoid 
undue waste and inefficiency, particularly when the country’s absorptive capacity is weak. 
1.30 In 2009, the authorities set an adjustment path in line with recommendations of the PIH 
model, but additional decisive steps must be taken for fiscal sustainability to take hold. The PIH 
model recommends FCFA 0.6 trillion in public expenditure for 2009, FCFA 1 trillion in 2013, and FCFA 
1.3 trillion in 2020. This path sharply contrasts with recent experience and with the budget originally 
proposed for 2009 that envisioned public expenditure beyond FCFA 2 trillion. However, in response to 
the plunge in hydrocarbon prices that occurred in 2009 the government revised its budget to substantially 
curtail expenditures (Figure 1.10). Although still far from PIH recommendations, particularly for 2010 
(Figure 1. 10:), this is a positive step that needs to be accompanied by substantially higher public 
investment efficiency to avoid abrupt distruption in future provision of productive and social services 
needed to diversify the economy. 
1.31 The government needs to develop an appropriate strategy for improving financial returns 
on EQG’s sovereign financial assets. The rate of return to investing petroleum savings is a critical 
determinant of the permanent income approach. For instance, an increase in the rate of return of just 1 
percentage point compared to the return considered in the base-case scenario of the PIH model would 
allow the government to increase public expenditure by 3.4 percentage points of GDP (or FCFA 178 
billion more per year). However, currently the country has no strategy for investing its financial assets, 
undermining its ability to maximize the potential return on its wealth. This source of added income is a 
low-hanging fruit ready to be picked and could be achieved by creating a sovereign fund. Establishing 
such a sovereign fund will require developing an adequate institutional setting for supervision of fund 
management and obtaining a broad political consensus on the most favorable risk/return ratio to pursue. 
The best practice is to outsource management of oil savings to the private sector on a competitive basis, 
and other well-established sovereign funds such as the Norwegian Government Pension Fund – Global
12
 
may provide useful guidance on the institutional setting required. 
1.32 Given the extreme contrast between PIH projections and the recent pattern of capital 
expenditures, building an efficient public finance management system should rely on a two-pronged 
strategy: enhancing presently limited institutional capacity to formulate and monitor expenditure 
programs and increasing both petroleum savings and its productivity. Public finance management in 
EQG is very weak and must be strengthened if macroeconomic management of petroleum revenues is to 
be improved. Strong political will is also needed to stick to the expenditure recommendations from the 
PIH. To get the best returns on its wealth, greater transparency in petroleum revenue management is 
needed, along with a strategy for management of the sovereign fund described above that searches for 
high returns, broad consensus, and prudent management.  
1.33 While the PIH is helpful in sketching the path toward fiscal sustainability there are several 
caveats to the proposed criterion that may weaken its use to guide macro policy. First, while it is 
fairly straightforward to estimate the net present value of the stream of oil receipts, uncertainty about the 
future path of oil revenues affects the reliability of such projections. Second, strong institutions are 
                                                          




required to enforce the fiscal discipline called for in the PIH model. Third, while the PIH specifies 
spending limits, with some margin of error, it says nothing about the quality of spending and provides no 
benchmark for setting expenditure priorities. Finally, it does not ensure stable public expenditure levels 
since it allows large swells and declines in annual public investments in tandem with expanding or 
contracting annual inflows of oil revenue. Despite these caveats, the criterion can help the government 
face the reality of past unsustainable expenditures and the fiscal pressure from the recent drop in oil 
prices. While the model is particularly helpful in providing guidance for general public spending over the 
medium term, it clearly cannot operate autonomously from the overall Public Finance Management 
(PFM) system, nor does it ensure that spending within the PIH limit is free of waste and countercyclical.  
 
Figure 1. 10: PIH Recommendations under Different Scenarios and in the 2009 Budget 
 
Figure 1. 11: Overall Balance as Percentage of GDP, 2009–50 
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F. Improving Institutional Governance to Lift Public Sector Constraints to 
Growth 
1.34 The increased government take from oil production13 will not be sustainable without a 
stable and predictable legal framework for petroleum activities that brings in qualified petroleum 
companies to develop new fields and raise the amount of proven reserves. While difficult to 
evaluate,
14
 the share of government revenue from the petroleum sector relative to the value of extracted 
oil and gas has increased from about 20 percent before 2000 to about 50 percent in 2007 (Figure 1.12). 
EQG has already exhausted half of its proven oil reserves, and the value of extracted hydrocarbons is on a 
declining trend (Figure 1.13). Therefore, hydrocarbon policy will become more important as efforts are 
made to raise proven reserves and new oil contracts are entered into. The government adopted in 2006 a 
new Hydrocarbon Law
15
 and a new production-sharing model contract, which increase state participation 
in new petroleum projects to a minimum of 35 percent, via participation by the national oil company 
(GEPetrol) and the national gas company (Sonagas). They also raise local content in the sector through 
promotion of employment and technical capacity for Equatorial Guineans. Taxation of petroleum 
exploration and production activities was also amended in 2004,
16
 and implementation of the provisions is 
being discussed with petroleum companies holding contracts predating the legislation. While the new 
legal regime has increased the government intake, it has yet to prove adequate in attracting international 
companies with the financial and technical capacity to find and exploit new petroleum reserves.  
Figure 1. 12: Government Oil Revenues, 1992–2007 (Percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 1. 13: Value of Oil Output and Reserves, 1995–2035 (FCFA billion) 
 
Source: World Bank 
                                                          
13 The government’s take represents its share of economic profits, including all income sources (such as sales, bonuses, royalties, 
taxes, and government participation, among others).  
14 Petroleum contracts are not public.  
15 Decree Law No. 8/2006 of November 3, 2006. 





92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 
      












95 00 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 
Value of Oil Extracted, left scale 
Proven Oil Reserves, right scale 





1.35 Petroleum revenues need to be shielded from rent-seeking behavior and used to promote 
private sector development instead. The state’s monopolistic position as the owner of petroleum 
reserves and the high proportion of revenues they generate compared to the non-oil economy attract elites 
to rent seeking, that is, to lobbying the government for access to the income stream. This is further 
exacerbated by the limited need of government at present for private sector financing of the public budget 
since most of its revenues are collected through petroleum taxes and royalties. Although this rent-seeking 
model is transitory (given the finite nature of an extractive industry), it thwarts development of a 
sustainable private sector and distorts the political incentives, which focus more on getting access to 
petroleum income than on long-term wealth creation and the well-being of the general population. A key 
to curtailing rent-seeking behavior is greater transparency in public resource management. To that end, 
EQG joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2008 to make petroleum sector 
operations more open, although results have yet to be achieved (Box 1.2). Moreover, this initiative alone 
will not be enough; other factors must be addressed (see Table 1.4). The institutional system must be 
strengthened to ensure separation of functions between Gepetrol (operator on the petroleum market) and 
the Ministry of Mining (regulator) to avoid conflict of interest. Counterbalance institutions must be 
strengthened to limit the capacity of the government to generate rents. It is also very important to carry 
out reforms in public finance management to ensure that Geproyectos, the main contracting authority in 
infrastructure projects, does not accumulate undue discretionary power. Financial administration should 
be streamlined and better documented, and civil servants and public companies should be held 
accountable with regular external audits. Equatorial Guinea is still far from these standards and must 
move quickly to ensure that potential benefits from EITI are not undermined by an underperforming 
institutional setting.  
Box 1. 2: Petroleum Transparency Initiatives in Equatorial Guinea 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, 
investors and international organizations, including the World Bank, that supports improved governance in resource-rich 
countries through the verification and full publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and 
mining.  
 
The EITI was launched in 2003 and Equatorial Guinea asked to join in 2004. A National Commission comprised of 
representatives of government, petroleum companies, and civil society was formed in May 2005 to take charge of 
implementing the EITI. Upon creation of the National Commission, the appointment of the national coordinator and her 
deputy, and the adoption of a working plan, EQG was admitted as a ―Candidate Country‖ by the EITI Board in February 
2008. The National Commission adopted a Memorandum of Understanding in February 2009 that establishes its 
commitment to a decision-making process based on consensus of the parties that form its membership. The commission 
has hired an audit company to aggregate information provided by the government and the petroleum companies on 
hydrocarbon payments. The report is being prepared and is expected to be available before the end of 2009, with the final 
EITI validation process programmed to start in January 2010.  
 
Despite these steps, EITI implementation has been hampered by limited institutional capacity, notably by a civil society 
that is not well organized and lacks technical capacity to fully participate in the National Committee. To help overcome 
these constraints, donor and private sector assistance has been provided such as the Civil Society Support Project financed 
by the European Development Fund, training from the Revenue Watch Institute, technical seminars by the oil companies, 
and technical assistance from the World Bank financed by a Multi-Donor Trust Fund and the Government of Equatorial 
Guinea. The World Bank has also encouraged the government to conduct training workshops for civil society groups and 
other government agencies. Thanks to these all efforts, civil society is stepping up to play an increasingly important role in 
the tripartite dialogue, although its capacity still needs strengthening.  
 
Notwithstanding this progress and the political will of the authorities, implementation has still lagged, primarily due to 
coordination snags within the government, as well as the gradual evolution of civil society participation described above. 
As the March 2010 deadline for validation as a ―Compliant Country‖ looms, the National Committee, and particularly its 
government members, will need to take significant and resolute steps to ensure that the audit report is completed, the 






Table 1. 4: Conditions Favoring Rent-Seeking Behavior 
Condition Favoring Rent 
Seeking and Corruption 
Explanation 
Excessive concentration of 
discretionary authority in the hands 
of individual civil servants 
This is especially likely where procurement activities are carried out 
without acceptable contracting frameworks in place. 
Complex financial administration 
with multiple layers of 
bureaucracy 
When many people share responsibility for revenue or expenditure 
controls, no one feels responsible. Multiple decision points slow 
approvals and create an environment for rent-seeking behavior to 
accelerate a slowly moving approval process. 
Weaknesses in organizational and 
administrative systems 
Weak budgeting systems can result in allocations that steer resources 
away from priority areas and prevent effective spending of funds. 
Extrabudgetary entities and national oil companies operating outside 
the budget that are overseen by weak, low-capacity government 
entities offer the opportunity for detection-free diversion of revenues 
away from the state. 
Excessive organizational 
concentration or centralization of 
authority 
Separation of functions should be mandatory between those involved 
in operating an oil-producing company and those involved in 
administration or regulation of the country’s natural resource base. If 
necessary, specific new entities should be established to manage the 
state’s oil and gas resources. 
Lack of transparency in PFM and 
inadequate reporting 
Public accountability of government generally, and for oil revenues 
in particular, demands the highest standard of transparency and 
reporting on the sources and disposition of oil revenues by the 
government and the national oil company. The latter should be held 
to the highest standards of transparency and regular reporting to the 
government and the public on all aspects of its oil and gas production 
activities. 
Inadequate external audit 
mechanisms 
Weak auditor courts are unable to properly perform their audits to 
detect noncompliance, fraud, and corruption. This is particularly 
damaging if there is no an effective internal control. National oil 
companies that are not subject to annual external audits by 
internationally certified auditing firms are more able to conceal 
revenue diversions, side-payments, export volume/quality mis-
measurements, and other fraudulent activities. 
        Sources: INTOSAI workshop on Supreme Audit Institutions and corruption (undated); MacDonald (2006).17 
1.36 The poor business environment needs to be radically reformed to facilitate development of 
the non-oil economy to create jobs and a floor for long-term wealth creation. Equatorial Guinea has 
adopted the common business legislation promulgated by the Organization for the Harmonization of 
Business Law in Africa (OHADA) but lacks the capacity to implement it. The business environment has 
been assessed as very unfavorable.
18
 EQG’s Doing Business ranking even suggests the situation is 
deteriorating rather than improving, falling from 161 in 2006 to 167 in 2008 (Figure 1.14), well below the 
performance of countries with similar income per capita. EQG’s business environment suffers from the 
small size of its economy, which tends to hamper the formation and application of equitable business 
regulation, as well as the poor business environment of the CEMAC region as a whole. The number of 
procedures and duration to start a business in EQG are double the regional average, and starting a 
business takes more than three times the world average of 43 days. Lack of transparency and uneven 
                                                          
17 MacDonald, A. 2006. ―Fiscal Policy and Revenue Transparency: Public Financial Management Strategy for African Oil and 
Gas Producers.‖ Mimeographed document, World Bank, Washington, D.C.  
18 According to the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Foundation) the overall freedom to start, operate, and close a 
business is considerably restricted by Equatorial Guinea's national regulatory environment. 
19 
 
application of commercial regulations are still major problems, and modern bankruptcy procedures have 
not been developed. Although the Investment Law
19
 offers fiscal incentives, they may be of limited value 
given other aspects of the business environment, and need consideration within the overall tax policy.  
Figure 1. 14: 2008 Ease of Doing Business Ranking for Equatorial Guinea and Select Peers  
(Out of 181 countries) 
 
G. Conclusion and Recommendations 
1.37 EQG has become an oil exporting country with limited production in its non-oil economy 
that combined to generate large imports, severely affecting employment creation and poverty 
reduction. Increasing petroleum revenues from high prices and production and better contract terms have 
fueled most of the consumption, investment, and imports in the nonhydrocarbon sector. They have 
created a sense of abundance that has only recently been tempered with the sharp decline in petroleum 
prices in 2008. The authorities must realize that continued economic growth along the previous path 
becomes unsustainable as petroleum revenues begin to run dry, and that employment creation and poverty 
reduction depend on productivity gains in the non-oil economy. The good news is that petroleum 
revenues have generated enough savings to implement much needed investment programs that can ease 
constraints on the non-oil economy, raising domestic productive capacity and creating employment. 
However this will require strict fiscal discipline and adequate budget allocation to ensure that public 
expenditure focuses on country priorities, an issue that is analyzed in Chapter 2. 
  
                                                          




























Issues to Address Action to Take 
Overall expenditure is too high, inconsistent 
with the PIH targets, and will deplete 
petroleum savings too quickly for future 
generations. 
 Adjust the overall public expenditure envelope to 
targets proposed by the PIH rule. 
Management of petroleum revenues lacks 
transparency. 
 Expedite implementation of the EITI and across the 
oil sector value chain.  
 Strengthen public finance management to better 
control budget expenditure. 
A complex system of fees and public 
payments hinders private investment.  
 Streamline the current system of fees and public 
payments in line with the Doing Business 
recommendations.  
Ensure an adequate rate of return on savings 
from petroleum revenues. 
 Appoint a committee to effectively design and 
supervise investment strategies to raise financial 
returns of petroleum savings, following best 
international practices. 
Non-oil domestic production is negatively 
affected by real exchange rate appreciation. 
 Invest in non-oil domestic sectors (i.e., agriculture) 
to mitigate Dutch disease effects and foster 
employment and income.  
 Make sure that investment increases productivity in 
the non-oil sectors. 
Medium Term 
Issues to Address Action to Take 
Widespread poverty and high inequality may 
lead to tensions.  
 Reallocate public expenditures to increase funds for 
social protection.  
 Develop domestic employment and target social 
protection systems to lowest quintiles of the 
population.  
Limited domestic private investment.  Improve the business environment. Set up a 
committee for an in-depth review of hindrances to 






CHAPTER 2: BUDGET ALLOCATION EFFICIENCY 
2.1 Significant hydrocarbon production in Equatorial Guinea has fed a huge and rapid influx 
of government revenues and parallel increases in public expenditure. Hydrocarbon production rose 
from 250,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2002 to 366,900 b/d in 2008, while international oil prices jumped 
from US$34 per barrel in 2004 to US$93 in 2008. New petroleum legislation in 2006 further boosted the 
government’s intake. This revenue boom has fueled growth in public expenditure, notably capital 
expenditures that expanded tenfold between 2004 and 2008. Recurrent expenditure has not keep pace, 
however, raising doubts that the balance in allocation between capital and recurrent spending is ideal 
given the country’s challenges. 
2.2 Despite increased public spending, the public sector still runs a surplus. The overall 2002 
fiscal surplus of 16.8 percent of GDP remained high in 2008 (15.3 percent of GDP). Gross official 
reserves for 2008 are estimated at US$7.6 billion (21.2 months of imports or 41.3 percent of the GDP), up 
from US$1.6 billion in 2004 (5.5 months of imports). The savings are mostly explained by the magnitude 
of oil revenues flowing in and the country’s limited absorptive capacity. Part of the reserves, representing 
19 percent of GDP in 2008, is held in government’s accounts in private banks abroad.  
2.3 The rapid and significant leap in public revenues and expenditures and Equatorial 
Guinea’s limited institutional capacity call for thorough review of the budget allocation process to 
avoid inefficiencies. This chapter reviews allocations between 2002 and 2008 to highlight major trends 
and where potential gains in efficiency can be found.
20
 It first analyzes the structure and trends of 
government revenues. It then reviews the economic and functional composition of public expenditures, 
focusing on sectoral allocations of public investment that represent over 80 percent of the national budget. 
It concludes with recommendations for improvement.
 
 
A. Public Revenues 
2.4 Total public revenues doubled between 2002 and 2008, driven by higher prices and volumes 
of hydrocarbon exports and better contract terms with petroleum companies for sharing returns. 
Oil revenues have been expanding 34 percent yearly on average. By 2008 they accounted for 89 percent 
of total public revenues and 47 percent of GDP (Table 2.1). 
                                                          
20 The main challenge of this analysis has been the poor quality of budget data. Available information on budget implementation 
does not allow for a proper comparison with budget approval data, so that data used in this chapter will mostly refer to what was 
allocated rather than what was spent. Data on budget allocations are from the Budget Directorate of the Ministry of Finance and 
Budget, and data on budget execution are from the Treasury. These data have been cross-checked for consistency with data 
provided by an IMF technical assistance team working at the Treasury. This IMF technical team has also worked with the 
authorities to estimate Public Investment Program execution by sector, invaluable information that is extensively used throughout 





Table 2. 1: Public Revenues, 2002–08 (Percent of GDP) 
 
 
2.5 The primary driver of rising oil revenues has been the renegotiation with private companies 
of better petroleum contract terms for the state. The 2006 revision of the Petroleum Law boosted the 
state’s share of profits, raising the royalty tax rate from 10 percent to a minimum of 13 percent and fixing 
the state’s minimum ownership stake in oil and gas operations at 20 percent. Royalties (levied on total 
petroleum production) and profit sharing accounted for 83 per cent of the state’s oil income in 2008. The 
corporate income tax levies 25 percent of final profits from petroleum operations,
21
 and has increased in 
line with GDP. Finally, bonuses and rents, which are mostly lump-sum payments for exploration and 
production contracts, remain relatively low and are not a major source of budget financing. 
2.6 The only other state revenue stream on the rise comes from oil derivative operations, which 
reached 4.2 percent of GDP in 2008. However since these operations are closely linked to oil and gas 
extraction, generate little employment, and mirror the oil economy in their affect on growth and poverty 
reduction, this analysis treats them as part of the hydrocarbon economy.  
2.7 EQG is neglecting non-oil taxes, which have not kept pace with the growth of the non-oil 
economy.
 
Non-oil tax revenues declined to 2.3 percent of GDP in 2008 from 4.2 percent of GDP in 
2002. While the non-oil economy increased an average of 33 percent annually in nominal terms between 
2002 and 2008, non-oil tax revenues only increased by 25 percent yearly, representing a take of only 7.3 
percent of non-oil GDP in 2008 compared to 17.8 percent in 2002. The declining trend derives mainly 
from a significant fall in the personal income tax and in taxes on goods and services. Income taxes fell to 
1.4 percent of GDP in 2008, compared to 2.6 percent in 2002. Although income and corporate taxes have 
grown 13 percent per year on average to FCFA 73.2 billion in 2008 (compared with FCFA 38.9 billion in 
2002) due to the buoyancy in non-oil activities, mainly construction and public works led by the oil 
boom, the increase is well below economic growth both in the overall and the non-oil economy.  
                                                          
21 A withholding tax of 1 percent of the turnover of the preceding fiscal year is levied at the beginning of each fiscal year as an 
advance payment of corporate taxes. In case of losses, a tax credit is carried forward. The duration of the loss carry-forward 
depends on contractual provisions and on the applicable fiscal law. 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average 
Total revenue 27.5 27.3 31.9 37.9 45.7 48.8 46.9 38.0 
  Oil revenue 22.4 23.1 28.3 34.7 42.0 44.1 41.6 33.7 
       Corporate income tax 8.3 6.9 5.8 7.2 9.1 6.6 6.6 7.2 
Royalties 11.4 13.9 14.7 11.7 21.7 12.4 12.5 14.1 
Profit Sharing 2.7 2.2 7.5 14.5 11.2 24.9 22.2 12.2 
Bonus and rents 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 
  Non-oil revenue 5.0 4.3 3.6 3.2 3.7 4.7 5.3 4.3 
Income taxes  2.6 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 
      Corporate Income 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 
      Personal Income tax 1.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 
      Other Income tax 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Taxes on goods and services 0.9 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Taxes on trade  0.6 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 
      Other taxes 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
    Nontax Revenue 0.8 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.4 2.4 3.0 1.5 
 Grants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Memorandum Items 
Oil Production (Thousand Barrels  
per Day)  -- -- 368.2 375.5 362.9 368.5 359.2 366.9 
Adjusted Crude Oil price ($US/bbl) -- -- 34 49 60 67 93 61 
Sources: EQG authorities, EIA, IMF 
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2.8 Despite growing trade, collection of custom taxes has not kept pace since 2002. They declined 
from 0.6 percent of GDP in 2002 to 0.2 percent of GDP in 2008, even though imports jumped from 
US$500 million to US$4 billion during the period.
22
 This is well below customs collection in other 
CEMAC countries (for instance, 2 percent of GDP in the Central African Republic and 5 percent of GDP 
in Gabon) and is explained by the many tax exemptions for the public sector (government, public 
enterprises and other public institutions) as well as poor administrative practices. Also, export duties on 
timber and cocoa were eliminated in 2007 to boost profitability in these industries.
23
  
2.9 Reforms to improve tax revenues are being carried out in line with the CEMAC but with 
limited success. The new tax code that took effect in 2005 replaced the domestic turnover tax with a 
value added tax (VAT), raised the corporate income tax, and made the personal income tax more 
progressive.
24
 In addition, the Tax Administration Directorate was reorganized and its capacity 
strengthened to better monitor taxpayers by expanding the system of taxpayer identification numbering. 
Nonetheless, the private sector’s limited capacity to implement the VAT and the public sector’s to enforce 
it caused collection to drop to 0.7 percent of GDP in 2008, compared to 0.9 percent of GDP in 2002 when 
the tax was introduced.  
2.10 Strengthening tax administration and a determined effort to reform customs administration 
are essential to improving non-oil tax revenues. The tax administration has very limited skilled 
personnel and an unclear institutional setting, with several bodies participating in revenue administration 
(the Tax Directorate, the Customs Directorate, and the Ministry of Mining). The Tax Directorate’s 
enforcement role is largely confined to the non-oil sector, with limited involvement in petroleum 
revenues. Weaknesses reported in the collection of customs duties include extensive ad hoc exemptions, 
tax evasion and mismanagement. The government aims to strengthen tax and customs administration to 
monitor oil production and related tax payments. Notable among the measures already taken to reform the 
customs regime is the outsourcing of management at ports to an international company that will automate 
customs administration and carry out preshipment inspections. Implementation of these measures should 
be accelerated to expedite trade procedures and raise customs revenues in line with neighboring countries.  
2.11 Increased savings from petroleum revenues are boosting interest income, which earned 2.2 
percent of GDP in 2008 compared to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2002 when they started to accrue. Other 
nontax revenue comes from rising sales or rental of government properties due to the oil boom. These 
trends pushed total non-oil nontax revenues to FCFA 155.6 billion (3 percent of GDP) in 2008, up from 
FCFA 12.7 billon (0.8 percent of GDP) in 2002. 
B. Public Expenditures 
2.12 The public budget follows a dual management system with separate current and capital 
expenditures and is dominated by capital spending (81 percent of the total budget in 2008). Current 
expenditures are presented following an economic classification by salaries, goods and services, interest 
payments, and transfers and subsidies. Capital expenditures are recorded in a single budget item, which is 
then apportioned in the Public Investment Program. The oil boom has led to a tenfold increase in capital 
expenditures between 2002 and 2008. Current expenditures have, however, remained stagnant at less than 
5 percent of GDP during the period (Figure 2.1). 
  
                                                          
22 Customs tax rates are set in line with the CEMAC common external tariff, which assigns rates of 5, 10, 20, or 30 percent of the 
import’s value, depending on the category of the goods. 
23 Producer profits had recently been adversely affected by the nominal appreciation of the CFA franc vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. 
24 It also raised the tax on gross income for nonresidents, and reduced the withholding tax for nonresidents on dividends paid and 
interest earned in EQG. 
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Figure 2. 1: Public Expenditure Structure (Percent of GDP) 
 
C. Current Expenditures 
2.13 Current expenditures are insufficient to provide meaningful public social services. EQG’s 
current expenditures only represent 19 percent of total spending and 5 percent of GDP in 2008, which are 
the lowest among CEMAC countries, where 2007 current expenditures represented around 66 percent of 
total expenditure and over 10 percent of GDP (Table 2.2). Although current expenditure has increased 18 
percent yearly it has not kept pace with overall or non-oil GDP growth and declined to 5 percent of GDP 
in 2008 from 6.7 percent of GDP (or 44 percent of total public spending) in 2002. This low level cannot 




Table 2. 2: Government Expenditure in the CEMAC Region, 2007 
 
D. Economic Structure of Current Expenditures 
2.14 The economic classification of recurrent expenditures consists of (a) goods and services, (b) 
salaries, (c) subsidies and transfers, and (d) interest payments. While goods and services represent, on 
average, the largest share of current expenditures, subsidies and transfers have become the second 
expenditure group among current expenditures, expanding at the same rate as overall GDP (Table 2.3).  
Table 2. 3: Economic Composition of Public Expenditure, 2002–08 (Percent of GDP) 
 
2.15 Efforts to improve public administration are insufficient and the wage bill does not finance 
key public services. Despite the increase in the wage bill to FCFA 56 billion in 2008 (1.1 percent of 
GDP) from FCFA 26 billion in 2004 (notably for civil servants, who represent 80 percent of public 
employment), the wage bill still remains well below the CEMAC regional average (4 percent of GDP in 
2007). Most importantly, the increase has not always been related to improved staffing in key social 
sectors; for instance, salaries of staff working abroad doubled from FCFA 3.7 billion in 2004 to FCFA 8.9 
billion in 2008 following the opening of new embassies and consulates. Public administration is weak 
both in personnel numbers and skills, and the government will need to accelerate efforts to ensure that 
higher budget allocations to wages and salaries foster productivity and increased human capital in the 
social sectors (see Box 2.1). To that end, the strategy for administrative reform prepared with assistance 
from the UNDP should be quickly endorsed and implemented by the government. 
  
CAR Chad Cameroon Congo Gabon EQG
                      (in percentage of GDP)
Total expenditure 12.7 21.1 15.6 32.0 21.0 26.1
    Current expenditure 8.0 13.8 11.6 21.4 15.1 4.5
          Wages and salaries 4.4 4.6 4.2 3.9 5.4 1.1
          Goods and services 1.8 2.4 4.4 5.9 3.4 2.0
          Transfers and subsidies 1.1 3.1 2.3 8.2 4.1 1.3
          Interest 1.2 0.4 0.5 2.8 2.1 0.0
    Capital expediture 3.6 7.3 3.9 10.6 4.5 21.4
    (in percentage of total public expenditure)
Total expenditure 100 100 100 100 100 100
    Current expenditure 62.7 65.4 74.6 67.0 71.9 18.8
          Wages and salaries 34.8 21.6 27.2 12.1 25.9 4.1
          Goods and services 13.8 11.6 28.3 18.4 16.3 9.0
          Transfers and subsidies 8.4 14.7 14.9 25.8 19.5 5.6
          Interest 9.1 1.8 3.2 8.6 10.2 0.0
    Capital expediture 28.2 34.6 25.2 33.1 21.2 81.2
Source: IMF and World Bank
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total expenditure 15.2 15.7 19.4 18.6 22.3 26.1 26.6
Current expenditure 6.7 5.7 4.7 4.1 4.5 4.5 5.0
Wages and salaries 1.7 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1
Goods and services  3.4 2.9 1.9 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.4
Interest payments 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transfers and subsidies 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.1 1.6 1.3 1.5
Capital expenditure 8.4 9.8 14.6 14.1 17.8 21.4 21.6
Sources: EQG authorities, World Bank, IMF
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Box 2. 1: Public Administration in Equatorial Guinea 
The Ministry of Public Function and Administrative Reform (MoPA) manages EQG’s public administration, 
including civil servants and contract staff. Law 2/2005 divides public employment into five grades from A (requiring 
a university degree) to E (requiring primary education). In 2008 there were 515 A-grade staff out of 8,464 civil 
servants, with most of the latter (48 percent) classified as C-grade.
a
 The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of 
Health are the main employers with 40 percent and 21 percent of total public employees, respectively.  
 
Law 2/2005 envisions two hiring processes in public service—through a public exam or by merit. Taking into 
account the limited capacity in the civil administration and in the country in general, the government seeks to attract 
highly educated staff and has decided to select all A-levels based on merit. Entry public exams are not specific to 
vacancies and do not refer to a specific professional body but instead evaluate general competencies. The absence of 
professional career paths (such as for lawyers, economists, or engineers) within the public administration makes it 
difficult to know what constitutes adequate education and training and to assess the overall staff needs of the 
government by skill category. Public personnel training is provided at the national university but is often not well 
tailored to public administration needs. Increased public expenditure has been accompanied by a large number of 
short-term contractual staff being hired at the sector level. In fact, these hires have turned out to be longer term, 
extending beyond the one-year limits in worker contracts.  
 
Payment is not linked to productivity gains but to job scales within each grade that increase with seniority. That is, 
every six years the employee is promoted to a higher scale, with promotion accelerated for outstanding work during 
three consecutive years or adequate training. In addition to salaries, civil servants receive several benefits associated 
with their position. Some are post benefits, or complemento de destino, such as water and electricity subsidies. 
Others are assignment benefits (complemento de puesto). Still others derive from seniority (a three-year bonus, or 
trienios, for civil servants and a four-year bonus, or cuatrienios, for the military) or are rewards for productivity 
(complemento de productividad). Law 2/2005 specifies that an A-grade salary cannot exceed three times the salary 
earned at C-grade, but the overall scale is not linked to a minimum or average wage. Salaries are revised every 
several years to compensate for accumulated inflation, with the latest revision in 2006. In the view of many external 
specialists, public sector salary scales and levels could merit upward adjustments. 
 
There is limited control over actual work by public employees. Salaries are paid, net of taxes and Social Security 
contributions, into staff bank accounts; but no payment stub is issued, making it difficult to adequately reconcile 
benefits and final payments. Also there are delays in reconciling employment information between sector ministries 
and the Treasury. In the view of the authorities, some workers may continue to receive a salary without actually 
working, but their number is negligible.  
 
The government has committed to public administration reform to raise efficiency and improve service delivery.
b
 Its 
broad aims are to improve the sector’s human capital, upgrade overall management of its work force, and introduce 
more appropriate and agile administrative procedures. Key specific proposals call for the complete outsourcing of 
D- and E-grade staff positions, and an estimated 20 percent reduction in C-grade slots that will be offset by a similar 
increase in A-grade staff. A proposed Public Administration Training Institute will tailor instruction to the duties and 
skill needs of public employees. 
 
a National Security and Defense are not included. 
b A report for administrative reform that followed recommendations spelled out in the National Development Plan was prepared 
in 2008 with assistance by UNDP. The report was validated at a workshop in November 2008 and is now pending adoption by 
the Council of Ministers before implementation. 
2.16 Goods and services remain the main recurrent expenditure, averaging 15 percent annual 
growth between 2002 and 2008. Due to the lag relative to expansion of gross domestic product, its share 
declined to 2.4 percent of GDP in 2008 compared to 3.4 percent in 2002. 
2.17 Interest payments have dropped significantly since no new debt has been incurred. With the 
rapid rise of gross domestic product, outstanding external debt has fallen to 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2008 
compared to 21 per cent in 2002. As a consequence interest payments have declined, representing less 
than 0.1 percent of GDP in 2008. 
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2.18 Transfers and subsidies have climbed quickly since 2002, reflecting the large state role in 
the economy through diverse autonomous institutions and the rising costs of the fuel subsidy 
program. This segment represented 1.5 percent of GDP or 30 percent of total current expenditures in 
2008, up from 19 percent of current expenditures in 2002. The Budget Law distinguishes nine categories 
of transfers and subsidies: to families, local municipalities, public corporations, autonomous institutions, 
social security, or financial institutions, as well as transfers to nonprofit institutions, transfers to 
subregional organizations and various grants (see Annex VI for a description of the different entities 
receiving transfers and subsidies, and Table 2.4 for a distribution of funds since 2002). Transfers to 
autonomous institutions increased to 63 percent of total transfers in 2008 following the decision to further 
expand the government’s role in the economy. To this end, the government bought foreign equity shares 
in a local oil exploitation company through the National Oil Company Gepetrol, a purchase that will 
require additional public disbursements to defray the company’s operational costs in the future. Other 
autonomous institutions have also been created such as the telecommunications regulatory body ORTEL, 
and ENPIGE, a real estate investment company in charge of managing social housing.  
2.19 Reform of the current institutional framework is needed for the Ministry of Finance and 
Budget to effectively monitor the autonomous institutions. Assessing the operational efficiency of 
autonomous institutions (accounting for more than 36 percent of the current budget) is difficult because 
some do not transmit their budgets and implementation reports to the MoFB and Parliament for review 
and supervision, even though they are required to do so by the 1995 Decree defining the regulation of 
autonomous institutions and state-owned enterprises. Unclear and overlapping responsibilities between 
technical and financial ministries overseeing these autonomous institutions creates conflicting data on 
their financial and operational performance, adding to the confusion. Oversight staffing is also 
inadequate. The General Directorate of Autonomous Institutions and Public Enterprises in the MoFB 
responsible for supervision of autonomous institutions has just two staff members to supervise ten 
government agencies, nine public enterprises, all local governments and two chambers of commerce. The 
institutional system should be reformed to ensure that autonomous institutions report to a single 
directorate that is adequately resourced to properly supervise their budgets. The experience of other 
countries suggests that strengthening the MoFB enhances fiscal discipline and leads to better use of funds 
at decentralized levels. 
Table 2. 4: Transfers and Subsidies as Shares of GDP, 2002–07 
 
2.20 The largest share of transfers and subsidies (averaging 36 percent over 2004–07) is allocated 
to fuel subsidies to protect domestic consumers against upward spikes in international oil prices. The 
subsidy, recorded as transfers to autonomous institutions, is paid directly to Total Company as 
compensation between taxes dues by the company and the difference between the retail domestic price 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
To Families 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
To Municipalities 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
To Public  Corporations 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1
To Autonomous Institutions 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.8 0.7
To Social Security 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
To Financial Institutions 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
To Non profitable Organizations 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1
To Sub regional Organizations 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2
Grants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total Subsidies and Transfers 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.3
Sources: EQG authorities and World Bank
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fixed by the government and the international market price. The subsidy is not targeted and all consumers 
(rich and poor households, enterprises and public entities) benefit alike. Furthermore, gasoline 
consumption is likely to be higher in rich households and the formal sector therefore making the gas 
subsidy regressive. The government also plans to set up a US$20 million Food Security Fund to subsidize 
prices of basic food products in 2009. The fund will compensate the difference between the cost of food 
and a fixed food price for consumers. 
2.21 The efficiency of the transfers and subsidy system is questionable, with subsidies not well 
targeted to the needs of the population. Subsidies to families, the details of which have yet to be 
collected, merely represent 0.1 percent of GDP in 2007 (or 4 percent of total subsidies) well below 
subsidies to nonprofit organizations (mostly sport federations and political parties) that represented 12 
percent of total subsidies in 2007 (see Figure 2. 2: ). In addition, some of the subsidy systems, notably the 
fuel price subsidy, are not well targeted and benefit mostly the better off. In this context, the subsidy to 
families which represent 4 percent of total transfers and subsidies in 2007 seems insufficient to face the 
high poverty still prevalent in EQG. 
Figure 2. 2: Recipient Transfers and Subsidies as Shares of Total Transfers and Subsidies, 2002–07 
 
E. Administrative Composition of Current Expenditures  
2.22 The budget does not follow a functional classification, hamstringing the ability of 
authorities to link budget allocations to development objectives and sector policies. The 
government’s budget follows an administrative classification by sector ministries, departments, and 
agencies. To analyze sectoral budget allocation, ministries have been grouped by governmental function 
as defined in the international standard classification of functions of the government (COFOG) from the 
International Monetary Fund’s Government Financial Statistics (see Annex VII for a description).
25
  
2.23 Current spending does not reflect the development priorities of EQG since 57 percent of 
total current expenditure in 2008 is allocated to security and administrative services. Allocations to 
                                                          
25 Some expenditure is not allocated to sector ministries such as debt service and special funds allocated to the Caja Autonónoma 
y Amortización de Deuda Pública and obligaciones diversas that include capital expenditure. 
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public administration represent 42 percent of total allocated recurrent budget (Figure 2.3), rising to FCFA 
56 billion in 2008 from FCFA 19 billion in 2005. Allocations for defense and security, which represent 
around 15 percent of total current expenditure, are probably underestimated since the budget does not 
include salaries of military staff. When considered together, public administration (0.7 percent of GDP) 
and defense and security (0.3 percent of GDP) represent almost two-thirds of all current expenditure 
(Table 2.5). 
2.24 Social sector spending is too low to address the needs of the country’s poor population, 
representing only 23 percent of 2008 total current expenditure. Education and health current expenditures 
have increased nominally (to FCFA 15 billion and FCFA 8.7 billion for education and health respectively 
in 2008), in line with the National Development Plan to improve social services and reduce poverty. 
However their relative shares of current expenditure have actually declined. Education spending fell to 11 
percent of total current expenditure in 2008 compared to a share of 13.5 percent in 2003, and the share of 
health allocations declined to 6.4 percent in 2008 from 8.2 percent in 2003. Despite increased efforts to 
develop the education and health systems, allocations have trailed other sectors such as public 
administration and defense. Social protection would seem to run even farther behind, accounting for 0.1 
percent of total current expenditures in 2008. However social protection allocations do not include 
transfers and subsidies to protect consumers against rising international oil and food prices. If fuel and 
food subsidies managed by the MoFB are included, overall social expenditures can reach an average of 10 
percent of total current expenditures between 2003 and 2008. 
Table 2. 5: Administrative Composition of Public Expenditure, 2005–08 (Percent of GDP) 
 
  
2005 2006 2007 2008
Public Administration 0.4          1.0          0.9          0.7          
Defence and Security 0.3          0.3          0.3          0.3          
Economic Services 0.3          0.4          0.4          0.3          
Transport 0.0          0.0          0.0          0.0          
Health 0.1          0.1          0.1          0.1          
Education 0.2          0.2          0.2          0.2          
Social Protection 0.0          0.0          0.0          0.0          
Unallocated recurrent expenditure 0.6          0.8          0.1          0.1          
Total 2.1          2.9          2.2          1.6          
Source: EQG authorities 
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Figure 2. 3: Administrative Composition of Current Expenditure, 2008 
(Percent of total current expenditure) 
 
F. Capital Expenditures 
2.25 Capital expenditure is poorly planned, executed, and reported, which limits adequate 
investment monitoring and weakens investment effectiveness. The Public Investment Program has 
numerous preparation and implementation shortfalls that severely affect the quality of investment data. 
The public budget contains only an overall envelope for capital expenditures without specific breakdown. 
Many PIP investment construction expenditures currently classified as infrastructure are actually social 
spending, such as for hospitals or schools. Also, it is possible to execute a project not included in the PIP, 
and some projects in the PIP are never implemented. Management of the investment program is under the 
Office of the President without financial accountability from the MoFB. This fosters duplicate spending, 
wasted resources, and insufficient monitoring of PIP implementation—a heavy toll given that the PIP 
represents about 80 percent of the total public budget. 
2.26 Government’s tenfold increase in public investment since 2004 has focused on improving 
infrastructure. In 2008 capital expenditures reached 21.8 percent of GDP (Table 2.6), up from 8.4 
percent of GDP in 2002. Using data from the PIP, projects have been bundled together to analyze 
allocations in the social, infrastructure, economic and productive sectors. Data confirm the results visible 
on the ground, which show improved infrastructure such as roads, airports, and ports alongside less 
successful construction of social infrastructure such as housing, schools, and hospitals. Approval of the 
NDP signals the government’s aim to shift resources toward investment in social sectors although limited 
implementation capacity in these social sectors has limited past spending there to a mere 2.5 percent of 




Figure 2. 4: Public Investment Program, 2005–08 
(Percent of GDP) 
 
Table 2. 6: Public Investment Program, 2005–08 
 
Allocation by Purpose (Percent of GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Social sectors 1.4 5.5 4.5 3.1 
Public administration 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.7 
Productive sectors 1.7 1.4 2.3 3.8 
Infrastructure 0.7 0.7 8.3 7.1 
Total  4.5 8.6 16.3 15.7 
Capital Budget Execution 
(Percent of GDP) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Social sectors 1.6 1.8 3.1 2.5 
Public administration 2.8 2.7 2.9 1.6 
Productive sectors 1.5 3.7 3.6 13.4 
Infrastructure 4.4 7.0 7.3 4.3 
Total  10.3 15.2 16.9 21.8 
                        Execution Rate  
                        (Percent of allocated investment) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Social 115 32 69 81 
Public administration 409 279 245 92 
Productive sectors 86 277 159 355 
Infrastructure 606 1,022 88 60 
Total 225 178 104 139 
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2.27 The high infrastructure investment (notably roads) will not be sustainable when large 
projects are completed. Infrastructure represents half of the investment carried out, two-thirds of which 
was in roads (around 4.1 percent of GDP between 2005 and 2007). Capital expenditure in airports and 
urban facilities represented around 1.2 percent and 1 percent of GDP, respectively (8.5 and 6.3 percent of 
total infrastructure expenditure between 2005 and 2007, respectively, as indicated in Figure 2. 5: ). This 
investment, which has significantly upgraded the deteriorated road system and the main airports, can be 
expected to slow in coming years as the bulk of transport infrastructure improvements are completed, and 
resources will likely shift toward investments in the sectors using the newly installed infrastructure (that 
is, in the productive and social sectors). 
Figure 2. 5: Infrastructure in the Executed PIP, 2005-08 
(Percentage of total investment implemented) 
 
2.28 Investment allocations to productive sectors are too low to raise productivity substantially 
in the non-oil economy. Investment in the productive sectors equaled 3.7 percent of GDP in 2007, 
mostly focused in ports (see Figure 2.6).
26
 As upgrades to the ports of Malabo and Bata reach their final 
stages, a significant shift in public investment is expected to increase productivity in the non-oil economy. 
Given the size of the rural population and the importance of agricultural activity for their livelihood, the 
authorities should prioritize agricultural investment. Currently, agriculture is not considered a priority for 
investment and accounts for less than 0.5 percent of total outlays. 
2.29 Investment in social sectors will need to increase to improve the living conditions of the 
general population. Investment in social sectors has hovered around 2.5 percent of GDP in recent years 
(about 16 percent of capital expenditures implemented between 2005 and 2008, see Figure 2.7). Despite 
NDP recommendations, budget allocations for social sector investments has remained constant in 
absolute terms since 2006, and merely around 2.5 percent of GDP has actually been implemented. 
                                                          
26 The large investment in productive sectors in 2008 is explained by greater state participation in petroleum exploitation blocks 
though the purchase of Devon’s shares. While is the authorities accounted this as an investment in productive sectors, it is more 
properly accounted as an acquisition of financial assets rather than an investment. Furthermore, even when considered as an 
investment it poses a problem since sinking resources in petroleum exploitation contradicts the NDP recommendation to diversify 
the economy toward greater non-oil production. 
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However, this low amount may be misleading since a portion of social infrastructure such as schools or 
hospitals is often accounted as infrastructure. In any case, social sector investment is far too low given the 
importance of education, health, water and sanitation, and housing for poverty reduction, and needs to 
increase significantly in size to improve the overall social and economic conditions of the population.  
Figure 2. 6: Executed Investment in Productive Sectors, 2005–08 
(Percent of total investment executed) 
 
 
Figure 2. 7: Executed Investment in Social Sectors, 2005–08 
(Percent of total investment executed) 
 
2.30 The current institutional setting for investment management is reaching its limits. Execution 
of the PIP has exceeded investment allocations each year; and the government has spent twice the amount 
budgeted between 2004 and 2007, with overruns of US$385 million in 2004, US$460 million in 2005, 
and US$600 million in 2006. This overexecution, mostly concentrated on physical infrastructure and 











2005 2006 2007 End June 2008
Education Housing




public administration, is due mainly to the government’s will to carry out investments urgently. However 
there is serious risk that the current lack of discipline in committing public funds may lead the country to 
repeat the experience of Nigeria, where similar bursts in public spending from oil revenues achieved little 
in the long term (see Box 2.2). Moreover, the large size of the 2007 capital budget of around US$2 billion 
and the limited overrun of US$37 million seems to mark the ceiling for the government’s investment 
capacity. Since the bulk of infrastructure investment (characterized by large contracts) has been 
completed and given the NDP’s calls for greater productive investment to develop the non-oil economy 
and social investment to fight poverty, the government must begin to redefine its institutional investment 
arrangements to handle smaller contracts. This requires improved supervisory capacity of sector 
ministries expected to take more of the investment lead in the years ahead. The next chapter will analyze 
the current institutional setting for public investment and propose recommendations to facilitate project 
implementation, safeguard public funds, and raise efficiency. 
Box 2. 2: Nigeria’s Petroleum Management Experience 
Nigeria’s experience with petroleum management is among the most studied cases by scholars and development 
practitioners. Their unanimous conclusion is that the country’s development performance has been disappointing 
despite enormous revenues accruing to the government since mid-1960, estimated on a cumulative basis at more 
than US$400 billion by 2007. Nigeria remains among the 15 poorest nations in the world, with 54 percent of its 
population living below the poverty line (2003–04 National LSMS).  
The two primary lessons for Equatorial Guinea from Nigeria’s lackluster performance highlight the importance of 
strong macroeconomic management and efficient expenditure policies. Prior to the early years of this decade, 
successive Nigerian governments did not save oil windfalls, with the scale of public spending fluctuating in line 
with the international price of oil. This caused extreme exchange rate volatility harmful to private sector 
development. When oil prices were low, the government lacked public savings to draw on and tried to preserve its 
inflated level of spending through heavy borrowing, which led to a massive accumulation of debt (72 percent of 
GDP at the end of 2004). Moreover, the windfall of the 1980s and 1990s was spent on costly but inefficient public 
investments in infrastructure and industries that were poorly managed, had low completion rates, and suffered from 
rampant corruption. Once state-owned enterprises were put into operation, insufficient maintenance and weak 
governance made them quite inefficient. The attention of those in power was focused on rent seeking, which led to 
neglect of private sector development in the non-oil sector economy (particularly in agriculture and manufacturing), 
fuelling unemployment and exacerbating poverty and conflict, particularly when petroleum prices were low. 
Equatorial Guinea should also examine Nigeria’s more recent experience in attempting to break deeply engrained 
but unsustainable practices. In 2004, Nigeria started to implement a new development strategy that more responsibly 
managed its oil wealth. The authorities have adopted a more disciplined fiscal policy that unlinks the size of the 
annual budget from current oil prices, saving a significant portion of the oil windfall when oil prices are high to ride 
out times when they are not. Nigeria has also made good progress in improving governance and fighting corruption. 
First, the government budget has become more transparent; and allocations are widely published so that citizens can 
better hold officials accountable. Second, a separate unit in the Presidency ensures that public money cannot be 
disbursed for investment unless proper procurement procedures have been respected. Third, the government has 
initiated implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) to improve accountability of 
government oil revenues. Fourth, an effort was made to improve budget planning and implementation at the sector 
level through development of sector expenditure strategies. Despite these notable improvements, more needs to be 
done to improve the quality of spending since inefficiency and leakages in both the current and capital budgets 
continue. Nigeria still has significant room for greater spending efficiency, but at last the country has put itself on 
the path toward more sustainable natural resource wealth management. 
G. Conclusions and Recommendations 
2.31 For years the Government of Equatorial Guinea has spared no efforts to increase the level of 
capital spending, with added urgency since 2008 on implementing the National Development Plan focus 
on productive and social sectors. Results are noticeable on the ground—infrastructure has been upgraded, 
infrastructure and construction projects are ongoing. Nevertheless budget management and sector 
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allocations need a major overhaul to (a) increase transparency in revenue management and allocation of 
budget resources, (b) better respond to NDP priorities (notably in education and health), (c) ensure 
expenditure sustainability and adequate maintenance of investment, and (d) raise the impact of public 
expenditure on poverty. 
2.32 Transparency. Transparency in petroleum revenue management is the yardstick that will 
measure the commitment of authorities to overall fiscal transparency. EQG joined the ranks of the EITI as 
a candidate country in 2008, but decisive steps need to be taken to produce a report affirmed by all parties 
participating in the initiative and to improve public financial management for better supervision of the 
public budget. Greater transparency of expenditure requires rethinking the current administrative 
classification, which does not allow allocation assessment by sector and makes it very difficult to oversee 
NDP implementation. The latter is further complicated by the fact that many NDP objectives are being 
served by autonomous institutions that provide limited information about their activities and budgets, 
raising doubts about the government’s capacity to supervise their results. To improve investment 
transparency, an effective system is needed to execute and monitor implementation of the PIP so that both 
the investment and recurrent budgets can be reconciled and an execution report that includes all budget 
expenditures can be prepared and presented to the Parliament and the public. 
2.33 Budget allocation. The NDP sets an ambitious agenda for poverty reduction and economic 
diversification and spotlights the importance of targeting petroleum revenues properly to foster 
employment and growth. However, the public budget today does not adequately support the NDP. Budget 
allocations are too skewed toward infrastructure and administrative services and provide insufficient 
support to social sectors that are key to higher labor productivity and that raise the return on 
infrastructure. Similarly, important sectors for domestic growth and employment such as agriculture are 
underserved. Finally, social protection is being provided mostly through transfers and subsidies that are 
not appropriately targeted, which undermines their benefit.  
2.34 Expenditure sustainability. The investment and recurrent budgets are prepared and executed in 
parallel. This raises the risk that the infrastructure in certain sectors (notably education and health) may 
underperform because there is too little recurrent expenditure allocated after the investment has occurred. 
Similarly, if maintenance costs are not foreseen in the recurrent budget, infrastructure faces a serious risk 
of rapid deterioration or obsolescence.  
2.35 Greater impact of public expenditure on poverty. Lack of data prevents poverty incidence 
analysis of public expenditure. The last household survey is unavailable, and budget data are confined to 
allocations without providing information on what is actually spent. Inconsistencies about population and 
other sector indicators further limit the analysis. Chapter 4 on education and chapter 5 on health will 
elaborate about the potential impact of public expenditure on different segments of the population (rural 
and urban, for instance), but will not be able to assess the impact on the lowest income quintiles that are 
in dire need of public support. The investment in infrastructure will undoubtedly have an overall positive 
impact for the population at large. Roads will better connect the countryside to cities, improving access to 
social services and enlarging the market for agricultural products. However, the road strategy of the 
government is unknown, making it difficult to assess the actual impact many new roads will have on the 
poorest segment of the population. Other large investments such as airports positively impact the overall 
economy but do not directly address the needs of the poor. In the short run, the government will need to 
shift investment priorities toward education, health, housing, water and sanitation and agriculture, areas 






Issues to Address Action to Take 
Budget data do not permit an adequate 
supervision of budget implementation and 
limit budget analysis and control. 
 Expedite reforms in public finance management to 
ensure budget execution is adequately recorded by 
the Ministry of Finance and Budget. 
Too little allocation goes to current 
expenditures in the social sectors, reducing 
the return on infrastructure investment. 
 Increase public employment in social sectors and 
better link public salaries to productivity. 
 Implement the recommendations from the 2008 
report for administrative reform prepared with 
assistance by the UNDP.  
Investment allocations are too skewed toward 
infrastructure (roads, ports, airports) instead 
of productive and social investment.  
 Increase allocations to productive sectors (notably 
agriculture) to raise productivity in the non-oil 
economy and to social sectors (notably health and 
education) to reduce poverty, in line with the NDP 
recommendations.  
Widespread poverty and high inequality may 
lead to discontent. 
 Focus public expenditure on programs to develop 
domestic employment and better target social 
protection systems to lowest quintiles of the 
population. This can start with an increase of 
subsidies to poor families. 
Current institutional setting is not able to 
fully implement the PIP.  
 Reform the current institutional setting to deal with 
smaller contracts and shift more authority to sector 
ministries.  
Medium Term 
Issues to Address Action to Take 
Small collection of non-oil tax revenues will 
not be enough to sustain public expenditure 
when petroleum taxes dwindle.  
 Expedite reforms in the Tax and Customs 
Directorates to raise institutional capacity and 
reduce ad hoc exemptions to improve non-oil tax 
collection. 
Insufficient oversight is exercised over 
transfers to autonomous institutions. 
 
 Approve a legal framework that develops the 1995 
Decree regulating relationships between the MoFB 
and the sectors to ensure that the autonomous 
institutions report to a single directorate and the 
MoFB has more resources for adequate supervision. 
The current administrative classification of 
the budget does not allow assessment of 
sector allocation with regard to NDP and 
MDG priorities. 
 Develop a functional classification of the budget to 
better reflect the government’s strategic resource 






CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC FINANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR 
3.1 This chapter assesses and provides recommendations for public finance management 
(PFM) in Equatorial Guinea, with a special emphasis on the infrastructure sector. Indeed, the 
country’s public spending is characterized by a high proportion of capital expenditure (according to 
available official data, around 80 per cent of total public expenditure
27
). The analysis in this chapter 
focuses on the budget and its institutional framework, and its recommendations are geared to a better 
strategic allocation of resources, more efficient service provision, and compliance with fiscal constraints 
to facilitate implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP). The Public Expenditure and 
Financial Accountability (PEFA) framework
28
 has been used as a reference for this report, although a 
proper PEFA scoring has not been carried out. Had it been, Equatorial Guinea would have performed 
poorly. Yet our findings suggest that much progress can be made in the short to medium term, and this 
report focuses on essential and realistic recommendations for how the government can improve its PFM 
framework. 
3.2 The analysis concentrates on central government expenditure. The budget is not consolidated, 
and limited information from decentralized public sector institutions is available. The emphasis is also on 
public expenditure since public revenues were examined in chapter 2.  
3.3 Our analysis is hampered by limited availability of information about legal requirements 
and whether they are being met and by extensive informality in PFM procedures. Even when a 
regulatory framework exists, its terms are not widely available. Critical legal documents such as the 2003 
law regulating state public finances
29
 are not made public, which limit the capacity of public officials to 
implement critical PFM procedures. Previous analysis by international institutions also has been limited, 
confined mainly to two reports by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2005.
30
 The lack of a legal 
framework for public finance management is especially obvious in the infrastructure sector where there 
are neither legal rules for executing expenditure and procurement nor guidelines for project appraisal and 
selection.  
3.4 Efficiency of infrastructure public expenditures is severely impeded by the existing 
institutional setting and incomplete legal framework. The PFM analysis has focused on infrastructure 
spending because the authorities’ determination to implement projects quickly exacerbates already loose 
budget constraint. However no up-to-date list of ongoing or finished infrastructure projects in the last five 
years exists, which limits the capacity to identify newly built infrastructure or the cost of ongoing 
projects. To overcome these limitations, some investment projects were reviewed together with engineers 
and technicians to assess current procedures and make concrete recommendations for improvement. 
  
                                                          
27 This percentage is overestimated since a significant proportion of the PIP is in fact current expenditure.  
28 PEFA is a multiagency partnership program that has established a Performance Measurement Framework for Public Financial 
Management (June 2005). It is integral to a coordinated effort for supporting PFM reform, which emphasizes a country-led 
approach, donor harmonization and alignment around the country strategy, and a focus on monitoring and results. The goal is to 
mainstream best international practices. The framework is available in English, Spanish, and French at www.pefa.org. 
29 Law 9 of November 13, 2003. 
30 International Monetary Fund, ―Republic of Equatorial Guinea: Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes—Fiscal 
Transparency Module,‖ April 2005; and IMF, ―Equatorial Guinea, Modernization of Public Expenditure Management Processes: 
Steps for Reforming the System,‖ November 2005. 
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A. Challenges to Effective Public Finance Management 
Budget Comprehensiveness and Transparency 
3.5 The public budget does not record all public spending and the amount of extra-budgetary 
spending is difficult to evaluate. The budget covers ministries and legislative and judicial institutions, 
but many other public agencies fall outside its purview. First, only state subsidies and transfers to some 
autonomous entities are recorded, while the entity budgets are neither included nor consolidated in the 
National Budget. Second, some donor-financed spending is not recorded in the budget. Third, the budget 
does not provide an accurate picture of state revenues. In this context, the government’s firm decision to 
join the EITI is very positive and should allow more transparency and better knowledge of total oil 
revenues.  
3.6 Inadequate budget classification and recording reduces government accountability and 
transparency. There is a lack of widely available norms;
31
 and formulation, execution, and reporting of 
the central government’s budget use different classifications, leading to information gaps that prevent the 
government and Parliament from monitoring compliance with initial budgetary authorizations. Indeed, the 
initial and revised budgets are presented using an economic (by nature of expenditure)
32
 and an 
administrative (by organizational unit, including ministries) classification, but data on budget execution 
are reported using only the economic classification. The Treasury has partial information on current 
expenditure by ministry from 2007,
33
 but it is neither provided to sector ministries nor recorded in budget 
execution documents. Thus, the Parliament approves spending allocation by ministry and by economic 
category but does not receive information about actual expenditure by ministry. As a consequence, poor 
and unreliable information on budget execution translates into weak budgetary preparation in subsequent 
years.  
The current budget classification provides hardly any information on investment expenditure, 
although it represents 80 percent of the budget. Only two categories of investment expenditure are 
recorded in the State Budget: (a) financing of miscellaneous projects (Budget Code 5310) and (b) 
cofinancing of miscellaneous projects (Budget Code 5380). Moreover, all investment expenditure is 
recorded in a single administrative unit (―Diverse obligations‖), regardless of the administrative unit 
benefitting from the investment.
34
 Also, around 30 percent of budgeted investment in the PIP—such as 
training programs, pharmaceutical purchases, studies, the design of development plans—should in fact be 
considered as current expenditure.
35
 If from an economic standpoint some of this expenditure can be 
considered as future investment (for example, in human capital), from an accounting point of view they 
do not increase public assets and therefore should be recorded as current expenditure. The government 
should introduce more categories in the budget classification to allow for a better monitoring of 
investment expenditure (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 for current and proposed budget classification). It 
would also be useful to introduce accrual elements into the public accounts to facilitate audits (see 
paragraph 90 below).  
  
                                                          
31 Laws and decrees are not widely available, and access to some legislation is denied for reasons of confidentiality. The 2003 
law on public finances is not available in any ministry. 
32 Wages, goods and services, interests, current debt interests, transfers and subsidies, investment expenditure, debt amortizations, 
special funds. 
33 Data by ministry are only available from January to November 2007 (December data are unrecoverable) for Malabo but not for 
Bata. Proxies for December 2007 and Bata have to be calculated using data on total expenditure by economic classification.  
34 For comparison, current expenditure distinguishes 26 administrative units. 
35 Word Bank estimations are based on the 2008–10 Public Investment Program Budget. Current spending represents about 34 
percent of programmed investment for the Ministry of Education and 26 percent for the Ministry of Health in 2008. 
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Table 3. 1: Current Budget Classification for Investment Expenditure 
Administrative classif. 
Economic classification  
Section 7: Diverse obligations 
5310 – financing of miscellaneous projects  
5380 – cofinancing of miscellaneous projects  


















5310 – financing of miscellaneous 
infrastructure projects 
      
5311 – financing of miscellaneous 
projects (other than infrastructure) 
      
5380 – cofinancing of 
miscellaneous infrastructure 
projects 
      
5381 – cofinancing of 
miscellaneous projects (other than 
infrastructure) 
      
3.7 Public access to key fiscal information is limited. Information on the public budget and 
government performance is inaccessible to the general public. Annual budget documentation, which is the 
most widely available information in the ministries, exists only in printed form and in a limited number of 
copies. The information is not obtainable through the press, a Web site, or sale or notice boards. In-year 
budget execution reports are unavailable in sector ministries. There are no external audit reports and 
contract awards are not published.
36
 The current lack of transparency reduces agency accountability and 
increases opportunities for misappropriation. To increase transparency, the government could publish 
fiscal information and contract awards on the Internet, on boards outside the Ministry of Infrastructure, as 
well as in magazines published in the country. Given the lack of access to published material and to the 
Internet, only a small percentage of the population could access such information, but this would still 
represent an improvement over current practice. 
3.8 The priority should be to improve budget classification. In the short run the government 
should ensure that the same economic and administrative classifications are used for the approved and 
executed budgets and that an additional administrative classification is introduced in the investment 
program. This should also be complemented by a better distinction between infrastructure investment 
(fixed assets) and other investment types that should be classified as current expenditure. The final goal 
should be to introduce functional or programmatic classifications to better identify poverty-reducing and 
other priority expenditures.  
Budget Preparation  
3.9 Current and capital expenditures follow different budget rules and procedures. The 
Ministry of Finance and Budget (MoFB) is responsible for preparing and supervising the execution of 
current expenditures, and its only role in the investment budget is to set the global ceiling. The Ministry 
                                                          
36 The only public information on contract awards is at the construction site, where signs are posted with the name of the 
company in charge of the project, the government agencies involved, and the total cost. 
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of Planning and Development (MoPD) is responsible for the investment budget. This raises 
inconsistencies
37
 and makes it difficult for sector ministries to decide on adequate distribution of capital 
and current expenditures in their respective sectors. Current expenditure in social sectors, for instance, 
might be shortchanged even though it yields a higher rate of return than some infrastructure investment. 
Unifying budgetary responsibilities would allow sector ministries to redress that imbalance by allocating 
current and capital spending resources to each project more effectively. While having a single ministry 
responsible for preparing and following the execution of the whole budget would be a solution, this 
chapter will present several alternatives to improve the current institutional framework without such a 
merger of responsibilities. 
3.10 Budget preparation of current expenditures does not reflect national priorities and 
maintenance costs. Under current procedures sector ministries submit a first budget proposal without 
receiving any guidance from the MoFB, which can lead to overspending in nonpriority ministries that 
have been particularly ambitious in their initial request. Another problem is that operational costs of many 
construction projects (such as schools or hospitals) are not factored into project budgeting even though 
they can be expected to represent a higher proportion of the recurrent budget as more investment projects 
are finished. The MoFB needs to address these issues by (a) communicating their budget ceiling to the 
sector ministries at the beginning of the budgetary process so that NDP priorities receive due 
consideration in the overall budget; and (b) setting some form of multiannual planning that takes into 
account the cost of operating and maintaining infrastructure once it has been installed. This could be done 
through a project technical card that indicates, among other things, investment and maintenance costs, 
planned operational expenses, and an investment timeline to properly plan annual budgeting. This project 
technical card would be updated regularly during construction and with relevant additional information as 
needed (potential contents of the technical cards are further detailed in paragraph 153 later in this 
chapter). 
3.11 Planning of capital investment needs to be improved to ensure that projects correspond to 
NDP priorities and to facilitate their follow-up. The PIP in the 2008 and 2009 budgets shows the 
authorities’ determination to increase the amount budgeted for capital expenditures. However the current 
institutional setting does not provide adequate information to monitor implementation and adjust budgets 
throughout the year.
38
 It is therefore essential to improve investment planning and provide better easily 
accessible information about the list of ongoing projects. Suggestions for improvement are made later in 
this chapter. 
Budget Execution  
3.12 Procedures for budget execution are frequently bypassed, reducing budget control and 
information quality. The official procedure for expenditure execution is described in Decree 52/2005, 
but it is actually used for a very small percentage of public spending. The procedure separates the 
administrative phase (payment-authorizing officer
39
), the payment phase (public accountant), and the 
disbursement after the delivery of goods, works or services (Treasury). Figure 3.1 details the current 
budget implementation system. It is a long procedure that is very centralized at the MoFB, with none of 
the credit administrators at the sector ministries acting as payment-authorizing officers.
40
 To expedite 
                                                          
37 Under the current system for example, inconsistencies can arise if the demands for current and investment expenditure evolve 
differently during budgetary negotiations with the MoFB and the MoPD.  
38 An example of this was the preparation of the amended budget for 2009. This amended budget sought to decrease investment 
in line with lower revenues from lower-than-projected oil prices. The law presenting this amended budget states that ―the lack of 
information on priorities, the degree and rhythm of execution of the projects currently being implemented, as well as on the exact 
evaluation of the annual cost of each of them, has not allowed us to do a complete analysis of the portfolio of projects.‖  
39 The President is the main payment-authorizing officer; the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance are second-order 
payment-authorizing officers. 
40 An expense can take one to two months to get paid since the sector ministry initiates the procedure. 
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commitment and payment and avoid some of the controls applicable to the administrative phase, direct 
payments are made for civil servant salaries (representing 25 percent of the current budget in 2008). Also 
to accelerate budget implementation, sector ministries send payment requests directly to the MoFB or the 
President, bypassing the system. This limits the capacity of the MoFB to produce reliable and timely 
reports on budget execution, a gap that is only partially bridged by quarterly Treasury reports 
(approximately two months after the end of a given term) since the Treasury has incomplete information 
to carry out an adequate classification. Furthermore most of the procedures are manual, which increases 
risks of mistakes.  
Figure 3. 1: Normal Procedures for Executing Current Expenditure 
 
Source: Decree No. 52/2005 that establishes norms on public accounts and ―Proyecto de instrucción relativa a los procedimientos 
de los gastos públicos,‖ Ministry of Finance and Budget, and interviews.  
(*) This step does not appear in the decree. 
3.13 There is a risk that goods are paid before being delivered. Most of the control is concentrated 
on the purchase commitment, with rather lose control on goods delivered,
41
 opening the possibility of 
paying for a good/service that is never provided. Some improvement has been made recently, with the 
Treasury now requesting confirmation of delivery before payment. This is a positive evolution, and these 
payment controls should be systematically carried out, notably by the MoFB.  
3.14 Three other budget execution procedures exist although they are not formally regulated: (a) 
an emergency procedure that allows payments before goods or services are delivered, (b) cash advances 
(not including petty cash), and (c) payment of infrastructure expenditure (further detailed in Figure 3.3, 
later in this chapter). 
The emergency procedure bypasses certain budget execution steps. Sector ministries send the 
commitment request directly to the payment-authorizing officer who then transmits it to the Treasury for 
payment without the Budget Directorate (BD) or the Financial Control Directorate (FCD) intervening. 
The payment title is sometimes sent for ex post regularization to the BD or the FCD, but this is not always 
the case. This procedure presents several problems. First, execution is not properly recorded by the 
administrative services. The FCD and the BD, which are mandated to follow budget implementation, are 
unaware of these expenditures and therefore underestimate budget execution. Second, there is no 
guarantee that the service was rendered or the good delivered, which increases the risk of misuse or 
corruption. Third, accounting quality is poor since administrative controls for adequately recording the 
                                                          
41 Sector ministries are responsible for ensuring that the service has been rendered or the goods delivered. The general directorate 
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expense into the budget appropriation item are lacking. In sum, even when budget execution data are 
available, they are of poor quality and do not adequately reflect the real destination of the expenditure.  
3.15 The cash advance procedure lacks appropriate controls and cannot be assimilated with 
petty cash procedures.
42
 In the Equatorial Guinean system there is no need to provide documents to 
account for and record past expenditure. Also, advances are made to a bank account of the minister or of 
the ministry, and they are considered final budgetary expenditure without need to provide further 
justifications. The Treasury does not know what the money will eventually be used for and cannot 
classify the disbursement against the appropriate budgetary appropriation. A similar system of monthly 
advances is used to buy office supplies (one-twelfth of the annual budget for the line item is paid every 
month to each ministry and no documentation is requested). This procedure is highly problematic since it 
is impossible to know the final use of the funds. It not only raises the risk of misuse but limits Treasury 
control on sector accounts since no record of all existing bank accounts and their amounts is kept (even in 
the economic services of the sector ministries).  
3.16 The government needs to address weaknesses in budget execution quickly. All existing 
procedures should be formalized and developed on the basis of the 2005 Decree, providing clear 
instructions for application. This should be reinforced by a review of budget implementation procedure to 
make it swifter and to establish adequate controls on the most relevant steps (availability of credits, 
control of goods provision) to reduce the use of exceptional procedures and reduce payment delays so that 
suppliers willingly deliver goods before being paid. This could eventually entail delegating part of the 
budget procedure to sector ministries as credit managers.
43
 Adequate procedures should be introduced for 
management of small budget amounts to replace the current cash advance system, notably concentrating 
payments to sector ministries into a single account per ministry. Finally, regularly reconciling information 
on budget execution from the BD or the FCD and payments made by the Treasury should ensure that 
expenditure is properly monitored by the payment-authorizing officer. An integrated information system 
would certainly be useful, but it is not necessary to quickly improve the situation. Only if the current 
organization and procedures are modified will an integrated information system be productive.  
Accounting 
3.17 The current accounting system does not allow registration of assets and liabilities and 
makes it difficult to account for actual infrastructure spending. The only financial statements are 
budget execution reports that do not contain accrual information. Therefore the chart of accounts is the 
same as the budget classification, which does not permit the registration of assets and liabilities.
44
 Since 
the pace of infrastructure construction is raising the complexity of accounting operations, it is very 
important to develop asset registration that in a first step could introduce some additional and simple 
accrual aspects to the current cash-basis accounting system. This improved classification would provide a 
distinction between investment in fixed assets and other public investments, providing the basic elements 
for preparing a balance sheet of public sector assets with assets registered at their acquisition cost. 
                                                          
42 Petty cash is funding advanced by the Treasury to sector ministries to carry out budget expenditures. Documents to account for 
the expenditure are submitted retrospectively from the sector ministry to the Treasury for recording. With petty cash 
management, expenditure is not recorded when the cash advance is made but when the justifications are provided and have been 
verified by the accountant. The accountant is then able to determine the nature of the expenditure and apply the correct 
classification. 
43 Arguments against budget decentralization are often based on the incapacity of sector ministries to apply the rules properly. 
Given the current situation in which there is no control by the MoFB on considerable parts of the budget that are controlled de 
facto by sector ministries, the proposed evolution could only lead to an improved control of public funds. 
44 According to the 2005 decree, there are three types of accounting systems: contabilidad presupuestaria, contabilidad general, 




External Scrutiny and Audit  
3.18 Internal and external oversight, although formally present, provide very weak results. 
According to the 2005 decree that defines norms in public accounting,
45
 the control of budget execution is 
carried out at five levels: within each ministry, by public accountants, by the competent authorities within 
the MoFB, by the jurisdiction in charge of controlling accounts, and by Parliament.  
3.19 There is no internal audit within each ministry and the role of Inspector General of 
Finances (IGF) should be strengthened to ensure adequate internal audits to reduce the risk of 
misappropriation of public goods. The Inspector General of Finances (Inspección General de Finanzas) 
has broad powers and a mandate across entities of the central government to carry out internal audits.
46
 In 
particular, IGF can act as a control for any institution that uses public funds—including ministries, public 
companies, and autonomous institutions—and evaluate public policies following an annual program of 
control. However, the IGF does not use recognized professional auditing norms and in practice does not 
act as a control for the Treasury and review public accounts. Audits and inspections held in ministries 
entail a significant risk of not detecting frauds and irregularities since they do not foster audits of 
expenditure procedures and do not allow close analysis of the reliability and integrity of financial 
information. Strengthening the role and professionalism of IGF is crucial to identify problems, provide 
recommendations in public finance management, and ensure that procedures are defined and adequately 
enforced. A risk-based approach to audit planning also should be developed to focus attention on the most 
relevant issues. 
3.20 External independent control is lacking. There is no national audit office with jurisdictional 
authority for certifying public accounts on a regular basis.
47
 An external independent auditing office is 
essential to ensure transparency and accountability in public fund management by publishing audit 
findings to the public. To carry out its role adequately, it is essential that this office be endowed with 
organizational independence, enjoy free and unlimited access to information, and be adequately staffed 
and funded to operate. 
B. Management of Public Investments in Infrastructure48  
Investment Guidance and Preliminary Screening 
3.21 Formal guidance from the NDP cannot be translated into the investment program given the 
plan’s wide development priorities and long time frame (12 years). To facilitate planning of 
investment projects, the National Development Plan should be complemented with sector strategies and 
action plans that present detailed sectoral priorities in the medium term (that is, until 2015). These 
sectoral investment strategies could be prepared by each sector ministry, with impetus and cross-ministry 
coordination from the MoPD or the National Agency 2020.  
3.22 The 2008 PIP, with projects to be implemented between 2008 and 2010, does not reflect 
strategic investment allocations.
 49
 The PIP continues the government’s ambitious investment effort, 
which has seen public investment in infrastructure increase sixfold between 2004 and 2008, when it 
                                                          
45 Decree No. 52/2005 of March 17, 2005, establishes public accounting norms, Articles 119 to 127. 
46 As of January 2009 there were 11 Inspectors and 1 General Inspector. 
47 The IGF represents Equatorial Guinea at the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). 
48 Analysis in this section follows the methodology developed in Anand Rajaram, Tuan Minh Le, Nataliya Biletska, and Jim 
Brumby, ―A Diagnostic Framework for Assessing Public Investment Management,‖ mimeographed document, PREM 
Department, World Bank, Washington, D.C.  
49 Budgets prior to 2008 did not include a detailed list of the projects included in the PIP. They only mentioned the total amount 
budgeted for investment. 
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represented approximately 80 percent of the budget. Close to 1,400 projects have been identified by the 
government for implementation during 2008–10 compared to just 159 projects executed in 2004. The 
increase has been particularly rapid in 2008 and 2009 in response to NDP priorities for investing oil 
revenues in infrastructure to create the conditions for sustained economic growth after petroleum reserves 
are depleted. However, the PIP is not regularly updated and cannot be used to monitor investment 
implementation or assess strategic investment decisions. Furthermore, not only is the PIP not an 
instrument for yearly budget allocations, it is not being used for strategic medium-term budget allocations 
as described in the section on Project Selection and Budgeting below.  
3.23 Public investment decisions are concentrated in the Presidency. Ultimate investment 
allocation is decided by the Presidency, without the need to record the investment project into the Budget 
being implemented, bypassing any formal screening and budgetary system in place. 
3.24 Attempts to improve investment in social sectors have not succeeded. The authorities 
established a Social Development Fund in 2005 with support from USAID to improve social service 
delivery by enhancing the administrative and technical capacity of selected ministries and raising budget 
allocation to social sectors (health, education, gender, and sanitation). The Social Development Fund 
helps the ministries to prepare projects, participates in project selection, and will assist in project 
implementation and monitoring. Although a first set of projects have been prepared, their implementation 
has been significantly delayed, which seriously undermines the government’s credibility for rapid social 
service improvement.  
C. Formal Project Appraisal 
3.25 Projects are seldom appraised, raising the risk of inappropriate project selection. There is 
no formal guidance about project presentation and assessment; and although some large projects (in the 
mining sector for instance) go through a study phase before being implemented, this is not the norm for 
most projects. Sector ministries propose projects for inclusion in the PIP, but only after the project has 
been included do they send the proposed terms of reference (often with little detail) to the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Urban (MoIU) and Geproyectos for technical review. Therefore, project proposals do 
not include cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analyses, which make difficult to choose the most efficient. 
The socioeconomic value of projects (that is, an assessment of the number of potential beneficiaries, the 
potential project impact, and project feasibility) should be included by sector ministries when presenting 
proposals for inclusion into the PIP. A more thorough analysis could be performed before implementation 
with the help of the project manager (Geproyectos). This would require clear formal guidelines about 
project preparation and appraisal and increased capacity in staff and skills at Geproyectos. 
3.26 Priority is given to expedite investment implementation, with efficiency and effectiveness of 
less concern. High petroleum revenues have loosened budget constraints; and given the country’s dire 
needs, the government considers that all new infrastructures is useful so there is not much need to 
prioritize. However since institutional capacity is limited, the government will not be able to implement 
the 1,400 projects envisioned in the 2008 PIP, which means that formal project appraisal is required to 
select which are the most relevant. Ensuring that adequate time and resources are committed to project 
identification and formulation is therefore critical for the design and effective implementation of relevant 
and feasible projects. Maintenance and operating costs of infrastructure also should be evaluated prior to 
project selection. Furthermore, it is unclear whether environmental assessments of infrastructure projects 
are carried out. Cost-benefit analysis and pricing environmental costs are always difficult exercises, but 
the authorities need to integrate them into the project assessment process to limit the negative impact that 
a large investment program may have on the environment.  
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3.27 Limited technical capacity of ministry staffs hinders investment efforts, and outsourcing 
project appraisal should be considered. The number of civil servants working on public investment 
management is low and their capacity is limited.
50
 The government needs to review staffing numbers by 
skill type and functions in each ministry and prepare a precise analysis of missing skill sets to define a 
much needed human resources policy, a training strategy, and a hiring policy. Given limited staff pools 
some skill sets might be difficult to find for each ministry, but technical personnel could assist several 
sector ministries at a time. While this capacity is built up, the authorities should consider outsourcing 
project appraisals to an international contractor. Not only could this raise overall investment efficiency by 
carrying out project appraisals that are currently not properly done, but it would also help build 
institutional capacity by training local staff in internationally accepted appraisal methodologies.  
3.28 Guidance on project appraisal is essential to ensure better investment allocation and 
facilitate implementation. The government preference to expedite investment implementation does not 
require neglecting the appraisal phase, as is the case today. The aim, after all, is to make sure that 
Equatorial Guinea raises investment efficiency by implementing projects that work. The key assessments 
required include the following: (a) confirmation that the investment is consistent with the NDP and 
policy; (b) stakeholder analysis, including evaluation of institutional capacity; (c) complementarities with 
other ongoing and planned initiatives, incorporating lessons learned; (d) an objective hierarchy 
assessment (objective, purpose, results, and indicative activities); (e) assessment of resource and cost 
requirements; (f) assessment of management, monitoring, coordination, and financing arrangements 
(including financial management and internal control/reporting); and (g) environmental analysis. The 
formal guidance should describe which techniques and tools for economic evaluation are more 
appropriate to the scale and scope of the project—with larger projects requiring more-rigorous tests of 
financial and economic feasibility and sustainability. It is particularly important to assess whether the 
project is relevant (does it meet demonstrated and high-priority needs) and feasible (is it well designed 
and will it provide sustainable benefits to target groups). The project appraisal process should consider 
project proposals of different scales and take into account the key macro, sectoral, and project-specific 
uncertainties, such as inflation, cost overrun, and change in output and key input prices over the project’s 
life. The appraisal of each project according to these criteria should be reflected in key documents, such 
as project technical cards. 
D. Independent Appraisal Review 
3.29 No independent project review is being performed. The MoIU is responsible for its own 
investment projects in roads, social housing, and urban infrastructure and also for all infrastructure 
projects presented by the sector ministries in which it intervenes as a technical ministry. Sector ministries 
often identify a project and rely on the MoIU for project designing and feasibility assessment as well as 
implementation. These designs however are not reviewed by any other independent institution and 
sometimes are only prepared after the project has been incorporated into the PIP. 
3.30 Geproyectos, a national agency with technical capacity and expertise in public investment, 
participates throughout the investment project cycle and can hardly be expected to carry out an 
independent review of project appraisals. Geproyectos is independent from other ministries and 
accountable only to the Presidency, although three ministries—MoPD, MoIU, and MoFB—are members 
of its board of directors.
51
 Its objectives are broad and cover the entire investment process, from
 
(a) 
planning, design, supervision, execution, monitoring, evaluation, and control of all public infrastructure 
                                                          
50 For example, Geproyectos has only around twenty technical staff, the Roads Directorate at the MoIU has only four engineers, 
and the Directorate of Construction and Housing at the MoIU has six engineers, together with one architect and four technical 
architects (delineantes).  
51 The National Office of Planning, Evaluation and Project Monitoring in Equatorial Guinea (Geproyectos) was created by 
Decree No. 106/2004 of Aug. 18, 2004, modifying Decree No. 37/2003, but its internal regulation has not been yet approved. 
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projects, constructions that involve civil engineering, as well as those projects that are earmark funded 
either by the Treasury or donors; to (b) elaborating and publishing calls for tender and assessing the bids; 
(c) periodically informing the government on its activity and the progress of works and projects being 
implemented in the country; and (d) any other attribution that may be decided.  
3.31 New structures stemming from the National Development Plan could carry out independent 
technical reviews. Three new institutions have been created to realize the NDP. The Consejo Superior 
Guinea Ecuatorial 2020, chaired by the President, is in charge of providing strategic leadership, validating 
the priorities for implementation of the NDP and evaluating its progress.
52
 The National Agency 2020 
(Agencia Nacional Guinea Ecuatorial 2020) is a technical institution in charge of coordinating and 
making the NDP operational.
53 
Its final role will, however, depend on the place assigned to it within the 
current institutional setting in which informal arrangements are prevalent. Two main roles might be 
delegated to the National Agency 2020: (a) carrying out independent reviews of project proposals that 
have been adequately appraised by Geproyectos or the MoIU; and (b) devising an NDP action plan and 
budget with new reporting tools that allow for monitoring and evaluation of NDP implementation.
54
 
E. Project Selection and Budgeting 
3.32 Many institutions intervene in the decision-making process with unclear roles that vary 
according to the sector of the project. The project selection procedure is not formalized and it is not 
clear who formally authorizes project implementation, which dilutes responsibilities and transparency. 
There are three main actors: the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Infrastructure, and Geproyectos. 
Sector ministries also intervene but to a lesser extent and with varying intensity according to the sector. 
The MoFB’s role consists of setting the overall investment ceiling. The three new structures stemming 
from the NDP are getting on their feet, but their role is unclear in the absence of better coordination and 
formalization of procedures. There is substantial institutional overlap in the current institutional setting. 
Geproyectos shares with the MoPD and other sector ministries the authority for planning public 
investments and with the MoIU for assessing infrastructure projects. Geproyectos and the MoIU both 
intervene in the implementation of investment projects, and they prepare the tendering process, choose the 
contractor, cosign contracts, and are co-responsible for project monitoring. There is also overlap between 
the National Agency 2020 and Geproyectos since both report to the Presidency on infrastructure projects 
that are part of the NDP.  
3.33 The PIP is prepared by the Ministry of Planning and Development (MoPD), based on 
limited information provided by sector ministries. Sector ministries are not requested to justify their 
investment proposals, and there is no minimum screening requirement for projects (Figure 3.2 shows the 
steps of PIP preparation). Ministries provide a list of projects for implementation, sometimes with their 
estimated total cost and duration.
55
 Further information is sometimes provided on the content and 
justification of projects and their cost, but mostly for projects that should be classified as current 
expenditure. For infrastructure projects there is very little information, and sector ministries may only 
indicate a project’s name and costs without a justification. No explanations are provided on the 
methodology used for cost evaluation, and the timetable is not justified. No distinction is made between 
projects that were approved in previous years but not yet begun and ongoing projects, sometimes because 
projects are implemented by a different institution (that is, Geproyectos) and the ministry does not have 
the information. For ongoing projects, there is no information on the amount already executed and the 
amount that remains. The MoPD does not have information on project implementation and cannot 
                                                          
52 Decree No. 63/2008 of Nov. 20, 2008, created the Superior Council of Equatorial Guinea 2020. 
53 Decree No. 61/2008 of Nov. 20, 2008, created the National Agency of Equatorial Guinea 2020.  
54 The NDP also creates the Comité Nacional de Concertación ―Guinea Ecuatorial 2020‖ for further coordination with 
stakeholders not included in the Consejo Superior Guinea Ecuatorial 2020. 
55 There is no breakdown between years according to the calendar of implementation. 
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correctly budget ongoing investment to identify the surplus for new projects. This could soon become an 
overwhelming problem as the portfolio of ongoing projects grows and the fiscal constraint tightens.  
3.34 The PIP does not reflect NDP priorities. There is no ceiling per ministry, and ministries do not 
spell out their priorities but provide an aggregate investment program for implementation. To build the 
PIP, the MoPD adds all the ministerial demands. If the total estimated cost of the projects is under the 
investment ceiling set by the MoFB, then all the projects are approved. However if they exceed this 
amount, the MoPD has limited information to decide which projects to reject. The informal rule applied 
for the initial 2009 budget
 
was to accept all projects presented by social ministries and reduce the 
budgeted amount of the remaining projects for 2009 by scheduling more costs in 2010 or 2011, taking 
into account possible delays in implementation.
56
 Thus, final budgetary envelopes by sector depend 
mostly on the capacity of a ministry to come up with projects rather than on strategic importance. In spite 
of a small number of projects being labeled ―Priority Projects Horizon 2020‖ it is uncertain whether these 
or other projects in the PIP are consistent with the strategic goals of the government. Furthermore, 
approximately 30 percent of projects included in the PIP should not be considered as investment but as 
recurrent expenditure.  
3.35 The PIP has no connection with the budget process. There is a quasi-total disconnect between 
the investment program and executed investments (see Annex VIII for an example from the education 
sector). Few projects in the PIP are actually implemented, but no accurate report tracks PIP 
implementation. There is no gatekeeping process to prevent unscreened or new projects from being 
included in the PIP during the course of the year. The decision to start a project lacks transparency. Also, 
since only one appropriation for capital investment is made annually and there are no sector envelopes in 
the PIP, the Treasury does not refuse payment of any investment project as long as the total investment 
budget is not exhausted.  
                                                          




Figure 3. 2: Preparation of the Public Investment Program 
 
Source: World Bank 
3.36 Infrastructure maintenance and operating costs are not taken into account when selecting 
projects. They are not considered when assessing a project nor in choosing between contractor bids and 
are only estimated once is the work finished.
57
 A ministry’s capacity (in both financial and human 
resources) to operate and maintain a particular infrastructure are not criteria for project selection even 
though differences in operational and maintenance costs between projects in the medium to long run, can 
be substantial and taking them into account could lead to different projects and contractors being chosen. 
There is today a high premium for contractors proposing projects cheap to build, even if they turn out to 
be costly to maintain. 
                                                          
57 The company that carries out a project construction guarantees to pay maintenance costs for two years. 


















































No possibility to know which projects of the PIP are being 
implemented because of lack of reporting on execution of projects 










knows how much 
has been paid to 
each company 
but cannot link 
this to the PIP
49 
 
3.37 The decision-making process requires improved and more-transparent procedures. After 
coordination and agreement among the different institutions have been reached, procedures should be 
written down and codified. Legislation should be developed, and a clearly designated institution should be 
authorized to select projects in the PIP and the procedure to start projects that are not included in the PIP. 
Sector ministries should act as clients of Geproyectos, presenting their project requests for technical 
review and ensuring that the findings are taken into account during project preparation and 
implementation. In this new framework, Geproyectos would be the project manager for all infrastructure 
projects, and the National Agency 2020 could concentrate on interministerial coordination, independent 
project evaluations, and reporting. Increasing transparency and availability of information for all the 
relevant actors will also be crucial for improving public finance management in infrastructure.  
3.38 Although the current system is very ineffective, a few quick measures can significantly 
increase investment efficiency. First, sector ministries need to identify the cost of ongoing projects so 
that the MoPD can calculate the surplus that can be allocated to new projects. Second, the available 
investment budget should be divided into sector envelopes that reflect national priorities. Third, the PIP 
should provide a good picture of projects with a reasonable chance of implementation in the medium 
term, particularly with regard to next year’s projects since many on the list have slim probabilities of 
getting off the ground then due to the limited capacity of some sector ministries to implement many 
projects simultaneously. Fourth, project costs need more frequent updating. Presently they are often rough 
estimates provided by ministries at an early stage that do not get revised during implementation, even 
when the cost agreed on contractually turns out to be very different from what had been anticipated.
58
 
Fifth, multiyear planning can be improved. Currently it is not done on the basis of a careful analysis of 
project features but rather as a way to adjust high investment requests to annual budgetary constraints by 
spreading the overall funding for a project over three years. Sector ministries should provide better 
information on the expected calendar of projects so that the MoPD can improve both multiyear planning 
and annual budgeting and provide the government and Parliament with more realistic figures. Sixth, the 
PIP includes a large amount of current spending that should not be counted as investment. Better 
screening by sector ministries and the MoPD and new budget classification to identify infrastructure 
projects would help ensure that only investment projects are included in the PIP. 
F. Project Implementation 
3.39 There is no procurement regulatory framework, which raises the risks of corruption and 
the selection of nonoptimal proposals and contractors. The lack of procurement regulations gives 
Geproyectos and the MoIU the freedom to opt for a bidding process or a direct award of contract. And if 
bidding is chosen, there are no rules on tendering so that decisions on publicity requirements, criteria of 
choice, and obligatory timelines are made ad hoc. Finally, no process exists for resolving complaints 
involving the procurement process. This lack of formal procedures raises the risks of collusion and 
corruption, increases the probability that suboptimal projects or contractors will be chosen, and in general 
negatively affects the final price and quality of the project. The authorities are aware of these risks, and 
the NDP highlights the need for building a procurement regulatory framework to enhance public 
investment efficiency. The plan also calls for establishing databases on standard prices and unit costs of 
construction. Following these recommendations, the government should expedite preparation and 
adoption of a system that is in line with the OECD/DAC
59
 recommendations and create databases with 
unit costs for crosschecking with contract costs. 
3.40 Financial execution of infrastructure projects is concentrated at the Treasury and at 
Geproyectos, with limited involvement of other ministries. The procedure is not formally documented 
                                                          
58 For two projects reviewed, only 32 per cent and 60 per cent of the costs were actually budgeted. 
59 Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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and an informal procedure has filled the legal vacuum (see Figure 3.3). The Treasury has all the 
information on financial execution. It records infrastructure payments in a single section (Section 7—
Other expenditure) and keeps track of payments per company as approved in the payments’ commission 
documentation.
60
 However the information available makes it impossible to compare this execution report 
with the PIP because (a) many of the projects implemented are not included in the PIP or (b) when they 
are, they have different names and do not share the same budget code (see Annex VIII for an illustration). 
Furthermore, this information on budget implementation is not transmitted to sector ministries or the 
MoPD, which therefore cannot monitor execution of the PIP. The current system could be majorly 
improved by rationalizing the financial execution system in the infrastructure sector. This could be done 
by (a) identifying projects by a unique number (as used in the PIP) in contracts and payments and (b) 
sharing the payment information available at the Treasury with sector ministries and the MoPD.  
3.41 Given the limited number of staff, the government is unable to monitor all projects 
throughout the country and must rely mostly on external inputs from private supervision 
contractors. Up to four entities are responsible for monitoring projects: Geproyectos, the MoIU, 
specialized private companies, and sometimes sector ministries. For the most complex projects, 
supervision and control of the work is outsourced to private contractors that act as monitoring agencies. 
Construction contractors are required to submit progress reports to these monitoring agencies, which audit 
both financial and physical implementation and send periodic reports to Geproyectos and the MoIU. In 
addition at least one engineer from Geproyectos and a technician from the MoIU are assigned to monitor 
each project. They are expected to certify work progress through field visits, a mission similar to what the 
private monitoring agencies do. However, given the limited number of public engineers and the 
abundance of projects, only sporadic visits are possible,
61
 and the technical team must rely mostly on 
information provided by the private contractors to assess work progress and risk management.
62
 Sector 
ministries are usually not associated with project implementation, except for a few such as the Ministry of 
Mines that implement their own projects. 
3.42 A ―risk-based‖ monitoring system at Geproyectos and the MoIU should be developed. 
Monitoring tasks by public officials should be redefined and written down. Monitoring by both 
Geproyectos and MoIU should vary according to the risks or the importance of the project. A public 
engineer from Geproyectos or the MoIU would still be in charge of monitoring each infrastructure 
project. Projects with high risk would be closely monitored, while projects with lower or smaller risks 
would receive less systematic monitoring. Outsourcing project monitoring to a private company seems an 
adequate procedure and can lead to substantial reduction in the risk of noncompliance while also 
providing added technical advice. Nonetheless, this work must still be supervised by public engineers and 
will require streamlined procedures to ensure that public employees have all project documentation and 
updated information. Under the proposed system public engineers would carry out fewer tasks and carry 
out more internal controls to ensure monitoring agencies are correctly performing their work. 
Geproyectos and the MoIU should submit progress reports to sector ministries to facilitate a more 
effective control on project implementation and ensure that infrastructure is adapted to the needs of the 
administration that will operate it.  
  
                                                          
60 Geproyectos also has information on payments per contractor, but they are not aggregated by project.  
61 For example, engineers from Geproyectos inspect projects in a given area through missions that last two to three weeks, every 
three months approximately. 
62 Contracts are often not available at government dependencies even when the agencies are charged with monitoring contract 
terms, and they can only be found at the supervision agencies managed by private contractors. 
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Staying on Track during Implementation 
3.43 Adapting to changed circumstances in project implementation is difficult because available 
information is too segmented, hindering adequate project monitoring and control. There is no single 
and centralized information system, and project documents are scattered among different public 
institutions and private monitoring agencies. Some information does not exist at all: for instance, there is 
no updated list of projects (see Table 3.3 for a summary of available information). When adequate reports 
exist, such as those prepared by engineers from Geproyectos after field trips,
63
 they are not framed to 
meet decision makers’ needs. The current ―reporting‖ system cannot be relied on to be timely, thorough, 
and accurate, and a new system is needed to adequately inform managers on the physical and financial 
progress of their projects. This system will need to provide information about the pace of project 
implementation, constraints encountered, significant remedial or supportive actions required, and 
document changes in forward plans, including budgetary requirements and reallocations. Finally, it will 
need to be flexible enough to adapt information requirements to the different decision levels, that is, it 
will require a hierarchy of data collection and reporting formats to meet information needs of different 
levels of management (see an example in Figure 3.4). 
  
                                                          
63 Field trip reports by Geproyectos engineers are well structured and provide useful information such as project name, location, 
contractor, private monitoring agency, contract amount, implementation delay, project starting date, date of inspection, 
comments, execution quality (five possible grades), percentage of execution at the date of the last mission, and current percentage 
of execution. However, some information such as delays is not systematically reported. 
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Table 3. 3: Available Information for Infrastructure Projects 





where it can be 
found 
Comments 
List of budgeted 
projects 
Available MoPD 
This list does not reflect the reality of infrastructure 
projects in EQG (i.e., number of projects, nature, and 
costs). 
Updated list of 
infrastructure projects 
under implementation 
Not Available Not Available 
This list is not available per sector. There is a list of 
payments to contractors, but it cannot be used for 
project monitoring. 
First year the project 
was budgeted and 
amount budgeted 
Available (if the 
project was 
budgeted)  
MoPD This is irrelevant if the project was not budgeted. 





This cost can differ from the one recorded in the 
budget. It does not include operation and 
maintenance costs, which are not evaluated until the 
project is finished. 
Revised cost estimates Not Available Geproyectos  
It could be retrieved from the minutes of the 








Information that should be available at the project 
manager level is not systematically reported and 
available at a glance. 





There is a list of payments made to contractors 
(which can be part of a project or several projects at 
a time). This list does not correspond to the PIP. It is 
not possible to reconcile both lists and know 
implementation by project. 
Rate of return of the 




Not Available Not calculated. 
Source: World Bank 
Note: This table does not apply to noninfrastructure investment expenditure.  
3.44 A project database with relevant information and updated indicators should be created. 
Project technical cards should be designed to provide this information, containing at least the project’s (a) 
name and budget code, (b) objective and description, (c) outcome indicators, (d) initial and revised cost 
estimates, (e) initial and revised timeline, (f) responsible sector ministry, and (g) person in charge of 
monitoring. The centralization of infrastructure management in Geproyectos makes it easier to gather this 
information. With these project technical cards, Geproyectos could create a database geared to different 
phases of the project cycle, in particular at the implementation stage. One key need will be to identify 
projects using the same single budget number attributed in the PIP. Examples of reporting tools are 
provided in Annex IX.  
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Figure 3. 4: Reporting Needs by Level of Management 
 
 
Source: European Commission, ―Project Cycle Management Guidelines‖ (2004) 
3.45 Information on physical and financial execution and project changes needs to be made 
available to ministries outside Geproyectos. Given the lack of appropriate information, the MoPD has 
started to place staff in sector ministries to obtain updated knowledge of project execution and build up 
capacity for project preparation and monitoring. This activity should be encouraged, and accompanied by 
a clarification of roles between Geproyectos, the MoPD, and the upcoming National Agency 2020 since 
all will have a reporting task. Coordination will be essential to avoid duplications, improve information, 
and raise efficiency. This also requires that sector ministries receive updated information on project 
implementation.  
3.46 Geproyectos’ Payments Commission makes strategic decisions on project changes with 
limited technical information. The Payments Commission is formed by high-level representatives that 
include the Director of Geproyectos; the Minister of Infrastructure; the Minister of Planning, Economic 
Development, and Public Investments; and the Treasurer. Sector ministries do not attend the 
commission’s meetings, but contractors often do. The main purpose of the Payments Commission, after 
all, is to approve contractors’ payment requests; although these meetings also consider and decide on 
modifications in project funding or planning. Thus projects are not necessarily reviewed and revised on a 
regular basis, but are taken up intermittently when contractors have asked for a meeting to resolve 
payment requests. Therefore, despite the fact that the budget process for investment projects diverges 
from formal budget procedures it does not improve the system to know, among other things, if there are 
payment delays.  
3.47 Technical committees need to be created to complement the Geproyectos Payments 
Commission. These technical committees, operating at a lower level of responsibility, would help to 
prepare the Payments Commission meetings and could specialize by sector, including all relevant sector 
ministries. They would be formed by staff at the administrative level (general directors, general 
secretaries and/or directors) and would review project progress and performance periodically, taking 
technical decisions to ensure adequate project implementation. Decisions implying changes in funding or 
payments would still be reserved to the payments commission. 
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G. Facility Operation 
3.48 There is no asset registration. There is no accrual accounting and all investment is recorded 
under a single budget line, making it difficult to differentiate fixed assets from the rest of public 
investment (including around 30 percent of PIP projects that actually are current expenditures). A first 
step toward clarifying the situation is to create a new budget line for recording all fixed-asset investments 
to inventory new physical infrastructure.  
3.49 Operational costs are not considered until the infrastructure is transferred to the sector 
ministry, which weakens project sustainability. Sector ministries seldom carry out a thorough project 
appraisal before implementation and often do not participate during the construction phase. Operational 
and maintenance costs therefore go unassessed until the infrastructure is finished and handed over to the 
sector ministry responsible for its functioning. Sector ministries must be involved in the implementation 
to adequately prepare for the transfer to operational status, budget recurrent costs, and hire qualified 
personnel in advance. 
H. Evaluation 
3.50 The National Agency 2020 could conduct project evaluations to ensure that key lessons 
learnt from ongoing projects feed into future projects. Such evaluations would be particularly useful 
in Equatorial Guinea because many infrastructure projects in the PIP are of similar type and will be built 
in the future. The ability to judge how effectively government resources have been spent would be very 
useful in helping successor projects avoid past mistakes and build on proven good practices. The National 
Agency 2020 (Agencia Nacional Guinea Ecuatorial 2020) may be the best-placed institution at this time 
to carry out such investment program evaluations and prepare investment implementation reports. New 
programming and project identification should draw on the results of such monitoring and evaluation.  
I. Conclusions 
3.51 Current budget expenditure is penalized by cumbersome administrative procedures that 
encourage informal short cuts that render the formally adopted Budget irrelevant. This leads to 
incomplete and unreliable budget data, insufficient monitoring of budget disbursement, risk of corruption, 
and the proliferation of ministerial bank accounts whose balances are not adequately monitored. More 
importantly, it prevents the authorized Budget from being used as a tool for resource allocation and 
implementation control. The highest priority should be given to ensuring that simpler and quicker 
procedures are enforced to encourage ministries to use the official channels so that information from the 
executed budget is systematically reported and can be compared to the voted budget. Transparency and 
audits are also very weak and need to improve in the medium term to improve budget quality.  
3.52 Public investment decisions are centralized at Geproyectos, which does not use the PIP as a 
tool for investment allocation or control. Geproyectos reports directly to the Presidency and is not 
constrained by the PIP. Project appraisal is seldom carried out, and the public investment cycle has no 
clear connection with the budget process. No procedure prevents unscreened projects from being 
implemented, even if they have not been included in the PIP. Moreover, reporting does not allow 
reconciliation of investment implementation data with data stemming from the PIP formally adopted, 
which makes the PIP an irrelevant tool for making investment decisions. Furthermore, internal controls 
for project supervision are weak and rely on limited technical staff, private monitoring agencies, and 
contractors. The overall poor governance of infrastructure investment raises the risks of corruption and 
reduces public investment efficiency at a time when the government needs improved and streamlined 
budget procedures to implement the large investment program set in the NDP. 
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3.53 Although the budget system underperforms, a few measures could be taken to make the 
budget a relevant tool for management and resource allocation. Implementation of the recurrent 
budget requires streamlined procedures that allow for more delegation from the payment-authorizing 
officer (currently the President of EQG) to lower administrative levels. This selective delegation would 
ensure larger responsibility of the MoFB in budget implementation and would help to reinforce the 
budget system—with improved disbursement reporting better aligned with enacted budget appropriations 
and strengthened internal controls. On the investment side, PIP’s project quality needs to be raised by 
carrying out project appraisals and allocating resources on the basis of NDP’s strategic guidance. This 
should be complemented by greater transparency in the decision-making process, eliminating the 
possibility of implementing unscreened projects not included in the PIP, and by a better reporting system 
that allows comparing projects implemented with the PIP formally adopted. This will require a clearer 
definition of responsibilities among all institutions participating in the investment cycle, including more 
involvement of sector ministries during the preparation and implementation phase. Finally, internal 
controls should be strengthened to better supervise private monitoring agencies and focus on the most 
relevant or risky projects. 
Recommendations 
Short Term 
Issues to Address Action to Take 
Budget and PIP preparation does not reflect 
national priorities. 
 Define sector envelopes during the budget 
preparation phase. 
Budget and PIP preparation does not take 
into account maintenance and operational 
costs. 
 Improve multiannual planning by taking into 
account the operational and maintenance costs of 
infrastructure projects. 
Inadequate budget classification and 
recording reduces government’s 
accountability and transparency. 
 Use the same economic and administrative 
classification for current and investment 
expenditure in the initial budgets and in reports on 
budget execution. 
Procedures for budget execution are 
frequently bypassed, reducing budget control 
and quality of information. 
 Streamline and formalize budget procedures to 
ensure allocations are used for their intended 
purpose, expenses are properly recorded, and budget 
execution is monitored. 
Many institutions intervene in the decision-
making process with roles that vary 
according to the sector of the project, and no 
independent review of projects is carried out. 
 Increase transparency in the decision-making 
process, clarifying the role of the different actors in 
infrastructure project management and appointing 
one institution to carry out independent reviews of 
project appraisals. 
Technical capacity of staff in all ministries, 
notably sector ministries, is very limited and 
hinders investment efforts. 
 Define a human resources policy for hiring, 
retaining, and training enough qualified staff to 
effectively assess and implement investment 
projects. Accelerate the MoPD institutional capacity 
building program in sector ministries.  
Projects are seldom appraised, raising the risk 
of inadequate project selection. 
 Approve a formal and well-publicized guidance for 
project appraisal, tailored to the technical capacity 
of ministries and to the nature and size of projects. 
 Outsource project appraisals to raise investment 
efficiency and enhance institutional capacity 
The PIP has no connection with the budget  Reduce the current practice of launching often 
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process. unscreened projects that are not in the PIP, and 
ensure appropriate procedures are followed for 
projects included during the year. 
Available information on project execution is 
too segmented and hinders adequate project 
monitoring and control. 
 Design a new reporting system based on project 
technical cards with all relevant information 
(including the same project number used in the 
PIP), with regular updating by Geproyectos and 
information on project implementation disseminated 
to the MoPD and sector ministries. 
The government cannot effectively monitor 
all projects throughout the country and relies 
on external inputs from private monitoring 
agencies. 
 Set up a monitoring system with various degrees of 
monitoring according to the risk of each project. 
Make supervision personnel accountable for 
progress of projects under their jurisdiction, and 
involve sector ministries in the monitoring and 
regular review of projects by requiring Geproyectos 
and the MoIU to submit progress reports to them. 
Geproyectos’ Payments Commission makes 
strategic decisions on project changes with 
limited technical information.  
 Create technical steering committees at the senior 
level to review progress and performance of 
projects in a given sector. They will periodically 
meet and follow up on project implementation using 
improved reporting tools. 
Operational costs are not considered until the 
infrastructure is transferred to the sector 
ministry which negatively affects project 
sustainability. 
 Operational and maintenance costs should be 
assessed at project preparation and the sector 
ministry should participate in project 
implementation to ensure that maintenance plans are 
in place, recurrent cost requirements are reflected in 
future budgets and adequate human resources hired. 
Medium Term 
Issues to Address Action to Take 
The current accounting system does not allow 
for registration of assets and liabilities and 
does not account for actual infrastructure 
investment. 
 Create a new budget line in the economic 
classification to differentiate between infrastructure 
investment and other investments and provide some 
basic information on assets accumulation. 
Internal control is very weak and raises the 
risk of corruption. 
 Professionalize the internal audit function to obtain 
an accurate analysis of the reliability and integrity 
of financial information and reduce the possibility 
of corruption. 
External oversight does not exist.  Create a national audit office with jurisdictional 
power and adequate means, and ensure broad 
dissemination of its audit reports. 
There is no procurement regulatory 
framework, which raises the risks of 
corruption and selection of nonoptimal bids 
and contractors. 
 Elaborate a procurement regulatory framework and 
a unit cost database for comparison with contractor 
proposals. 
No project evaluation is conducted, 
neglecting key lesson learning that would 
raise the efficiency of future investment 
projects. 
 Develop ex post evaluation, in particular for 





CHAPTER 4: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION  
4.1 Information on the education sector is woefully inadequate. It offers a very low level of 
disaggregation, is often inconsistent, and in many cases is either nonexistent or unavailable. These 
problems are more pronounced for the preschool and secondary levels. For the first time, the Ministry of 
Education, Science, and Sport (MECD) prepared the Primary Education Yearbook for the 2007/08 
academic year, which apart from the errors typically found in any first census, provides a wealth of data.
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4.2 Serious discrepancies exist in the population data from the statistical source consulted, 
thereby hindering analysis of the education sector. Official data from the 2001 census indicate that 
Equatorial Guinea had a population of 1,014,999 inhabitants in 2001, while UN estimates put the figure at 
530,000 in 2000. These discrepancies in the total number and its distribution by age group and district 
hinder identification of the demand for education, especially with respect to the primary school-age 
population. In order to compensate for this lack of information, a school-age population projection based 
on both statistical sources was prepared (see Annex X). 
A. Organization of the Education System 
4.3 Organization of the educational system in Equatorial Guinea is based on General Education 
Law No. 5/2007, which amends Education Law No. 14/1995. The new law extends primary education 
from five to six years and shortens secondary education from seven to six years. The levels and types of 
educational offerings in Equatorial Guinea are as follows: 
 Preschool education, which is free, has recently been declared compulsory, and is divided into 
two phases—nursery school for one- to three-year-olds, and kindergarten for four- to six-year-
olds. This level has a Basic Curriculum Structure and a corresponding textbook has been 
published, although data is lacking on the quantity and distribution of the textbooks. 
 
 Primary education, which is free and compulsory, covers six years of study divided into two 
cycles: the first, from ages seven to nine and the second, from ages ten to twelve. The Primary 
Studies Certificate (Certificado de Estudios Primarios) is awarded upon completion of the second 
cycle; and under the law, students who fail the examination for this certificate have the option of 
pursuing occupational vocational training. Primary education is offered at one-teacher schools 
(Grades 1 and 2), escuelas graduadas (Grades 1–3), and colegios nacionales (Grades 1–6). 
 
 General secondary education is divided into two parts: a four-year cycle known as the Basic 
Secondary Education (ESBA) program, with a new approved curriculum; followed by a two-year 
cycle, the bachillerato, which covers science, the humanities, technology, and the arts, with each 
discipline offering its own specific compulsory and optional subjects, although the curriculum is 
being revised. The General Secondary Education Certificate (Graduado de Educación Secundaria 
General) is awarded upon completion of the bachillerato and allows students to pursue college 
preparatory courses (Curso de Orientación Universitaria, COU). The General Education Law 
does not explicitly indicate whether secondary education, irrespective of the type, or 
postsecondary education is free. The ESBA is offered at national secondary education institutes. 
                                                          
64 Other reports used in this chapter are as follows: Paula Razquin, ―Informe de situación del sector educación y lineamientos 
para fortalecer la política educativa‖ (Report on the Situation in the Education Sector and Guidelines for Strengthening Education 
Policy), mimeographed document (2006); Academy for Educational Development (AED) in coordination with the Ministry of 
Education, Science, and Sport of Equatorial Guinea, ―Desarrollo Educativo en Guinea Ecuatorial,‖ or Educational Development 
in Equatorial Guinea, (2006); and the ―Plan de Acción Nacional para el Desarrollo de la Educación para Todos (EPT),‖ or the 
National Action Plan for the Development of Education for All (2002). 
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 Vocational secondary education requires completion of the ESBA program. This program has 
two two-year cycles: a middle cycle leading to qualification as an Assistant Technician (Auxiliar 
Técnico), and an upper cycle leading to qualification as a Certified Technician (Oficial Técnico). 
The program is offered at national vocational training institutes.  
 
 Higher education admission requires successful completion of the COU or the upper cycle for 
vocational training. Courses are provided at the faculties and university colleges. The faculties 
offer Bachelor’s degrees in Medical Sciences, Arts and Social Sciences, and Environmental 
Studies (all six semesters in length); a Master’s degree (four semesters); and a Ph.D (at least three 
years). The university colleges have a three-year cycle and offer training in Administration; 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry; Health and Environment; and Technical Engineering and 
Teacher Training. There is currently one center, the National University of Equatorial Guinea 




 Other types include continuing training, distance education, and special education. 
 
4.4 The Ministry of Education, Science, and Sport is responsible for managing the education 
system. MECD’s main responsibilities are to propose general educational policy guidelines to the 
government; approve study plans; establish public centers and authorize the establishment of private 
centers; promote, guide, and coordinate contributions from social and economic groups for the sector’s 
development; and issue and accredit qualifications. The sport portfolio was incorporated into the ministry 
in 2005. MECD’s organizational chart is characterized by its centralization and includes the following: 
 Civil service—Minister; Deputy Minister; General Secretary; State Secretary responsible for 
University Education; Regional Education Office (ministry office in the continental region) 
 Technical Implementation Units—General Directorates for Nursery and Preschool Education 
(recently established); Primary Education and Literacy; Secondary Education and Vocational 
Training; Planning and Educational Programming; Universities and Research; Youth; Physical 




 Administrative Services Units—General Secretariat; Personnel Office; Administrative 
Coordination Section; International Relations and Scholarships Section; Economic Section; 
Registration and Archives Section 
 Coordination Advisory Units—Administrative Council 
 Autonomous entities—National Commission for Cooperation; National Commission for the 
Accreditation of Certificates, Diplomas, and Degrees; and the Universidad  
Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial. 
                                                          
65 Spain’s Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), or the National Distance Education University, which is 
funded by the International Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID), also offers higher 
education in Equatorial Guinea. 
66 There is one Inspector General and 18 district inspectors, whose responsibilities include technical assistance in program design, 
oversight of class timetables, student and teacher attendance, level of enrollment, and generally speaking, collection of 
information on demand and supply problems. Although municipal and zone inspectors have been appointed to work with the 
district inspectors in recent years, they are insufficiently qualified and have limited resources to perform their duties. 
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B. An Underperforming System 
4.5 No reliable data on literacy rates exist, but they are believed to be high and in line with 
rates observed in the region. On one hand, the 2001 census recorded 50,644 illiterate persons among the 
population over the age of 15 years (9.2 percent of the total population above this age), which fell to 
17,623 illiterate persons over the age of 15 in the information survey conducted by the Inspectorate 
General of the MECD in 2008. This sharp decrease, coupled with the low level recorded, raises serious 
doubts about the quality of the data, especially in relation to the low primary enrollment rate. Using the 
2007 information survey, the illiteracy rate is 2.2 percent of the population over the age of 15, according 
to the official population source, and 4.7 percent according to the UN. However, these rates would appear 
to be considerably at variance with the actual situation
67
 since a primary completion rate of 43 percent 
indicates the level of illiteracy should be much higher, and closer to illiteracy rates in the region.
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4.6 A campaign to reduce illiteracy was recently launched. The starting point for the strategy to 
reduce illiteracy devised by the General Directorate for Primary Education and Literacy was the launch of 
the ―Yes, I can‖ program by Cuban experts. This program revolves around a ―facilitator,‖ using games, 
manuals, and television programs. However, the use of television is proving problematic since 80 percent 
of illiterate persons live in rural areas where access to electricity is very limited. However, it bears noting 
that the MECD is mulling the installation of solar panels and generators to overcome this obstacle.
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4.7 With the exception of the preschool level, enrollment rates have not improved in recent 
years and remain dismally low. Gross enrollment rates for preschool, primary, and secondary levels for 
the 2007/08 academic year were 83 percent, 80 percent, and 40 percent, respectively, of the 
corresponding school-age population
70
  (Figure 4.1). Although there has been a significant increase in 
preschool enrollment, primary and secondary enrollment barely grew between the 2000/2001 and 2007/08 
academic years (Table 4.1). Furthermore, growth at the primary level is primarily attributed to the 
incorporation of an additional grade (Grade 6).
71
 Thus the gross enrollment rate declined as the population 
increased (Figure 4.2) and, with the exception of preschool enrollment, is lower than that of the other 
countries in the region.
72  
Despite higher preschool enrollment rates in Equatorial Guinea than in most 
countries in the region,
73
 the main problem pertains to the primary enrollment rate, which is considerably 
lower than most others in the region.
74
 The secondary enrollment rate in Equatorial Guinea also compares 
unfavorably to that of other regional countries.
75
  
                                                          
67 Countries with illiteracy rates of between 2 and 5 percent are Greece, Portugal, Argentina, Chile, and Costa Rica.  
68 Burundi (41 percent), Cameroon (32 percent), Congo (52 percent), Côte d’Ivoire (51 percent), Gabon (29 percent), Ghana (42 
percent), Kenya (26 percent), Mali (81 percent), Nigeria (33 percent), Rwanda (35 percent), Tanzania (31 percent), Chad (74 
percent), and Uganda (37 percent), according to data from the Pôle de Dakar (UNESCO) for 2003/04 and 2004/05. 
69 Although the pedagogical approach seems appropriate, the installation cost of generators and panels is very high in relation to 
other priority actions.  
70 United Nations population estimates, the highest of the international sources cited, are used in this document. Rates from 
official national population sources would be considerably lower. 
71 Data included in the 2000/2001 National Action Plan for the Development of Education for All are compared with MECD data 
for 2007/08. 
 
72 See Pôle de Dakar (UNESCO) for 2003/04 and 2004/05. 
73 The preschool enrollment rate in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, and Chad is less than 3 percent, and is 
approximately 15 percent in Gabon and Nigeria. Ghana (42 percent) and Kenya (54 percent) have higher rates than Equatorial 
Guinea. 
74 The gross primary enrollment rate in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire is 70 percent, and between 80 and 90 percent in Burundi, Ghana, 
and Chad; the rate exceeds 100 percent in other countries such as Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, and Kenya. 
75 Data for the two cycles at this level are disaggregated. The gross enrollment rate for both levels of secondary education is 62 
percent and 16 percent in Congo, 61 percent and 25 percent in Gabon, 64 percent and 21 percent in Ghana, and 91 percent and 28 
percent in Kenya. Equatorial Guinea has slightly better results than Burundi (17 percent and 6 percent), Tanzania (14 percent and 
2 percent), and Uganda (23 percent and 9 percent). 
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Figure 4. 1: Gross Enrollment Rate 
(Percentage of the corresponding school-age group) 
 
                                      Source: World Bank 
 
 
Figure 4. 2: Primary and Secondary Enrollment by Grade 
 (Thousands of persons) 
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Table 4. 1: Enrollment Trends 
Level 2000/2001 % 2007/08 % Variation 
Preschool 20,039 15.0 46,538 28.7 132.2 
Primary 79,878 59.6 81,099 50.0     1.5 
Secondary 34,116 25.5 34,441 21.2     1.0 
Total      134,033 100     162,078 100            20.9 
      
         Source: EPT and MECD Directorates 
Note: Level percentages are rounded, with the total equaling 100 percent. 
4.8 As Figure 4. 3: shows, there is a low net primary enrollment rate, with a sharp decline 
between the first and second grades owing to the high number of overage students (by one year and 
by two or more years). Some 72.3 percent of primary students are overage relative to the theoretical age 
for each grade (44,754 of 81,099 students in primary school are two or more years overage, as shown in 
Table 4.2), owing either to late entry into the education system or repetition. According to the United 
Nations, gross and net access rates to the first grade stood at 93.4 percent and 47.3 percent of the 
corresponding school-age population,
76
  well below the average in the region where the gross rate 
approaches 100 percent. 
Figure 4. 3: Gross and Net Primary Enrollment Rates by Grade  
(Percent of school-age population by grade) 
 
   
Source: MECD, World Bank, United Nations population data 
 
4.9 The high rate of repetition at the primary level (24.3 percent of students) is very costly to 
the system. The highest rate of repetition is in the first grade (Table 4.3),
77
 and is significant because of 
the far-reaching consequences of the cost overrun for the education system and the impact of failure on 
the self-esteem of new students and their teachers. Reasons for this phenomenon include the following: 
                                                          
76 The MECD Yearbook indicates that a total of 16,808 new students were enrolled in the first grade for the 2007/08 academic 
year, of which 8,512 were seven years old or younger.  
77 Unlike countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania, whose repetition rates hover around 5 percent, the rate in 




























 Just 30 percent of the 1,036 primary school teachers meet the legal training requirements, and 
those that fall short demonstrate a low level of preparation.
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 Classroom age heterogeneity from high numbers of overage students results in varying learning 
rates, which makes the teaching process more difficult. 
 Fewer than half of students have a textbook. 
 Linguistic differences hinder learning, given limitations in the use of Spanish. 
 Rigid teaching methods, with little student participation. 
Table 4. 2: Gross and Net Primary Enrollment Rates 
Enrollment Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total 
Underage       3,521       1,768      1,330    907         679   486   8,691 
Theoretical        5,946       2,404      1,851 1,475      1,146    963 13,785 
Overage (+ 1 year)       4,640       2,432      2,173 1,921      1,451 1,252 13,869 
Overage (≥ 2 years)        9,626       7,997      7,447 7,581      6,768 5,335 44,754 
Total 23,733 14,601 12,801 11,884 10,044 8,036 81,099 
Gross Rate (Official)   55.2 34.8 32.0 31.3 27.1 22.3 34.4 
Gross Rate (UN) 131.9 85.9 75.3 69.9 62.8 50.2 80.6 
Net Rate(Official)   22.0   9.9   8.0   6.3   4.9   4.0   9.5 
Net Rate (UN)   52.6 24.5 18.7 14.0 11.4   9.1 22.3 
Source: MECD, World Bank 
Note: Rates are in percent; the net rate includes students in the underage and theoretical age groups. 
Table 4. 3: Repetition Rates (2007/08) 
Heading Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Total 
Repeaters   8,337   3,450   2,603   2,256   1,835 1,200 19,681 
Enrollment 23,733 14,601 12,801 11,884 10,044 8,036 81,099 
Repetition rate 35.1 % 23.6 % 20.3 % 19.0 % 18.3 % 14.9 % 24.3 % 
Source: MECD, World Bank 
4.10 It is necessary to develop and implement a strategy to reduce repetition rates. To provide an 
initial response, the Program for Educational Development of Equatorial Guinea (PRODEGE) is working 
with a number of schools (46 currently) to introduce a new teaching model to improve the quality of 
education through increased student class participation. Another option would be to eliminate repetition 
between two-year cycles (Grades 1 and 2, Grades 3 and 4, Grades 5 and 6), and introduce support classes. 
4.11 The system is highly inefficient and only one in every two students completes primary 
education. The official population source places the completion rate at 19 percent of the total student 
population, while population data from the United Nations puts the figure at 43 percent, well below rates 
in the neighboring countries of Gabon (66 percent) and Congo Brazzaville (73 percent).
79
 These high 
dropout levels are also affected by the high rates of repetition and overage, a vicious circle that 
encourages further dropout. Besides, the limited options at the secondary level, the poor sister of the 
system, and particularly of opportunities of vocational training, do not encourage families and youth to 
                                                          
78 According to the 2008 report ―Situación actual y características básicas de los docentes de la Educación Primaria en Guinea 
Ecuatorial‖ (Current Situation and Basic Characteristics of Primary Education Teachers in Equatorial Guinea), a survey on 
teachers lacking appropriate qualifications showed a high ratio had problems with written expression, spelling, and penmanship. 
79 According to Pôle de Dakar (UNESCO) data from the 2002/03, 2003/04, and 2004/05 academic years, completion rates in 
other countries in the region are Burundi (36 percent), Cameroon (62 percent), Congo (73 percent), Côte d’Ivoire (48 percent), 
Gabon (66 percent), Ghana (72 percent), Kenya (95 percent), Mali (43 percent), Mauritania (45 percent), Nigeria (76 percent), 
Rwanda (38 percent), Tanzania (55 percent), and Chad (35 percent). 
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finalize primary education. As shown in Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2, the highest dropout happens in the first 
grade, where almost half of the children abandon schooling (and the repetition rate is the highest). 
4.12 The Millennium Development Goals are far from being achieved. The National Action Plan 
for the Development of the Education for All (EFA) initiative developed in 2002 was designed to be the 
first systematic education policy program, facilitated in large measure by the robust economic growth 
from oil production. EFA objectives for 2015 are generally consistent with the MDGs and include 
expansion of school coverage, improvements in teaching quality at all levels, reformulation of secondary 
school curricula for both the bachillerato and vocational training programs, special attention to girls with 
poor academic performance, decentralization and deconcentration of education sector administration and 
management, adult literacy, and institutionalization of the sector’s technical management within the 
MECD organization chart. However EFA has not yielded the expected results to date, and Equatorial 
Guinea is far off track from achieving the education MDGs by 2015. There is a dearth of adequate basic 
information, qualified professionals, and appropriate funding (the state currently pays the salaries of only 
about 60 percent of teachers). In terms of coverage, the primary completion rate hovers around 43 
percent, less than half the 100 percent rate in the MDGs. Although no tests assess quality, it is presumably 
low, given the level of teacher training. 
C. Limited Progress in the Various Levels of Education 
4.13 While the number of students, centers, and teachers increased at the preschool level, 
resources are still inadequate to meet demand. Based on the assessment of the 2002 EFA plan, 
preschool education was being provided at three types of centers: state formal education centers, with 12 
classrooms attached to the colegios nacionales in Malabo and Bata; state nonformal education centers, 
with 300 located in rural areas; and private centers, with 45 classrooms located in urban areas and 
managed primarily by faith-based groups. Since then, the average annual growth rate of the centers has 
been 14 percent, and 15 percent for teachers (Table 4.4). This increase in human and physical resources is 
nonetheless insufficient to handle the increase in preschool enrollment, which doubled between 2001/02 
and 2007/08, leading to overcrowded classrooms, with 54 students in each center and 32 students per 
teacher during the 2007/08 academic year. Most of the 739 preschool centers (72 percent) are public, 
although the private centers are mainly located in Malabo and Bata.  
Table 4. 4: Trends for Preschool Enrollment, Centers, and Teachers (1999–2007) 
Year Students Centers Teachers 
1999/00 19,320 258   463 
2000/01 20,039 350   732 
2003/04 25,938 566   968 
2004/05 21,568 450   955 
2005/06 32,017 533 1,776 
2006/07 39,651 739 1,655 
2007/08 46,538 739 1,492 
Sources: The report ―Situation Analysis of Nursery and Preschool Education in Equatorial Guinea‖ (Análisis de situación de la 
educación infantil y preescolar de Guinea Ecuatorial) (2006/07), and data from the General Directorate for Nursery and Preschool 
Education.80 
 
4.14 Preschool teachers have limited training. Current legislation requires that teachers obtain a 
Degree in Primary Education (Maestro Diplomado en Enseñanza Primaria), which is awarded after three 
years of study at a College of Education. However, data for the 2006/07 academic year indicate that none 
                                                          
80 There are several discrepancies in the information. According to data from the 2007/08 academic year, there were 1,492 
teachers, which would imply a significant decline from the figure of 1,655 for the 2006/07 academic year. 
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of the teachers met the legal requirements, a problem exacerbated by the fact that 1,126 of 1,655 teachers 
were volunteers financed by students’ families.
81
 In any case, the best-trained teachers work in the 
districts of Malabo and Bata. To improve training of preschool teachers, UNICEF has been conducting 
summer courses since 1990, which have been reinforced with the ―Modular Training Project for Nursery 
and Preschool Teachers.‖ This three-year project awards a qualification that improves the wages of 
teachers contracted by the state. 
4.15 Enrollment in primary education has not increased despite improved human and physical 
resources. During the 2000/2001 academic year and in accordance with the EFA plan, the primary level 
had 79,878 students, 1,709 teachers, and 884 schools. During the 2007/08 school year,
82
 enrollment only 
inched up to 81,099 students, while the number of teachers jumped to 2,900 (Table 4.5). A large 
concentration of students was observed in the districts of Malabo and Bata (61 percent of the total), where 
the institutions are larger; and the country’s student-teacher ratio of 28:1 is below the regional average.
83
 
There are, however, differences between urban areas, with a 32:1 student-teacher ratio, and rural areas, 
with a 20:1 ratio. The number of schools fell to 813,
84
 owing to the increase in the number of colegios 
nacionales (which offer all six grades) from 74 in 2000/2001 to 395 in 2007/08. The primary level has 
2,339 classrooms, of which 81 percent were constructed with permanent materials and 56 percent are in 
urban areas. The student-classroom ratio is 29:1 (it is estimated that approximately 450 classrooms 
distributed among 73 institutions are used for a double-shift system), although the ratio increases to 35:1 
in urban areas and falls to 18:1 in rural areas. This difference raises questions about the possibility of 
expanding the double-shift system in urban areas to minimize expenditure on infrastructure (without this 
system, there would presently be 48 students in each urban classroom). 
4.16 The lack of educational offerings by the public sector has enabled the private sector to 
enroll half of all primary school students. Facilitated by the expansion of offerings covered in the EFA 
plan, 43 percent of all enrollments were in private schools receiving state support and 7 percent at private 
schools not receiving support, a significant increase from the 2000/2001 academic year when private 
institutions accounted for only about 20 percent of enrollments. Furthermore, this percentage is high 
compared to other countries in the region.
85
 There is no major difference in the student-teacher ratio 
between public and private institutions— 27:1 on average at state schools, which reflects their almost 
exclusive presence in rural areas, 31:1 at private schools receiving state support, and 23:1 at private 
schools not receiving support. 
4.17 Primary school teacher training is deficient and is not improving at a sufficiently rapid 
pace. During the 2007/08 academic year, there were 2,900 primary education teachers, of which 66 
percent were men and 20 percent were over the age of 55. The majority (55 percent) worked at public 
centers and nearly 80 percent taught at colegios nacionales that offered all six grades. Although a 
Diploma in Primary Education is required, fewer than half of teachers (47 percent) currently possess this 
qualification (Figure 4.4). Considering that only 664 students are registered at the Colleges of Education, 
the dearth of trained teachers shows no sign of abating in the short term. Among teachers with fewer than 
five years’ seniority, the relative share of those who do not meet the legal requirements falls to 44 percent, 
and to 36 percent for those with one year seniority. In other words, ―the demand for teachers cannot be 
                                                          
81 In 2007/08, of the 1,492 teachers registered, 521 were appointed and 971 were hired. We were unable to ascertain whether 
―volunteer‖ and ―recruited‖ are strict synonyms, or, which is more important, whether these teachers were paid by the state or by 
families. 
82 Data from the Primary Education Yearbook prepared in the context of PRODEGE. 
83 The student-teacher ratio is 83:1 in Congo, 63:1 in Chad, 62:1 in Rwanda, 49:1 in Burundi, and 48:1 in Cameroon. 
84 Of these, 184 have no water facilities and 533 lack electricity. 
85 The rate is higher than that of Chad (31 percent), Gabon (29 percent), and Ghana (21 percent), and markedly higher than that of 
Burundi, Rwanda, and Tanzania (1 percent), and Kenya (4 percent). 
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met by the graduates from university colleges, and the system is obliged to include persons who lack the 
preparation required for the teaching profession.‖
86
 
Table 4. 5: Regional Distribution of Primary Education Enrollment, Teachers, and Schools (2007/08) 
Region / District Enrollment (E) Teachers  (T) Schools (S) E/T E/S 
Insular Region 24,390 734 117 33 208 
   Malabo 21,011 613   77 34 273 
   Baney   1,388   53   17 26   82 
   Luba   1,294   45   16 29   81 
   Riaba     181     9    5 20   36 
   Annobón     516    14    2 37 258 
Continental Region 56,709         2,166 696 26   81 
   Bata 29,010   898 150 32 193 
   Mbini   1,401    57   33 25   42 
   Kogo   1,404    57   32 25   44 
   Evinayong   2,689  150   48 18   56 
   Niefang   3,023  110   59 27   51 
   Acurenám   1,453    88   31 17   47 
   Mongomo   3,319  142   57 23   58 
   Añigok   2,674  132   60 20   45 
   Akomibe   1,005    62   25 16   40 
   Nsork     778    48   22 16   35 
   Ebibeyín   5,461   207   80 26   68 
   Micomeseng   2,955   122   51 24   58 
   Nsok Nsomo   1,537     93   48 17   32 
Total 81,099 2.900  813 28 100 
Source: Primary Education Yearbook, MECD 
  
                                                          
86 ―Situación actual y características básicas de los docentes de la Educación Primaria en Guinea Ecuatorial,‖ a 2008 report 
prepared in the context of PRODEGE. 
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Figure 4. 4: Primary School Teachers by Qualification (Percentage of all primary school teachers) 
 
Source: MECD 
4.18 Secondary school enrollment fell owing to the shortening of the education cycle, while 
human and physical resources have been increasing, especially in the private sector. During the 
2000/2001 academic year, 34,116 students were enrolled in the ESBA program (78 percent in Malabo and 
Bata), which had 1,071 teachers distributed among 28 public and 29 private institutions, with a student-
teacher ratio of 32:1. During the 2007/08 academic year, enrollments fell to 33,177 students (80 percent 
in Malabo and Bata), largely because of the shortening of the cycle from seven to six years. The number 
of teachers grew by 44 percent, climbing to 1,540, while the number of institutions grew by 63 percent, 
especially in the private sector, where it increased by 97 percent, pushing the number of centers from 29 
to 57 (61 percent of secondary schools are private). Despite the legal requirement that teachers must hold 
a university diploma to teach classes in the ESBA program and a bachelor’s degree to teach the 
bachillerato program, 89 percent of secondary school teachers in the 2000/2001 academic year held a 
university diploma from either a university college, the defunct Center for the Development of Education 
(Centro de Desarrollo de la Educación, CDE), or a special program executed by the MECD during 1994–
97, and only 8 percent had a bachelor’s or doctoral degree.
87
  
4.19 Few opportunities for vocational training exist and they are concentrated in Malabo and 
Bata. As was the case with the 2000–2001 academic year, only two centers currently provide vocational 
training: one in Malabo (12 de Octubre), which offers a single cycle, and another in Bata (Modesto Roig 
Gené), which offers two cycles. In both cases, no significant changes in enrollment rates were observed. 
The number of students at the first center grew from 433 to 448, while the number fell at the second from 
906 to 816. Just about 4 percent of secondary school students pursue vocational studies, which is below 
the regional average.
88
 A two-phase reform process is now under way. First, the Spanish Agency for 
International Cooperation for Development (AECID) will assess labor market needs to design a new 
                                                          
87 Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Development of Education for All. No information is available for the 2007/08 
academic year. 
88 A number of countries, such as Kenya (1 percent) and Ghana (2 percent), have fewer students relative to the total number of 
secondary school students; however, most countries, such as Cameroon (32 percent), Mali (12 percent), and Congo (16 percent), 
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No information available 
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curriculum, and second, the Société française d'exportation des ressources éducatives (SFERE) will 
conduct a study in order to identify demand for education and construct four centers. 
4.20 Enrollment at the higher education level has increased significantly but is still inadequate to 
meet the country’s needs. Higher education is offered at the National University of Equatorial Guinea 
(Universidad Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial, UNGE), and average annual enrollment increased by 28 
percent over the last five years, jumping from 1,116 students during the 2004/05 academic year to 3,011 
students during 2008/09, distributed among various faculties as shown in Table 4.6. 
Table 4. 6: Higher Education Enrollment and Teachers (2008/09) 
CENTERS Enrollment Teachers 
Faculties  963                   161 
Medical Sciences  239 54 
Arts and Social Sciences  640 87 
Environment    84 20 
University Colleges                   2,048                   257 
Malabo College of Education   262  36 
Bata College of Education   402  49 
Administration   359  42 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry   509  64 
Health and Environment   354   41 
Technical Engineering   162   25 
Total 3,011 418 
Source: Universidad Nacional de Guinea Ecuatorial 
D. Limited Equity in the Education System 
4.21 Equity means equal access to quality education by all, regardless of socioeconomic level, 
gender, ethnic group, geographic location, or any other distinguishing factor. Therefore, evaluation of 
equity levels in an education system allows for myriad approaches to capture the range of diversity. The 
behavior of variables related to problems of equity will thus be analyzed from various perspectives and, 
when necessary, will be compared by district. 
4.22 Gender parity exists in access to primary education but begins to decline at the secondary 
level. During the 2007/08 academic year, enrollment distribution by gender at the preschool and primary 
levels was virtually proportional. However, at the secondary level, the number of girls declined to 42 
percent of all students in the bachillerato program and to 37 percent in the vocational training program. 
The number of girls pursuing higher education accounted for 39 percent of all students, with 29 percent 
enrolled in faculties and 43 percent in university colleges. From a gender standpoint, it should be noted 
that the lack of nursery schools for one- to three-year-olds may play a role by hampering the ability of 
mothers to access both the education system and the labor market.  
4.23 Efforts to provide physical resources for preschool education in Malabo and Bata are still 
falling short. While 60 percent of all preschool students are concentrated in Malabo and Bata, owing in 
all likelihood to rural migration, these areas only account for 42 percent of all teachers assigned to 
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preschools and 50 percent of permanent constructions (Table 4.7)
89
 As a result, preschools in insular 
region districts and Bata have a higher-than-average student-teacher ratio, which is estimated to be 24:1. 
Table 4. 7: Preschool Student-Teacher Ratios by District (2006/07) 
Region/District Students Teachers Student/Teacher 
Insular Region   9,753  276 35 
   Malabo  8,451  241 35 
   Baney     521   16 33 
   Luba     555   13 43 
   Riaba       35     1 35 
   Annobón     191     5 38 
Continental Region               29,798              1,369 22 
   Bata               14,860  444 33 
   Mbini     898    62 14 
   Kogo     842    46 18 
   Evinayong  1,211     81 15 
   Niefang  1,490     90 17 
   Acurenám     750     42 18 
   Mongomo  2,076   108 19 
   Añigok   1,219     69 18 
   Akomibe      561     59 10 
   Nsork      565     50 11 
   Ebibeyín   2,788    159 18 
   Micomeseng   1,207      72 17 
   Nsok Nsomo   1,331      87 15 
Total 39,551 1,645 24 
Source: ―Analysis of Nursery and Preschool Education in Equatorial Guinea‖ (Análisis de la educación infantil y preescolar de 
Guinea Ecuatorial), 2006/07. 
4.24 There is high regional inequity in primary school repetition rates, which is linked to lower-
quality teaching staff. Annobón, Akomibe, and Nsork have a repetition rate of approximately 39 percent 
of all students, which is higher than the average of 24 percent (Table 4.8).
90
 These districts also have a 
higher percentage of volunteer teachers and a lower share of legally qualified teachers, thus requiring a 
greater effort by families for the financing of education. However, Bata and Malabo are the districts with 
the best results, with a repetition rate slightly below average and a higher percentage of trained teachers. 
Another aspect of inequity is revealed in the fact that only 37 percent of teachers in public institutions 
possess the legal training requirements, while 61 percent do in private institutions that receive state 
support and 48 percent do in private institutions receiving no support. 
4.25 Malabo and Bata have better primary school infrastructure, an advantage over rural areas. 
These cities have the highest number of classrooms constructed with permanent materials, while Nsok 
Nsomo, Niefang, Micomeseng, and Ebibeyín are among the districts with fewer permanent constructions. 
Luba, Bata, and Malabo also have the highest percentage of students enrolled in colegios nacionales 
(Grades 1-6), which offer the best opportunities to complete and continue studies at the same center. This 
means that a significant percentage of the rural population, especially in Mbini, Kogo, Nsok Nsomo, 
Evinayong, and Akomibe, lacks opportunities to pursue studies beyond the second grade because they 
                                                          
89 Infrastructure quality at the preschool level is extremely poor across the board, as only 31 percent of preschool centers were 
built with permanent materials and are located primarily in the insular region. 
90 Momgomo and Riaba also have a higher repetition rate (30 percent) and fewer qualified teachers.  
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attend one-teacher schools in which the same teacher is responsible for the first and second grades. This 
encourages migration from rural areas to big cities, resulting in approximately 50 students per classroom 
in Malabo and Bata, which is considerably higher than the national average of 35 students per classroom. 
Lastly, Annobón’s poor education indicators in all categories bear noting.  
Table 4. 8: Equity Indicator Performance by District, 2007/08 (Percent) 
District Repetition  Volunteers  Legally Qualified Teachers  
   Acurenám 26.9 22.7 28.4 
   Akomibe 39.7 29.0 30.6 
   Annobón 39.5 21.4 35.7 
   Añigok 22.0 20.6 34.8 
   Baney 26.3 11.3 43.4 
   Bata 23.5 11.0 62.4 
   Ebibeyín 28.5 14.0 34.8 
   Evinayong 20.4 30.3 20.7 
   Kogo 21.4 10.5 36.8 
   Luba 25.8 11.1 40.0 
   Malabo 22.5   8.3 54.2 
   Mbini 28.0 12.3 38.6 
   Micomeseng 18.6 23.8 41.8 
   Mongomo 32.1 16.0 34.5 
   Niefang 23.3 21.8 45.5 
   Nsok Nsomo 25.2 11.8 22.6 
   Nsork 39.8 17.4 37.5 
   Riaba 29.8 22.2 22.2 
Total 24.3 14.2 47.1 
Source: Primary School Yearbook, MECD 
4.26 Secondary school educational and vocational training offerings are concentrated in Malabo 
and Bata, which encourages rural-to-urban migration. This is reflected in the student-classroom ratio 
of 64:1 in the insular region (72:1 in Malabo), which is far higher than the national average of 42:1. The 
high concentration of educational offerings in urban areas, primarily at private institutions, prevents rural 
populations from accessing this level or compels them to migrate to urban areas. Similarly vocational 
training offerings are limited to Malabo (albeit incomplete) and Bata. These offerings are not available in 
the other districts, thus forcing students who want to pursue vocational studies to migrate to these cities. 
E. Inadequate Financing of the Education System 
4.27 The extremely poor quality of budget information hinders analysis and the ability to make 
sector policy decisions. It is difficult to distribute expenditure by level, especially personnel and capital 
expenditure. Expenditure data on preschool and primary education are not always presented separately, 
and transfers are not always disaggregated. In an effort to resolve this problem, a number of assumptions 
have been made throughout this chapter.
91
 Significant discrepancies exist between the approved and 
                                                          
91 Budget items that cannot be clearly assigned to a level of education are distributed on the basis of the relative share of 
enrollment in the state sector (excluding higher education). Given that complete enrollment data were available only for 2007/08, 
this distribution pattern was used for all years; the negative effects of this assumption become evident when per student 
expenditure is estimated, which was done only for 2008. Furthermore, the number of institutions per sector is used to 
disaggregate enrollment figures for the preschool and secondary levels. However this distribution of enrollment (32 percent, 56 
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executed budget, and a number of the programs implemented, such as the ―English Language Training 
Program‖ of the Hydrocarbon Technological Institute of Equatorial Guinea (Instituto Tecnológico de 
Hidrocarburos de Guinea Ecuatorial), are not included in the budget. Similarly, there are major 
shortcomings in budget planning, preparation, and execution, as evidenced by the considerable volatility 
in budget execution that ranged from 37 percent in 2007 to 95 percent in 2008, which is explained 
primarily by the variability in capital expenditure execution.  
4.28 Public financing of the education sector is insufficient and well below the expenditure of 
countries in the region. State financing in 2001 as part of the preparation of the National Action Plan for 
the EFA was 0.5 percent of GDP (4 percent of total public expenditure), which was inadequate. Despite 
the ambitious goals of the EFA plan, which are in line with the MDGs, public expenditure on education 
hovered around 1 percent on average over the last five years. This is far lower than expenditure in other 
middle-income countries (of which Equatorial Guinea is one) that allocate 4.3 percent of GDP, and the 
average in sub-Saharan Africa of 3.9 percent of GDP.
92
 Similarly, public expenditure on education over 
the last five years accounted for only around 7 percent of total public expenditure, significantly below the 
percentage allocated by countries such as Uganda and Tanzania (30 percent), Ghana (25 percent), or 
Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon (16 percent). 
4.29 State shortfalls in education funding are covered by private contributions and external 
donors. Other sources of financing such as the payment of enrollment fees at private centers and 
contributions from Parent Teacher Associations at public centers (no data on these sources exists to gauge 
their size), as well as international assistance, are used to ensure functioning of the education system. In 
terms of volume, the AECID is worthy of special mention, having contributed €6.9 million in 2008 
(which is approximately 31 percent of all current expenditure on education), particularly for primary 
schooling. A significant share of this sum (€4.1 million) was allocated to education centers managed by 
the Spanish Federation of Religious Schools (Federación de Escuelas Religiosas de España) and the 
Association of Catholic Education Centers of Equatorial Guinea (Asociación de Centros Católicos de 
Enseñanza de Guinea Ecuatorial), which have a student population of around 16,500 primary and 5,200 
secondary level students. Support was also provided to the Colegio Español de Malabo (€1 million) to 
cover 500 students, and Colegio Español de Bata (€0.56 million) for 300 students.
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 For its part, UNICEF 
contributed €0.28 million to expand and improve public school infrastructure and teacher training in 
collaboration with UNESCO. Lastly, the Amerada Hess Foundation is financing a portion of PRODEGE. 
4.30 Per student expenditure for higher education is 50 times greater than for primary 
education, among the most unequal ratios in the region.
94
 There is a significant difference between 
expenditure per student in primary schools (US$232) and in universities (US$11,435) as Table 4.9 shows. 
This is explained by the high proportion of university expenditure in relation to total expenditure (around 
33 percent) and the limited number of university students (about 2,275 in 2008) benefiting from these 
studies. However, only about 40 percent of total education expenditure is allocated to primary and 
preschool education despite the fact that it benefits approximately 92,000 students (Table 4.10). 
Compared to other countries, the low percentage of expenditure earmarked for secondary education and 
the high percentage earmarked for higher education bears noting (Table 4.11). This situation represents an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
percent, and 12 percent for preschool, primary, and secondary schools, respectively) was adjusted to mitigate the impact of 
volunteer preschool teachers and the wage difference with the secondary level, producing the following distribution parameters: 
20 percent, 56 percent, and 24 percent the preschool, primary, and secondary levels, respectively. 
92 World Bank and UNESCO Institute of Statistics (2006), data for 2000–2002. 
93 Other programs include €0.6 million for the UNED of Malabo and Bata, with approximately 500 students, €0.25 million for 
primary and secondary curriculum reform (bachillerato and vocational training) and the development and adaptation of 
textbooks; and €0.38 million for teacher training. 
94 To estimate per student expenditure based on level of education, 2008 budget data and enrollment data in the state sector for 
2007/08 were used, and the relative share of educational institutions is estimated in order to disaggregate information on the 
preschool and secondary levels. 
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enormous inequity since very few people are being served by an important segment of public resources. 
Furthermore, public allocation to the sector is highly unpredictable because capital expenditure accounts 
for 60 percent of total expenditure and fluctuates significantly on an annual basis. 
Table 4. 9: Per Student Expenditure by Level of Education and Per Capita GDP, 2007/08 
Level Enrollment 








Capita GDP (%) 
(1)/UN per 
Capita GDP (%) 
Preschool    33,611   103,984     232  2.0  0.9 
Primary   59,250   183,713     410  3.5  1.5 
Secondary   13,332   722,022  1,610 13.8  6.0 
Higher 
Education     2,275 5,128,791 11,435 98.0 42.8 
Total 108,468   328,890     733   6.3   2.7 
Source: MECD, World Bank, UNESCO, and IMF 
 
 
Table 4. 10:  Education Expenditure by Level of Education, 2007/08 (Percentage of total) 
Level 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Primary and Literacy   37   42   44   25   40 
Secondary   22   30   30   11   27 
Higher Education   41   29   27   63   33 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: MECD, World Bank 
 
 
Table 4. 11: Education Expenditure by Education Level in Neighboring Countries (Percent of national total) 
Country Primary Secondary Higher Education 
Burundi 46 28 25 
Cameroon 40 45 15 
Chad 50 29 21 
Congo 29 42 30 
Côte d’Ivoire 47 37 16 
Gabon 36 39 26 
Mali 35 48 16 
Mauritania 44 39 17 
Nigeria 29 51 20 
Rwanda 43 20 37 
Source: World Bank and Pôle de Dakar (UNESCO) 
4.31 When inflation is excluded, recurrent expenditure in the education sector has increased 
slightly in recent years. The state slightly increased budget allocations for recurrent expenditure to 
FCFA 14.786 billion in 2008, compared to FCFA 13.867 billion in 2004 at 2008 constant prices once 
inflation is considered (or FCFA 9.083 billion in 2004 current prices). This sum fails to meet the needs of 
the Equatorial Guinean education system, whose main objectives include expansion of educational 
coverage with the resulting increase in wage expenditure. 
4.32 The functional distribution of current expenditure does not reflect the education sector’s 
priorities. A significant increase in transfers has come at the expense of personnel costs. This expansion 
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is essentially explained by the higher outlay for studies abroad, which climbed from FCFA 200 million in 
2004 to FCFA 2.5 billion in 2008; subsidies to sports federations amounting to FCFA 3 billion in 2008; 
and subsidies to the UNGE amounting to FCFA 3 billion in 2008 (Table 4.12). These budget items 
exacerbate inequity in the system since all scholarships target university students. Furthermore, execution 
of these budget items often leads to a doubling of the original appropriation, a reflection of poor 
budgetary planning and limited control over current expenditure. 
Table 4. 12: Current Expenditure by Category, 2008 (FCFA million) 
Category 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Personnel 4,967 54.7%  4,892 50.5%   5,662 52.1%   7,032 49.3%  6,338 42.9% 
Goods and Services 1,179 13.0%    796 8.2%      971 8.9%   1,292 9.1%  1,448 9.8% 
Transfers 2,937 32.3%  4,007 41.3%   4,227 38.9%   5,927 41.6%         7 47.3% 
Total 9,083 100% 9,695 100% 10,860 100% 14,251 100% 14,786 100% 
Source: General state budget and the World Bank 
4.33 Current expenditure is overgeared toward higher education. Approximately 47 percent of 
recurrent expenditure is allocated to the preschool and primary levels, 16 percent to the secondary level, 
and 38 percent to higher education. This distribution is disproportionate based on the relative share of 
enrollment at each level (28 percent at the preschool, 49 percent at the primary, 21 percent at the 
secondary, and 2 percent at the higher education levels), and is well below the recommendation of the 
Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) to allocate 50 percent of education expenditure to 
primary education and a maximum of 20 percent to higher education (Table 4.13).  
Table 4. 13: Current Expenditure by Level of Education, 2008 (FCFA million) 
Level 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Preschool No data No data No data No data  1,783 
Primary and Literacy 4,466 4,769  5,700 7,133  5,155 
Secondary 1,631 1,643  1,926 2,379  2,299 
Higher Education 2,986 3,284  3,234 4,739  5,550 
Total        9,083 9,695     10,860      14,251    14,786 
  Source: General state budgets, World Bank. 
4.34 The state only finances around 60 percent of the entire teaching staff. Just 59 percent of 
6,038 teachers are paid by the state. All others are paid as volunteers by private institutions or families, 
with roughly 970 volunteer teachers at the preschool level and 400 at the primary level. Wages in state 
pay grades A (bachelor’s degree), B (diploma), and C (secondary level education) were increased to 
US$296, US$232, and US$175, per month respectively. According to population data from the United 
Nations, the median wage for teachers as a percentage of per capita GDP is 13 percent, well below the 
regional average, in which median wages are four times as large as per capita GDP.
95
 Although this fact 
does not take into account the large number of volunteer teachers who only receive payment from parents, 
the indicator reveals the low level of resources earmarked for the sector. Similarly, there is a huge 
disparity in the system as managerial staff earns seven times more than teachers. Finally, it bears noting 
that if the entire primary school teaching staff were to meet the legal requirements for qualification 
(which would involve inclusion at least under pay grade B, the wage bill for primary school teachers 
would grow by 36 percent. 
                                                          
95 For example, average wages for teachers are seven times as large as per capita GDP in Burundi, four times larger in Cameroon, 
and five times larger in Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Nigeria. 
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4.35 Capital expenditure in the sector is low and is concentrated in higher education. Education 
accounted only for about 1.6 percent of all investments projected for 2008, and has fluctuated 
considerably during 2004–08 because of major programs that usually have been concentrated at the 
higher-education level (Table 4.14).  
Table 4. 14: Capital Expenditure by Level of Education, 2008 (FCFA million) 
Level 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Preschool   2,187    639    639    7,745   1,712 
Primary and Literacy 14,006 2,297 2,187  15,706   5,730 
Secondary 10,617 3,839 3,839  11,469   7,327 
Higher Education 20,138 2,016 2,016  72,401   6,118 
Total 46,948 8,791 8,681 107,322 20,886 
Source: General state budgets, World Bank 
F. Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.36 Significant strides have been made in the education sector in recent years. A strategy to 
reduce illiteracy was initiated. Preschool education was declared compulsory, and its basic curriculum 
structure and the publication of books were approved in launching the ―Independent Modular Training 
Project for Nursery and Preschool Teachers.‖ A new primary-level curriculum was approved; and with 
support from PRODEGE, a Primary Education Yearbook was prepared, a qualitative and quantitative 
study profiled primary-level teachers, and a new teaching method (active schools) was introduced. At the 
secondary level, the ESBA curriculum was finalized, increasing educational offerings (primarily by the 
private sector); and vocational training is being intensified through construction of four new centers and 
through in-depth reform of the curriculum to meet the needs of the labor market. 
4.37 Shortcomings exist at all levels of education. At the preschool level, despite improvements in 
the enrollment rate, the shortage of teachers who satisfy minimum qualification standards is having 
substantial impact at the next level through high repetition rates for the first grade of primary school. 
Preschools also suffer from a severe lack of infrastructure (including quantity and quality of classrooms, 
teaching materials, drinking water, and so on). At the primary level, none of the rates for enrollment, 
completion, repetition (essentially in the first grade, where teachers are the least qualified), or overage 
students nor the quality of the teaching staff has improved. In many rural districts, only a handful of 
schools offer all grades, reducing educational opportunities for boys and girls. Moreover, 48 percent of 
students turn to private institutions that require enrollment fees for attendance. Expansion of educational 
offerings at the secondary level to include the bachillerato program, whose coverage had stagnated in 
recent years, is essentially being achieved through private sector growth, jeopardizing equal opportunity. 
Vocational training at the secondary level remains very limited, and offerings are only available in the 
districts of Malabo and Bata. Although higher education enrollment at UNGE has increased in recent 
years, the student population is low (3,011 students for the 2008/09 academic year). Enrollment in 
Colleges of Education (664 students, with 102 graduates in the 2007/08 academic year) is far short of 
meeting the demand for new teachers, forcing the educational system to hire instructors who lack the 
required qualifications. 
4.38 Problems of equity exist, particularly at the regional level. While there are no differences by 
gender at the primary level, differences are apparent at the levels of secondary and higher education, 
where 42 percent and 39 percent of students are female, respectively. There are major differences among 
districts in provision of infrastructure, distribution of qualified and volunteer teachers, repetition rates in 
primary schools, student-teacher ratios, and vocational training offerings.  
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4.39 To remedy inefficient resource allocation in the sector, increased public financing of 
primary education is needed. The government’s financial support of education is quite limited and falls 
far short of the recommendations set forth in the EFA-FTI. Expenditure distribution by educational level 
overemphasizes higher education and is at variance with EFA-FTI recommendations and national 
priorities. Per student expenditure by each level reveals marked differences: a ratio of FTSF 100 to 1 at 
the preschool level would be FTSF 177 to 1 at the primary level, FTSF 694 to 1 at the secondary level, 
and FTSF 4,929 to 1 at the higher-education level. Moreover, the high income levels in Equatorial Guinea 
in the context of a global economic crisis mean that cutbacks can be expected in the financing from 
international sources that has covered the lion’s share of primary education costs. Earmarking greater 
domestic funding to primary education is thus essential. Equatorial Guinea can, at least temporarily, 
afford to do so without reducing resources earmarked for higher education.  
4.40 The information system needs to be upgraded to understand what is happening in the sector 
and adopt effective policy measures. The information system is highly inefficient and provides limited 
and unreliable data. The need to improve data quality for strategic decision making is urgent, requiring 
effective procedures to ensure regular and accurate information updates. To that end, the government 
must take the following steps: 
 Resolve the uncertainty around demographic numbers and distribution, in terms of age group and 
district, to detail socioeconomic conditions. This information is crucial for determining current 
and future demand and facilitating the design of expanded educational offerings, and obtaining it 
should result in a new population census. 
 Conduct a qualitative and quantitative infrastructure census for all levels of education, which will 
include, among other things, profiles of classroom-use frequency and the household needs of 
rural teachers to facilitate detailed investment planning for improvements. 
 Expand what has been done at the primary level by collecting data on teachers and students 
(including repetition, dropout, and overage rates) at the preschool and secondary levels, making a 
distinction between public and private institutions, between urban and rural areas, and among 
districts. This will provide an accurate picture of coverage, quality, and efficiency in both levels 
of education. 
 Conduct an assessment of the root problems causing repetition and the incidence of overage 
students, focusing on the first grade of primary school. Results from the new active schools could 
be evaluated as part of this effort to identify nascent solutions. 
 Given the ambiguities found in current information, review the extent of illiteracy. 
 Introduce a learning assessment system based on standardized tests to facilitate monitoring and 
identify differences in the quality of educational offerings by district. 
 Strengthen budget procedures to appropriately record public expenditure in the education sector.  
 
4.41 The overriding objective of education policy must be to achieve quality universal primary 
education by 2015. The most important elements for achieving this goal are to increase the number of 
teachers who satisfy the minimum training requirement and to expand infrastructure, although other 
policy measures are also needed to ensure that upgraded educational offerings occur in tandem with 
higher efficiency, quality, and equity. Equatorial Guinea possesses the financial resources to develop an 
education system that performs better, putting the country on track to meet MDG commitments. 
However, the problems that have been identified pose serious challenges that must be tackled 
comprehensively and urgently. This requires prompt reformulation of strategy for the education sector 
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that can identify and quantify the difficulties facing the system—particularly in such areas as access, 
coverage, quality, efficiency, and equity—and establish a stable financial model to meet those needs.  
4.42 The EFA-FTI recommendations are the most suitable foundation for formulating a strategy 
to facilitate timely achievement of the MDGs. Although high per capita income levels in the country 
preclude access to financing from the EFA-FTI Catalytic Fund, the EFA-FTI action framework is still 
most appropriate for an education system such as the one in Equatorial Guinea, whose characteristics in 
many regards resemble those of countries in the region where this strategy is being implemented. First, 
although EQG’s key objective is to achieve universal primary education by 2015, the sector strategy must 
address all levels of education in a comprehensive manner, including technical and vocational training. 
Second, EFA-FTI recommendations about resource allocation to and within the sector are extremely 
relevant to Equatorial Guinea. The EFA-FTI provides for development of a sustainable sector plan based 
on a detailed simulation model that allocates more overall resources, thereby increasing the percentage of 
education expenditure relative to total expenditure, and distributes the flow among the various levels of 
education by allocating the lion’s share of additional resources to primary education until it reaches 50 
percent in the medium term. In this framework, no more than 20 percent of total resources should be 
allocated to higher education. Achieving this scenario requires establishment of broad policy and priority 
guidelines. It is also necessary to develop a detailed medium-term spending framework that will outline 
the strategy’s main lines of action through 2015. The EFA-FTI also carries a hidden bonus in that this 
strategic planning process is usually supported and monitored by donors experienced with African 
educational systems. 
4.43 A staffing strategy needs to be developed that increases the number and improves the 
quality of teachers. Teacher recruitment and training are two key areas for improvement. It is estimated 
that by 2015, between 3,280 (UN data) and 7,700 (official source)
 96
 teachers will be needed, and filling 
those slots requires preparation of a staffing strategy that improves the flow of qualified new instructors 
into the system and encourages present staff to upgrade their skills through training to meet appropriate 
qualifications. The staffing strategy must provide for gradual elimination of the ―volunteer teacher‖ 
system, which entails financial contributions from student’s families and introduces severe inequities in 
educational offerings. Teacher training programs should therefore be developed to ensure that volunteer 
teachers attain the minimum teaching standards required to perform their duties as new paid members of 
the state civil service. Lastly, it is necessary to introduce a wage component that links pay to performance 
in areas such as teacher attendance, ongoing training as well as academic qualifications, and incentives to 
work in rural or disadvantaged areas. 
4.44 Promote more decentralized management of the financial resources of the education sector. 
The need to build capacity for education policy planning and budget design, execution, and reporting 
makes it essential to decentralize the administration, management, and oversight of the education system, 
providing resources and delegating responsibilities to the various inspection levels (district, zone, and 
municipality). It would also be advisable to establish a mechanism for transferring funds directly to 
schools for administration by a school management committee that includes managers, teachers, parents, 
and community representatives. These funds would be used to purchase teaching materials and uniforms 
and maintain schools and cafeterias. The level of transfer would be based on the number of students, 
weighing specific needs or particular educational risks. This mechanism will require a new legal 
framework and training not only of aforementioned committee members in fund management and control, 
but also of inspection teams. Although the positions of municipal and zone inspectors were recently 
created, there is still no adequate structure to monitor problems afflicting the sector such as student and 
teacher attendance and performance, and curricular material and infrastructure needs. 
                                                          
96 Not taking into account the impact of repetition and assuming a student-teacher ratio of 35:1. 
77 
 
4.45 Encourage student enrollment and attendance at the primary level. Primary enrollment rates 
since 2000 have remained constant during a period free of social conflicts and marked by high population 
growth. Encouraging more girls and boys to attend school must take into account sociological obstacles 
such as the poverty that affects a significant portion of the school-age population and being a child with 
uneducated parents. A quick way to improve coverage and equity, therefore, would be to establish a 
primary education scholarship system and introduce school cafeterias to encourage low-income families 
to enroll their sons and daughters. 
4.46 Develop mechanisms of public-private financing. The objective of the Government of 
Equatorial Guinea to assure free basic education should be prioritized through a fair allocation of 
resources whose benefits reach the most disadvantaged population. Even as the government does its part, 
additional resources can be brought into play. The increasing private sector participation in education 
shows the existence of popular demand for education services and people’s willingness to pay for them. 
To build on this confluence, mechanisms of joint public-private financing could be set up, with public 
funding supplementing private financing already available (for example, a grant system that matches 
private contributions with public funds). These mechanisms will require good targeting, management, and 
control to avoid inequities. Public-private arrangements seem particularly apt for vocational training, 
through agreements between educational training institutions and firms that could offer students on-the-
job training as ―apprentices.‖ 
4.47 Establish an infrastructure needs plan for coverage through 2015. This plan should establish 
annual construction and reorganization guidelines based on (a) priority accorded through objective 
criteria (unmet demand, condition of infrastructure, and so forth); (b) expenditure absorption capacity 
(construction capacity each year in terms of existing companies, materials, and so forth); (c) consideration 
of a double-shift system to save resources; and (d) the establishment of institutional prototypes based on 
specific teaching requirements for each level and the development of a budget to cover costs. 
Recommendations 
Short Term 
Issues to be resolved Actions to be taken 
Serious discrepancies exist in the population 
data provided by available statistical sources, 
clouding analysis of the education sector.  
 
 Conduct a new population census that quantifies 
demographic distribution by age group, district, and 
socioeconomic conditions to identify current and 
future demand for education. 
The illiteracy rate provided is implausible.   Review the extent of illiteracy through a survey. 
 Strengthen the ―Yes I can‖ campaign to combat 
illiteracy, with special focus on rural areas.  
The primary completion rate is very low (43 
percent), far from achieving the objective of 
universal primary education by 2015 set forth 
in the Millennium Development Goals.  
 Implement an action plan to achieve the MDGs in 
education (100 percent primary completion rate), 
following the EFA-FTI recommendations. 
High rates of overage admission and 
repetition. 
 
 Conduct an assessment of the problems pertaining 
to repetition and overage students, focusing on the 
first grade of primary school. 
 Assess initial results from the new active schools 
program, and if positive, strengthen the effort with 
additional resources. 
 Eliminate repetition between two-year cycles 
(Grades 1 and 2, Grades 3 and 4, Grades 5 and 6), 
and establish support classes. 
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Public financing of the education sector is 
inadequate and the state only finances around 
60 percent of teachers. These shortfalls in 
state financing are being covered by private 
contributions and external donations that are 
vulnerable to drying up.  
 Allocate more financial resources to the education 
sector, particularly for recurrent expenditure, at least 
20 percent of overall budget allocation (indicative 
EFA-FTI framework).  
 Develop a sector plan with medium- and long-term 
sustainable financing, allocating at least 50 percent 
of sector resources to primary education and no 
more than 20 percent of resources to tertiary 
education (in tune with the EFA-FTI framework). 
Distribution of education expenditure does 
not reflect the priorities of the sector. 
 Allocate more financial resources to primary 
education. 
The teaching staff is inadequate. Between 
3,280 (UN population data) and 7,700 
(official population source) additional 
teachers are needed to meet educational 
offering requirements through 2015. 
Instructors have limited training, with a large 
number of ―volunteer teachers‖ who receive 
financial contributions from students’ 
families, thus introducing severe inequities in 
the education system. 
 Adopt a staffing strategy that (a) provides for the 
recruitment of teachers to meet current and future 
needs, (b) improves training of the current teaching 
staff, (c) gradually removes ―volunteer teachers,‖ 
and (d) links performance to wages. 
 
Primary enrollment rates have not increased 
since 2000 despite a period free of social 
conflicts and marked by high population 
growth.  
 Encourage student enrollment and attendance at the 
primary level through a scholarship system and the 
introduction of school cafeterias. 
Extremely substandard infrastructure, often 
constructed with impermanent materials and 
lacking water and electricity, needs to be 
replaced or refurbished. 
 
 
 Conduct a qualitative and quantitative infrastructure 
survey for all levels of education, which will 
identify classroom frequency use and the household 
needs of rural teachers. 
 Prepare an infrastructure needs plan through 2015 
that (a) prioritizes location based on objective 
criteria (unmet demand, condition of infrastructure, 
etc.); (b) evaluates expenditure absorption capacity 
(construction capacity each year in terms of existing 
companies, materials, etc.); (c) evaluates the 
introduction of a double-shift system to save 
resources; and (d) establishes institutional 
prototypes based on specific teaching needs at each 
level. 
Few vocational training opportunities exist 
and are concentrated in Malabo and Bata, 
which encourages rural-to-urban migration. 
 Complete the assessment of labor market needs and 
their connection to vocational training. 
 Construct new centers in areas outside of Malabo 
and Bata. 
Medium Term 
Issues to be resolved Actions to be taken 
The information system is deficient, 
providing limited, poor quality data.  
 
  
 Collect data on teachers and students (including 
repetition, dropout, and overage student rates) at the 
preschool and secondary levels, distinguishing 
between public and private schools and urban and 
rural areas, and among districts. 
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 Introduce a learning assessment system based on 
standardized tests to monitor differences in the 
quality of educational offerings provided in each 
district. 
There are major deficiencies in the planning, 
preparation, and execution of the education 
budget, as evidenced by the considerable 
variability in budget execution. The quality 
of budget information is also extremely poor 
and hinders analysis and the capacity to make 
policy decisions.  
 
 Strengthen capacity in education policy planning 
and budget design and promote more decentralized 
management of the financial resources of the 
education sector through (a) decentralization of the 
administration, management, and oversight of the 
education system; (b) establishment of a mechanism 
for the direct transfer of funds to schools, to be 
administered by a school management committee; 
and (c) develop a reporting system of budget 
implementation. 
The regulations under General Education 
Law No. 5/2007 have not been fully passed. 
 Revise the legal framework governing the 
functioning of the education system, clarifying the 
issue of compulsory and free secondary education 





CHAPTER 5: PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH 
5.1 This chapter seeks to contribute to strategy discussions being held by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare 
(MSBES) for a new Health Development Plan (HDP) to identify key options, prepare an action plan, and ensure the 
financial sustainability of the health sector. In keeping with the National Development Plan (NDP) and the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), public resources to the health sector must be increased to expand access to and quality of 
health care services. 
5.2 The sector’s information system (SNS) is inadequate to determine the status of the health system or provide 
a basis for sound decision making. The Directorate of Planning (Dirección de Planificación) oversees the national health 
information system, while the Directorate of Hygiene and Epidemiology (Dirección de Higiene y Epidemiología) oversees 
the health information subsystem responsible for managing information on health and epidemiological services, a division 
of responsibility that hampers the coordination and presentation of a single database for the sector. Human resources also 
are scarce; and manual, unsystematic and incomplete processes are used to collect and analyze health data. This state of 
affairs is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate computer equipment. The seriousness of the situation is evident in the 
current inability to know the country’s true epidemiological status. The statistical gap leads to reliance on multiple sources 
that yield a broad range of estimates, throwing the overall picture into doubt. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to 
rigorously determine national health indicators and the main disease threats, or monitor movement toward the MDGs. 
5.3 Owing to the paucity of general statistical data, especially on population it is impossible to accurately assess 
public health needs. Equatorial Guinea has a serious problem with statistical information, particularly in demographics, 
and as earlier chapters have pointed out, this impacts the ability to pinpoint key social, economic, and epidemiological 
indicators. The main difficulty in bringing the country’s true picture into focus is the wide variance between the total 
population figures projected by national authorities from the last census in 2001 (the Third Population and Housing 
Census), and figures submitted by the international community. While the government estimated a population of 
1,014,999 inhabitants in 2001, the overall estimate from international organizations was around 500,000.
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5.4 A young population with a high fertility rate needs more health services. The government has projected an 
annual population growth rate of 5.6 percent, to which a significant increase in immigration must be added. According to 
official data, population rose by 7.6 percent annually between 1994 and 2001, a trend expected to continue in the medium 
and long term, significantly expanding the need for health services and seriously jeopardizing the sector’s financial 
sustainability. This increase in demand for health services will also be considerable when EQG’s age distribution is 
considered. EQG’s demography is typical of a nation with a high fertility rate where the under-14 population is the largest 
age cohort (47.3 percent of the population). The population increase and the country’s age structure require additional 
resources for the health sector and specific attention to areas such as reproductive and maternal-child health. 
5.5 Improvements in health indicators will be unsustainable if the population’s living conditions do not 
improve. Despite an increase in the country’s average income stemming from oil production, general living conditions 
remain very poor, impacting health status. Deprived of essential services or having limited access to drinking water, 
energy sources, housing, and adequate health and sanitary facilities, citizens are at greater risk of exposure to 
communicable diseases such as malaria, diarrhea, respiratory infections, cholera, and measles. Therefore any 
improvements in the health sector must be part of a wider effort to improve living standards, including social 
infrastructure (housing, water, and sanitation) and an increase in income. 
5.6 The country’s geographical and cultural diversity poses an additional challenge to the health sector, 
necessitating specific services. Equatorial Guinea is divided into two main regions: a continental section with a surface 
area of 26,017 square kilometers, and a group of islands—comprising Bioko (where the capital city Malabo is located), 
Annobón, Corisco, Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico, Mbañe, Cocoteros, and Conga—with a surface area of 2,034 square 
kilometers. The physical barrier posed by the sea makes access to and communication among the various health care 
levels difficult. The country also contains five ethnic groups—the Fang, Bubi, Ndowe, Annobonés, and Bisio—a number 
                                                          
97 Total population estimates are 507,000 according to WHO, 484,000 according to the Global Fund, and 530,000 according to the United Nations. 
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of which have specific cultural practices that may impact their health indicators. A large foreign immigrant population 
also may have culture-specific practices (for example, female genital mutilation) that impact health. 
A. Organization of the Health System 
5.7 The health sector’s strategy has not been approved, leaving the MSBES without clear guidelines for action. 
The health system is not fully legislated or regulated, although it is considered to be universal and designed for the benefit 
of all Equatorial Guinean citizens. However, it is not general in scope since it fails to address all health problems, nor is it 
free since a financial contribution is required from patients. System governance is seriously limited by the lack of strategic 
and operational planning. The HDP—prepared in 2002 with technical assistance from WHO, the UNDP, and UNICEF—
but never formally adopted includes a situation analysis of the health system and identifies the main strategic guidelines to 
be followed, but has yet to be approved by the government. In the absence of this HDP, two documents help define 
medium- and long-term strategic guidelines: the MDGs and the NDP approved in 2007. The NDP identified the following 
11 strategic objectives for the health sector: 
 Strengthen the coordination and management mechanisms and organization of the national health system. 
 Improve access to and the provision and quality of health services for the entire population. 
 Step up efforts to combat malaria, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and other endemic diseases. 
 Boost efforts to control chronic illnesses such as diabetes, high blood pressure, and newly emerging as well as 
reemerging diseases, 
 Develop a plan to combat and respond to epidemics (such as cholera and acute diarrhea). 
 Harmonize the content of the decree on urgent measures to halt the spread of HIV/AIDS with the law protecting 
the human rights of Persons Living with HIV/AIDS. 
 Construct pediatric wings at provincial hospitals to serve as referral centers. 
 Construct and put into operation regional psychiatric hospitals. 
 Establish a national center to prevent and combat endemic diseases. 
 Formulate and implement health development plans through the operation of health districts. 
 Update, approve, and implement the National Health Development Plan (HDP). 
 
5.8 The general objectives of the NDP for the health sector are difficult to implement, and the 2002 HDP needs 
to be updated and adopted to obtain an action plan. NDP implementation for health is problematic because (a) it 
entails a top-down approach without clearly defined or prioritized objectives; (b) it does not take into account the sector’s 
economic and financial sustainability, both in terms of overall funding and allocations among the various health service 
institutions; and (c) there is no action plan or indicators. Therefore, revising and adopting the 2002 NDP is urgently 
needed to provide the MSBES with clear strategic guidelines and an action plan. 
5.9 The structure of the MSBES is very bureaucratic and requires further decentralization toward health care 
providers. Health system organization is divided into three main levels: the central level, which corresponds to the 
management structure of the MSBES;
98
 the intermediate level, which covers the regional and provincial health offices; 
and the peripheral level, which includes the district entities. Health care is dispensed at three levels. The first is made up 
of health posts, each of which is managed and administered by a health committee. The second is comprised of health 
centers, which are managed and administered by health teams. The third corresponds to the hospital, which has a board of 
directors as its management and administrative body. Strategic decisions are made at the central level with little 
participation by the other levels. Moreover, policy and budget implementation is highly centralized, leaving little room for 
decision making by health care providers. 
                                                          
98 The central structure of the MSBES is comprised of a minister, a deputy minister, three presidential advisors, three state secretaries, a general 
secretary, and ten directorates-general. There are also national program directorates, three provincial directors, and ten department heads. This 
structure is too cumbersome given the country’s size, a problem exacerbated by the absence of adequate technical support. 
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B. Epidemiological Situation 
5.10 Health indicators show little or no progress between 2000 and 2009 and are in line with the rest of Sub 
Saharan Africa. The latest data available from the World Bank (Table 5.1) indicate that overall mortality and child 
mortality improved between 2000 and 2009, while other indicators, such as immunization and the incidence of 
tuberculosis show a negative trend and are comparable to the other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
5.11 The country’s epidemiological profile is of significant interest owing to the incidence of communicable 
disease, especially malaria, typhoid fever, acute respiratory infections (ARIs), AIDS, and diarrheal diseases.
99
 These data 
are substantiated by the 2007 statistical yearbook published by the MSBES, which includes specific information on 
medical care at the Malabo Hospital and the health centers attached to it. The main causes of death recorded at this 
hospital are communicable illnesses, primarily malaria, intestinal diseases, and ARIs. HIV/AIDS as well as diseases 
associated with alcohol poisoning and cirrhosis also account for a significant proportion (Table 5.2).  
                                                          
99 There is also an upward trend in cases of noncommunicable diseases such as high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, chronic renal 
insufficiency, mental illness, and tumors. 
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Table 5. 1: Health Indicator Trends in Equatorial Guinea and Comparators, 2000–2009 
 






 2000 2009 2009 2009 
Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months) 33 33 .. 70 
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months) 51 51 .. 68 
Newborns protected against tetanus (%) .. 69 .. .. 
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) 99 117 26 342 
Life expectancy at birth, female (years) 49 51 77 53 
Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female adults) 344 349 69 358 
Mortality rate, adult, male (per 1,000 male adults) 395 381 116 390 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000) 168 145 .. 130 
Source: World Bank GDF & WDI central database (April 2011) 
Table 5. 2: Main Causes of Mortality Reported by Malabo Hospital Emergency Services, 2007 
 
5.12 Malaria is the leading cause of mortality and morbidity and also the primary cause of child deaths, causing 
Equatorial Guinea to be classified as a ―malarial country‖ since 1998.
100
 It is estimated that malaria accounts for 37.3 
percent of all mortality cases and 31.5 percent of all morbidity cases, which is consistent with the regional average.
101
 This 
potentially serious infectious disease is widespread in rural and semi-rural areas as well as in poor urban areas with poor 
sanitation.
102
 In addition to its life-threatening impact (it is the leading cause of morbidity reported by primary and 
hospital care services), malaria causes great economic hardship through worker disability and absenteeism.  
                                                          
100 ―Grant Performance Report,‖ the Global Fund, December 2008. 
101 Medical Care Development International (MCDI) 
102 Noteworthy is the high incidence of malaria in the pediatric department of the Malabo Hospital, where malaria represented close to half of the 
diseases treated in 2007. 
 
       
Most Common Diseases No.              %     
Malaria 17 18%     
Hypovolemic Shock 14 15%     
Lung Disease 12 13%     
AIDS 8 9%     
Alcohol Intoxication 6 6%     
Heart Disease 7 8%     
Cerebrovascular Accidents 7 8%     
Cirrhosis 3 3%     
Tetanus 3 3%     
Psychoactive Drug Intoxication 2 2%     
Other 14 15%     
Total 93 100%     
       




5.13 The Malaria Control Project (PCMIB) was launched on the island of Bioko in 2003, and has successfully 
reduced incidence of the disease. The PCMIB is spearheaded by the Government of Equatorial Guinea, financed by the 
Marathon Oil Corporation, Noble Energy GEPetrol, and Sonagas, and managed by Medical Care Development 
International (MCDI).
103
 The original five-year public-private project, which includes a program of monitoring and 
supervision, began by spraying houses on the island and distributing free insecticide-treated bed nets and medication to at-
risk groups such as pregnant women and children under 15. By 2006 the impact was notable, and the project was extended 
to the continental region. The first phase of continental implementation was scheduled for five years with a budget of 
US$28 million, of which US$23 million was contributed by the Global Fund. The project’s main positive results to date 
include the following: 
 A 50 percent reduction in the number of malaria-infected children between the ages of 2 and 15, with 73 percent 
of sampled children indicating that they sleep under insecticide-treated bed nets 
 An 85 percent reduction in total malaria cases recorded at health centers 
 A 95 percent reduction in the number of malaria-infected mosquitoes. 
 
5.14 The HIV/AIDS prevalence rate is high and has barely fallen since 2001. The total number of HIV/AIDS cases 
among children and adults over the age of 15 climbed from 9,500 to 11,000 between 2001 and 2007 (Table 5.3). In light 
of the significant population increase, the prevalence rate among 15–49 year olds declined from 3.7 percent in 2001 to 3.4 
percent in 2007, which is consistent with the regional average. The impact of HIV/AIDS is much greater on females, who 
are three times more likely to become infected than men. 
5.15 Implementation since 2005 of the program to combat HIV/AIDS has met little success. The objective of the 
US$9.8 million five-year program is on one hand to reduce the number of infections through education programs targeting 
young people in schools and general awareness-building campaigns, and on the other hand to improve care to infected 
persons through the distribution of antiretrovirals, treatment of secondary infections, prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission, training of health personnel, and better organization of the health system to improve the quality of life of 
affected patients. However, the program has not yielded the expected results, and the latest monitoring report in August 
2008 indicated that only US$4.6 million (47 percent of the budget) had been executed, which triggered a number of 
modifications to refocus implementation. 
  
                                                          
103 Other collaborators were One World Development Group, the Medical Research Council of South Africa, the Harvard School of Public Health, 
Yale University, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, Texas A&M University, and the Red Cross. 
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Table 5. 3: Summary of HIV/AIDS Trend Data 
 
 
5.16 The MSBES and donors are striving to improve maternal and child care. The maternal mortality rate is 680 
deaths per 100,000 live births, among the highest rates in the region.
104
 In addition, the low number of births attended by 
skilled personnel (64 percent) is worrying. A coordination initiative between the MSBES and the various donors in the 
sector—especially UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the EU, WHO, and a number of 
nongovernmental organizations—is in place to accelerate reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality, although adequate 
information is not available to measure its impact and efficiency. This initiative is part of the National Reproductive 
Health Program that is under the supervision of the General Directorate for Public Health and Health Planning (Dirección 
General de la Salud Pública y Planificación Sanitaria). This five-year initiative, with a budget estimated to be FCFA 5.3 
million, is aimed at reducing maternal and child mortality rates by 50 percent by 2010, 75 percent by 2015, and at least 80 
percent by 2020, based on the following five specific objectives: 
 Develop comprehensive, accessible, and quality prenatal, childbirth, and puerperium care that will include family 
planning services (FCFA 1.154 billion).  
 Develop comprehensive services for early detection of diseases that threaten the welfare of pregnant women and 
newborns, including malaria treatment during pregnancy, the prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission, 
and the prevention and treatment of STIs, obstetric fistulas, uterine cancer, breast cancer, and so on (FCFA 548 
million).  
 Increase the number of personnel qualified to provide health care to pregnant women and newborns, as well as 
quality family planning services (FCFA 1.862 billion).  
 Strengthen the capacity of the community and of women in particular, to exercise their rights and actively 
participate in the reduction of maternal and neonatal mortality (FCFA 315 million).   
 Strengthen the institutional framework and the capacity to plan, manage, monitor, and evaluate maternal and 
neonatal health actions (FCFA 1.376 billion). 
 
5.17 The MDG indicators for the health sector have not improved and will be difficult to achieve by 2015 if 
reforms are not promptly implemented. Obtaining reliable data is difficult, but the latest available information on 
MDGs for the health sector (Table 5.4), shows no improvement in recent years. Indicators such as the child mortality rate 
or the prevalence and incidence of tuberculosis have jumped significantly between the base year and the last year for 
which data are available owing to the lack of medical coverage and the dearth of prevention measures. Unless drastic 
measures are adopted to organize and finance the health sector, timely achievement of health MDGs is in doubt.  
  
                                                          
104 For example, the Republic of Congo has a mortality rate of 740 per 100,000 live births.  
 No. of Cases 2001 2007
Adults (15+) and children 9,500 11,000
Low estimate 7,600 8,200
High estimate 12,000 14,000
Adult rate (15–49) (%) 3.7% 3.4%
Low estimate 2.9% 2.4%
High estimate 4.7% 4.6%
 Prevalence Male Female
Prevalence among 15–24 year olds 0.8% 2.5%
Low estimate 0.4% 1.7%
High estimate 1.4% 3.7%
Core data on epidemilogy response. Equatorial Guinea. WHO 2008 Update
Source: Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS. 
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Table 5. 4: Millennium Development Goal Trends in Equatorial Guinea 






4.1 Under-five mortality rate     
Children-under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births 170 1990 145 2009 
4.2 Infant mortality rate     
Infant mortality rate (0–1 year) per 1,000 live births 103 1990 124 2006 
4.3 Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized against measles     
Children 1 year old immunized against measles (%) 88 1990 51 2006 
5.1 Maternal mortality ratio     
Maternal mortalities  per 100,000 live births 680 2005 680 2005 
5.2 Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel     
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) 50 2004 64.6 2000 
5.4 Adolescent birth rate     
Births per 1,000 adolescent females 113 1994 128 2001 
5.5 Antenatal care coverage (at least one visit and at least four visits)     
Antenatal care coverage, at least one visit (%) 37 1994 86.1 2000 
6.1 HIV prevalence among population aged 15–49 years     
People living with HIV, 15–49 years old (%) 3.7 2001 3.4 2007 
HIV prevalence rate in national surveys, women 15–49 years old,(%) 3.4 2004 3.4 2004 
HIV prevalence rate in national surveys, men 15–49 years old (%) 2.9 2004 2.9 2004 
AIDS deaths 1,000 2001 1,000 2007 
6.3 Proportion of population aged 15–24 years with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS   
Men aged 15–24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (%) n.a.  n.a  
Women 15–24 with comprehensive correct knowledge of HIV/AIDS (%)    4 2000 
6.4 Ratio of school attendance of orphans to school attendance of nonorphans 
aged 10–14 years   
Ratio of orphan to nonorphan school attendance  0.95 2000 0.95 2000 
School attendance rate of orphans aged 10–14 (%) 84.6 2000 84.6 2000 
School attendance rate of children aged 10-14 both of whose parents are alive and who live 
with at least one parent (%)  88.7 2000 88.7 2000 
AIDS orphans (one or both parents) 1,600 2000 4,800 2007 
6.5 Proportion of population with advanced HIV infection with access to antiretroviral drugs    
Antiretroviral therapy coverage among people with advanced HIV 
infection (%) 14 2006 31 2007 
6.6 Incidence and death rates associated with malaria     
Notified cases of malaria per 100,000 population n.a  n.a  
Malaria death rate per 100,000 population, all ages n.a  n.a  
Malaria death rate per 100,000 population, ages 0–4 n.a  n.a  
6.7 Proportion of children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets     
Children under 5 sleeping under insecticide-treated bed nets (%) 0.7 2000 0.7 2000 
6.8 Proportion of children under 5 with fever who are treated with appropriate antimalarial 
drugs    
Children under 5 with fever being treated with antimalarial drugs (%) 48.6 2000 48.6 2000 
6.9 Incidence, prevalence, and death rates associated with tuberculosis     
Tuberculosis incidence per year per 100,000 population 102.2 1990 255.8 2006 
Tuberculosis prevalence per 100,000 population 175.6 1990 403.5 2006 
Tuberculosis deaths per year per 100,000 population 19 1990 66.1 2006 
6.10 Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured     
Tuberculosis detection rate under DOTS (%) 84.7 1995 74.9 2004 
Tuberculosis treatment success rate under DOTS (%) 89.0 1995 51.3 2003 
Source: United Nations (http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx)     
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C. Health Sector Resources 
5.18 The state is the country’s primary health care provider, although no data are available on 
the size of the private sector. The MSBES has responsibility for 18 hospitals, 46 health centers, and 300 
health posts. There are two regional hospitals (Malabo and Bata), 11 district hospitals, and five provincial 
hospitals (Table 5.5). The vast majority of the primary health care centers (36 of the 46 in operation) are 
under the direct control of the MSBES, while nongovernmental entities with which the MSBES 
coordinates are responsible for the others. Public health services are supported by a network belonging to 
the National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social, INSESO), which is parallel 
to the MSBES system, and to which only social security subscribers have access. INSESO currently has 
two health centers: the Dr. Loeri Combá Hospital in Malabo, which has 62 beds, and a small clinic in 
Bata that is expected to be complemented in 2009 by a new hospital with approximately 300 beds. 
INSESO is also planning to improve infrastructure at several health centers across the country to provide 
increased coverage. Although INSESO is more organized in its management of subscribers and ability to 
address their problems, its activities often duplicate work already done by the MSBES.  
Table 5. 5: Hospitals and Health Centers by Province, 2001 
 
 
5.19 The health sector’s infrastructure has fallen into a state of disrepair, and improvement 
plans may not be suitable due to the absence of cost-benefit calculations. Health infrastructure is very 
dilapidated, with inadequate facilities for patient admission, conditions that are exacerbated by external 
problems such as frequent power outages or lack of drinking water. To address this problem, the MSBES 
Province Health Districts  
Hospitals Beds Health Centers 
R D P Total No. Total State Other Total 
Bioko 
Norte Malabo 1     1 288   3 1 4 
  Baney   1   1 16 304 2   2 
                      
Annobón Annobón     1 1 7 7     0 
                      
Bioko Sur Luba     1 1 48   2   2 
  Riaba   1   1 10 58     0 
                      
Litoral Bata  1     1 224   4 4 8 
  Mbini   1   1 29   1 1 2 
  Kogo   1   1 16 269 1   1 
                      
Centro 
Surtral Evinayong     1 1 65   2 1 3 
  Niefang   1   1 24   3   3 
  Akurenam   1   1 13 102 2   2 
                      
Kie Nten Ebebiyin     1 1 92   3 2 5 
  Nsok Nsomo   1   1 16   1   1 
  Micomeseng   1   1 40 148 4 1 5 
                      
Wele Nzás Mongomo     1 1 80   4   4 
  Añisok   1   1 42   2   2 
  Akonibe   1   1 24       0 
  Nsok   1   1 20 166 2   2 




has identified essential infrastructure projects for the health sector, including new construction and the 
rehabilitation or expansion of existing facilities (Table 5.6). Its hospital building proposal provides for the 
construction of 7 new hospitals and 61 health centers and the expansion or rehabilitation of 8 hospitals 
and 12 health centers, representing a 39 percent increase in the number of health care centers and a 44 
percent increase in the number of hospitals. However, this health infrastructure development was not 
based on a technical analysis of the size and location of activities. 
Table 5. 6: Planned Health Facility Construction and Rehabilitation/Expansion by Province 
 
 
5.20 The paucity of human resources in the health sector will be exacerbated by the construction 
of new infrastructure. In light of current needs, limited and insufficiently trained personnel constitute 
major drawbacks in the current health system (Table 5.7). Equatorial Guinea has 211 physicians, a ratio 
of 2.08 physicians per 10,000 inhabitants,
105
 of which only 106 (50 percent of the total) are nationals, with 
Cubans accounting for the highest number of foreign physicians (82 professionals or 39 percent of the 
total). The MSBES recently conducted a survey to ascertain human resource needs in each district in the 
country to formulate a health development strategy. Needs were identified in almost all areas, from clinic 
support workers to diagnostic technicians, pharmacists, and administrative personnel. Most noteworthy 
among the needs identified were the shortages in nursing, with a need for close to 380 professionals, and 
in medicine, which needs an additional 24 pediatricians, 24 gynecologists, 22 internists, 13 anesthetists, 9 
general surgeons, and 68 midwives. The low wages earned by public sector workers with medical training 
prompt young people in these professions to emigrate to other countries. There is also a dearth of 
technical skills in the sector, especially in areas that require advanced technical and technological 
training, which could make it impossible to maintain medical teams in the future. The MSBES 
compartmentalizes management of the various professional groups, separating them into physicians, 
nurses, and other professionals, and lacks an overall picture of the problem or a plan for staffing expanded 
services as new infrastructure comes into service. 
                                                          
105 According to WHO (2002), the average in Africa is 2.17 per 10,000 inhabitants. 
Provinces 
New Construction Rehabilitation/ Expansion 
Hospital Health Centers  Hospital Health Centers 
Bioko Norte   6 1 2 
Annobón 1 1   
Bioko Sul 1 7 1  
Litoral 2 15 1 1 
Centro Sur  11 2 3 
Kie Nten 1 9 1 3 
Wele Nzás 2 12 2 3 
Total 7 61 8 12 
          Source: Social Service, MSBES, 2007 
89 
 




5.21 Given the lack of public sector coverage, private sector involvement is extensive, including 
direct provision of health care services (clinics and polyclinics) as well as additional diagnostic and 
therapeutic resources (laboratories). Private sector providers are not regulated by the MSBES, which is 
unaware of the number of private entities and the conditions under which dispense services. The MSBES 
does not act as a technical regulatory body for activities conducted by health professionals and does not 
certify the academic qualifications of health care providers. Since no professional associations regulate 
development of the sector’s various professions either, quality control of health care services is poor. 
D. Inequality in the Regional Allocation of Resources 
5.22 Regional distribution of resources is not uniform. Seventy-nine percent of all physicians and 
63 percent of all health personnel are found in the regions of Bioko Sur, Bioko Norte, and Litoral, with 
significantly lower numbers in the continental interior (Kie Ntem, Wele Nzás, and Centro Sur). 
According to data for 2001,
107
 the insular regions and the region of Litoral account for 60 percent of all 
hospital beds. This translates into significant variations in the use of health services measured by the 
number of outpatient visits and hospital admissions per capita among the health provinces, with the 
highest per capita activity rates found in Bioko Sur and Annobón (Figure 5.1). This is perhaps attributable 
to the lower number of health centers (Figure 5.2) and physicians (Figure 5.3) in the regions of the 
continental interior, which increases the physical distance for the patient to travel for treatment. Other 
factors that may have an influence are the greater sensitivity to price (because of high concentrations of 
the poorest populations), the illiteracy rate, the specific cultural traits of each ethnic group, and the use of 
traditional medicine. 
  
                                                          
106 The information on the number of physicians is from 2007, while the information on the other technical personnel is from 
2006. 
107 The Directorate-General for Hospital Care does not have an accurate record of the hospital beds in the country, owing, among 













Bioko Norte 70 40 100 372 110 
Annobón 2 5 5 43 23 
Bioko Sul  8 1 2 23 0 
Litoral 86 26 85 295 66 
Centro Sur 15 9 6 102 52 
Kie Nten 14 9 7 141 80 
Wele Nzás 16 11 13 184 81 
Total 211 101 218 1,160 412 
Per 10,000 2.08 1.00 2.15 11.43 4.06 
Source: Hospital Support Services, 2007, and Human Resource Services, 2006 
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Figure 5. 1: Rate of Use of Health Services by Health Province
108 
(Per 10,000 inhabitants) 
 
Source: Hospital Care Service, 2007  
Figure 5. 2:  Distribution of Beds by Geographic Area 








Source: WHO, UNDP, and UNICEF. NHDP Proposal, 2001 
 
Figure 5. 3: Distribution of Physicians by Geographic Area 
(Per 10,000 inhabitants) 
 
 





Source: Hospital Care Service, 2007 
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5.23 The allocation of resources is reflected in a specific epidemiological picture for each 
province. The hospital data for 2007 indicate a disproportionate impact on morbidity across the country 
(Table 5.8). There is a higher incidence of malaria in the continental interior and the Bioko Sur region, 
while AIDS is particularly prevalent in the Litoral Province (Bata, Mbini, and Cogo). It is difficult to 
draw conclusions about the impact of health service distribution on epidemiological indicators (for 
example, AIDS is concentrated in more internationally connected areas, regardless of health coverage), 
but it is obvious that the MSBES will eventually have to tailor its supply of health services to the specific 
situation in each province.  
 
Table 5. 8: Incidence of Main Diseases in Hospitals, 2007 
(Per 10,000 inhabitants) 
Province Malaria Typhoid Dysentery Tuberculosis AIDS Gonorrhea Diarrhea Pneumonia 
Bioko Norte 9.1 14.0 0.6 0.0 0.3 1.1 5.5 30.2 
Bioko Sur 115.7 41.7 0.0 4.5 12.7 2.8 38.2 51.7 
Annobón 41.9 89.9 41.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.9 26.0 
Litoral 69.5 6.4 2.9 5.9 76.5 4.8 19.0 24.2 
Centro Sur 140.3 8.3 7.3 2.7 8.6 8.7 34.9 39.4 
Wele Nzás 103.6 8.3 0.5 0.6 9.9 4.1 14.4 18.7 
Kie Ntem 81.6 4.7 5.2 3.6 18.2 10.3 31.0 23.0 
Rep. of Eq. 
Guinea 73.0 9.8 3.0 2.9 28.5 5.2 19.8 27.2 
Source: Annual Statistical Report, SIS, 2007      
 
5.24 INSESO is financed by subscribers and contributors, but services are only provided to 
subscribers. INSESO has a public health insurance system that ensures health protection for its 
approximately 60,000 beneficiaries and provides direct health service through its own clinics.
109
 
Financing is derived from two sources: (a) employer and employee contributions (all public and private 
sector workers are included, as well as self-employed persons and volunteers); and (b) a government 
subsidy of approximately 25 percent of INSESO’s total budget (which in practice has disappeared in 
recent years because of INSESO’s surplus). There is a clear inequality in the health care coverage for 
INSESO’s subscribers in comparison to the rest of the population since INSESO finances 43 percent of 
total recurrent health expenditure, which only benefits 60,000 members (or approximately 10 percent of 
the population) who therefore receive a higher per capita health expenditure than the rest of the 
population.  
E. Financing of the Health Sector 
5.25 Despite favorable economic growth in the last decade, the increase in health sector 
allocations is insufficient to meet the needs of the population. The national health system is financed 
by five main sources: the General State Budget
 
(GSB), the Investment Program (PIP), INSESO, cost 
recovery, and donors (Table 5.9).
110
 The government budget financed 88 percent of health sector 
                                                          
109 INSESO insurance includes a 75 percent reduction in the cost of a visit to outpatient facilities and a 50 percent reduction for 
the purchase of medication, as well as totally free access for beneficiaries who have to be admitted. If beneficiaries choose 
hospitals or health centers outside of the INSESO network, charges are subsequently reimbursed by INSESO in keeping with an 
agreement between the MSBES and INSESO. 
110 Private sector health expenditure could not be included in the table. Owing to the lack of adequate information, the total 
financial allocation for the health sector during the last five years cannot be obtained. The following constraints should be taken 
into account: (a) the GSB values correspond to budget appropriations since reliable information about disbursals cannot be 
obtained; (b) INSESO data prior to 2006 refer to budgeted values since the amounts executed were unavailable; and (c) since the 
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expenditure for 2008, either through the GSB or the PIP, with FCFA 54 billion allocated to the health 
sector in 2008, which amounts to €122 (FCFA 79,925) per capita per annum.
111
 However, there has 
obviously been a significant increase in financing through INSESO, which exceeds 10 percent of total 
financing for the system in 2008 owing to its increase in expenditure on infrastructure. These data are 
incomplete since they do not take into account the expenditure by patients in the private system, which 
can be very high. Not only is the total allocation insufficient, but the annual variability for each source of 
financing threatens the stability of the sector since it does not allow for strategizing based on a predictable 
budget. 
Table 5. 9: Sources of Public Financing for the National Health System 
 
 
5.26 The increase in public health sector expenditure is a result of investments rather than 
higher recurrent expenditure. Despite the 77 percent increase in current expenditure in the health sector 
since 2004, the sector has decreased its total current public expenditure, which fell from 5.1 percent of 
total recurrent expenditure in 2004 to 3.1 percent of total recurrent expenditure in 2008 (FCFA10.6 
billion), resulting in a very low current per capita public expenditure of €16 (FCFA10, 600) that fails to 
meet the population’s health care needs (Figure 5.4). Furthermore, despite the 37 percent recurrent budget 
increase in 2008, only 80 percent of this budget was spent, which suggests that the MSBES lacks the 
capacity to execute large budgets. However, health sector investment tripled between 2005 and 2008, 
reaching FCFA 37 billion in 2008, 94 percent of which was financed with domestic resources, and always 
remained significantly higher than recurrent expenditure. Notwithstanding, these figures must be viewed 
in context since the PIP is rather vague about the classification of included programs and often 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
cost recovery amounts for each institution were not obtained, the amounts for 2007 were reconstructed based on the report from 
the Malabo Hospital. 
111 Using the rate from official population data, the per capita expenditure would be much less—that is, €69 (FCFA 45,008)—
than would be the case using UN population data. 
112 The use of current expenditure in the PIP may create the following risks: (a) the deterioration of infrastructure, (b) no 
recurrent financing of current expenditure, (c) the diversion of strategic investment expenditure, and (d) the loss of strategic 
influence because of the dependence on external sources for the current operation of the MSBES. 
     CFAF millions 
Public 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
MSBES 6.056 18.503 15.119 34.136 48.010 
   GSB 6.056 5.556 7.278 7.864 10.750 
   PIP  12.947 7.841 26.272 37.260 
INSESO 0 0 1.851 2.188 5.998 
   Current   1.851 2.188 3.690 
   Investment     2.309 
Direct Revenues    346  




Figure 5. 4: General State Budget for the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 2004–08 
(Denominated in FCFA)  




5.27 Flaws exist in preparation and execution of the health sector budget, which is highly 
centralized. The lack of a health sector strategy prevents meaningful evaluation of GSB allocations since 
the priorities are unknown. The MSBES budget is prepared using a bottom-up method, consolidating the 
budgets submitted by the various departments within the ministry, essentially their Directorates General. 
The fact that the entities in the health system have no administrative or financial autonomy presents grave 
difficulties with cash management and the control of procurement for goods and services, and creates a 
lack of flexibility unsuitable for a sector in which rapid response is needed in emergency situations.
113
 In 
addition, the Economic Department of the MSBES lacks a suitable system to comprehensively supervise 
and control execution of the health budget, nor does it receive reports from the Ministry of Finance or the 
health regions. Since the manner of budget execution during the fiscal year is not tracked, a gap is created 
between what has been budgeted and the amounts that institutions spend. There is also no regular 
information system for financial services. The lack of an accounting system for recording capital, 
financial, and analytical transactions limits the analysis of public accounts and hampers decision 
making.
114
 Finally, the Minister of Health can draw on a number of bank accounts in the country’s 
financial institutions for extra-budgetary expenditure, with no requirement to report how it is used.  
5.28 Although the wages of public officials are funded by the state, revenue from operational fees 
is needed to supplement salary payments because of budget rigidity. Forty-seven percent of the total 
recurrent MSBES budget is allocated for personnel expenses, which helps ensure health sector 
operation,
115
 although this does not prevent channeling of some cost recovery revenues to personnel. This 
is particularly worrying because the MSBES did not execute its entire personnel budget for 2008. 
5.29 Funding for administration and for hospital treatments that do not meet the needs of the 
general population is excessive. The current MSBES cost structure does not permit functional analysis 
                                                          
113 Authorization for the purchase of goods and services is highly centralized in the agencies of the Office of the President 
(President and Prime Minister), making the process very bureaucratic and slow, with limited autonomy and flexibility.  
114 The poor organization of the centers of responsibility hinders data collection to categorize expenditure functionally, whether 
by aggregating cost centers or regions, and limits analysis to a financial consideration of income and expenditure. 
115 The MSBES also distributes a fixed operations subsidy to four hospitals to cover meals for inpatients: FCFA 910,000 for 














of public expenditure since the 15 cost centers defined in the GSB for the Ministry of Health are classified 
administratively rather than functionally (Table 5.10). Budget distribution seems very concentrated since 
only 4 of the 15 internal departments account for 92 percent of total expenditure. It also suggests that 
funding is inefficiently targeted for best results. The Administrative Center that manages the system and 
provides no health care receives 35 percent of the total budget. Hospitals are the primary focus of service 
delivery financing (31 percent of total expenditure), which means that illnesses are treated reactively 
rather than preventively through better primary health care (Figure 5.5). This is reflected both in the low 
immunization rate and the current infrastructure distribution across the country, which accords priority to 
large hospitals. The country’s main problems, including malaria and HIV/AIDS, could be tackled much 
more effectively by focusing on health promotion and disease prevention. 
Table 5. 10: Values by Cost Center, GSB 2008 
 
 
Figure 5. 5: Ministry of Health and Social Welfare Expenditure by Cost Center 
 
Source: General State Budget, Amended 2008 version 
5.30 Concentrating investment in hospital infrastructure requires MSBES to strengthen its new 
Secretariat for Infrastructure to improve effectiveness. Hospitals account for 55 percent of the health 
sector’s total public investment, almost twice the projected allotment for the primary care network (Figure 
5.6). This reflects the high cost of such infrastructure as well as the priority accorded by authorities to 
CFAF Thousands
Cost Center Value %
Administrative Center 3,736.73 34.8
DG Public Health and Health Planning 64.47 0.6
DG Hosp. Care and Coord. 22.46 0.2
DG Coord. HIV/AIDS Prevention 684.19 6.4
DG Pharmacy and Traditional Medicine 75.08 0.7
Inspectorate General of Services 18.39 0.2
Regional Office 1,085.41 10.1
Provincial Office (Cont. Reg.) 36.72 0.3
Bioko Norte Provincial Office 8.08 0.1
Hospital Administration 3,372.20 31.4
Bioko Sur Provincial Office 8.08 0.1
DG Supplies and Medication 1,587.25 14.8
Annonbon Provincial Office 8.26 0.1
DG International Health 21.56 0.2
DG Preventive Health Care 21.56 0.2
Total 10,750 100
Source: General State Budget (Amended), 2008
Note: DG refers to General Directorate (Direccion General)
Administrative Center  
34.76% 




 Regional Office; 
10.10% 
 Other; 9.01% 
95 
 
development of the national hospital complex. However formal selection criteria (cost-benefit analyses) 
have not been used to guide the investment being made. To better manage the high number of projects, a 
Secretariat for Infrastructure was recently established within the MSBES, making it the sole sector 
ministry to which the Ministry of Infrastructure has delegated the supervision of PIP implementation. 
This secretariat is still very small, with only one hospital engineer; and it will have to be strengthened to 
ensure adequate programming of the investment cycle and effective supervision of all projects under way.  
 
Figure 5. 6: Distribution of PIP Health Expenditure by Functional Area, 2008–10 
  
5.31 The much expanded INSESO budget had an execution rate of only 60 percent, which may 
indicate a limited capacity to manage larger resources. INSESO’s budget jumped from 6 percent of 
total public health sector financing in 2006 to 12 percent in 2008 as a result of a substantial rise in current 
expenditure and the increase in investments to expand the Loeri Comba polyclinic, construct a new 
hospital in Bata, and rehabilitate and build health centers across the country. Figure 5.7 shows that 
INSESO’s main expenses in 2008 were for personnel (28 percent of the total) and medications (27 
percent of the total). INSESO’s accounts are presented in a different manner from those of the GSB, 
creating another obstacle to consolidation and analysis of state expenditure in the health sector.  
 
Figure 5. 7: Distribution of INSESO Expenditure by Category, 2008 
 
Source: INSESO, 2008 
Clinical Supplies; 15.88% 
 Personnel Expenses;  
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5.32 Inefficiencies are associated with the existence of parallel health systems by INSESO and 
MSBES. Operating two parallel systems with overlapping responsibilities but separate financing and 
management, generates inefficiencies such as the following:  
 Unequal provision of health services in terms of access, efficiency, and quality 
 Duplication of system management resources and tools (such as information systems, human 
resources, and health priorities)  
 Duplication of public health care facilities, which can lead to a lack of balance between supply 
and demand, and high costs for construction, operation, and maintenance  
 Competition for scarce resources, especially human resources 
 Mitigation of economy of scale. 
 
5.33 External donors are essential for financing key health projects, but lack of coordination 
with MSBES affects systemic efficiency.
116
 External financing is critical to essential programs such as 
those to combat malaria (a US$23 million budget, boosted by an additional US$28 million for a second 
phase of the program) and HIV/AIDS (US$9.8 million). With UNFPA management and FCFA 185 
million from the European Union since 2003,
117
 a cost recovery mechanism was created to ensure 
replenishment of medication and contraceptive stocks. The Spanish Agency for International Cooperation 
provides approximately FCFA 4.466 billion each year for institutional strengthening programs, with a 
focus on those that impact primary care.
118
 Nongovernmental organizations also engage in direct 
interventions outside the view of MSBES. The MSBES, in fact, generally lacks up-to-date information on 
external financial contributions to health care. The lack of ministerial coordination with external 
organizations and the attempt by independently operated nongovernmental organizations to resolve the 
most pressing problems may result in efforts that work at cross purposes or miss the opportunity to 
expand success more broadly. 
5.34 Given the rigidity in budget management, cost recovery provides decentralized institutions 
within the health system with a way to generate essential income that can be used flexibly to cover 
their expenses. In keeping with the Bamako Initiative,
119
 institutions within the MSBES and INSESO are 
permitted to charge fees to patients for various services (such as diagnosis, treatment, or medications), 
subject to legal regulations that set prices and conditions adapted to each of the health care delivery 
systems. Although MSBES has tried to set parameters for managing these resources, no standard practice 
is mandated, which results in uneven and incomplete information about billing patients for out-of-pocket 
                                                          
116 The main external donors are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization, 
UNICEF, UNFPA, the Global Fund, and the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation. Each institution participates in a 
different way and usually drafts annual bilateral cooperation agreements (if the programs are managed directly by the financing 
institution) or multilateral agreements (if management is delegated to other entities).  
117 EQG/03/P01, ―Strengthening Reproductive Health Services in Equatorial Guinea‖ (Reforzamiento de los servicios de salud 
reproductiva en Guinea Ecuatorial) 
118 A new hospital is also to be built in Malabo using Equatorial Guinea’s debt relief from Spain. 
119
 The Bamako Initiative, sponsored by UNICEF and WHO and adopted by African ministers of health in 1987, was based on 
the realization that, despite accepting in principle the core tenets of comprehensive primary health care, by the late 1980s many 
countries—especially in sub-Saharan Africa—were burdened by a lack of resources and practical implementation strategies. 
The Bamako Initiative aimed to increase access to primary health care by raising the effectiveness, efficiency, financial viability, 
and equity of health services. Bamako health centers implemented an integrated minimum health-care package to meet basic 
community health needs, focusing on access to drugs and regular contact between health-care providers and communities. 
Based on the concept that communities should participate directly in the management and funding of essential drug supplies, 
village committees engaged in all aspects of health-facility management, with positive results for child health in West Africa in 
particular. The purpose of community financing was to capture a fraction of the funds households were already spending in the 




costs, the revenues raised, and how the income was handled. Without an accounting framework to process 
the information, only a summary of total collections and general payments is available. For example, fee 
collections at the Malabo Hospital during 2007 totaled approximately FCFA 95 million (Table 5.11) 
mainly for diagnoses and therapy, which represented 29 percent of total expenditure. These funds were 
used primarily for payroll (20 percent), free medical assistance (22 percent), and the purchase of essential 
goods and services for provision of health care (Table 5.12). 
 
Table 5. 11: Cost Recovery Amounts at the Malabo Hospital, 2007 
 
Table 5. 12:  Use of Cost Recovery Amounts at the Malabo Hospital, 2007 
 
5.35 Cost recovery generates inefficiencies in the system and inequality in access to health 
services. The financial capacity of the state ensures the regular payment of wages to MSBES personnel, 
but health care providers need to recover costs for the purchase of essential goods and services, including 
equipment maintenance. However, the current system design has serious flaws that reduce its efficiency 
and generate inequality among patients, such as the: 
 Possible triggering of demand for health services as a result of asymmetrical information on 
health market supply and demand, in which there is a tendency to maximize the number of 
services to increase cost recovery 
 Lack of regular audits on collection procedures 
 Lack of clarity on the exemption of economically/epidemiologically vulnerable groups 
  CFAF Thousands 
Category  Amount % 
Emergency Care 2,783 2.94% 
Ultrasound Scans 8,638 9.13% 
Laboratory 19,445 20.56% 
Hospitalization 7,917 8.37% 
Interventions  5,653 5.98% 
Charity 21,080 22.28% 
Official paper 4,174 4.41% 
Other 24,909 26.33% 
Total 94,600 100% 
Source: Malabo Hospital, 2007   
 
  CFAF Thousands 
Category  Amount % 
Health Supplies 10,682 11.30% 
Payroll 18,885 19.98% 
Cleaning 5,948 6.29% 
Offices  5,623 5.95% 
Allowances 5,090 5.39% 
Official paper 4,474 4.73% 
Security 3,581 3.79% 
Charity 20,500 21.69% 
Meals 10,920 11.56% 
Other 8,798 9.31% 
Total 94,503 100% 




 Cash payment for treatment of an illness owing to the lack of health insurance 
 Inequality in access to health services depending on the patient’s wealth. 
 
5.36 The current SNS financing model requires urgent reform to achieve the MDGs. Since the 
health system obtains limited results when most needed, Equatorial Guinea is listed among the countries 
at risk of not achieving the MDG targets for 2015 (see Table 5.13 for an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system and the opportunities and threats it faces). The MSBES does not currently use 
the financing mechanism as a tool for improving the efficiency and quality of service provision; therefore, 
a new financing model must be developed to address the main problems facing the sector, which can be 
summarized by funding source, management, and distribution: 
Source of funds 
 Insufficient financial resources allocated to the health sector, as evidenced by the general 
deterioration of facilities, the breakdown of medical equipment, and the inability of the budget to 
cover remuneration of personnel 
 High financial risk for patients from co-payments for health services or purchasing medication 
 Lack of coordination between parallel health systems (INSESO and MSBES) with respect to 
collective financial assistance mechanisms 
 Dependence on donor financing for a number of essential programs 
Management of funds 
 Excessive centralization of the budget management and execution process without any record of 
budget execution 
 Regional entities ill-equipped to manage and supervise the system 
 Lack of an adequate information system 
 Lack of coordination in fund management among the various MSBES institutions and with 
donors. 
Distribution of funds 
 Budget allocation dependent on the expenses incurred the previous year, which does not 
encourage efficiency 
 Budget allocation focusing on hospitals, far from the country’s priorities 
 Financing of administrative units within the system rather than the direct health care providers 
 Priority for financing infrastructure without suitable selection criteria rather than recurrent 
expenditure 





Table 5. 13: Analysis of Health System Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
Strengths Weadnesses 
Ability to work in adverse conditions                
Investment/general priority of the health system 
Vertical programs to combat malaria and HIV/AIDS  
Existence of a financing mechanism for the health 
system through INSESO 
 
Imbalance between the country’s per capita income and 
health indicators 
Lack of a National Health Development Plan 
Extremely deficient information systems          
Existence of two health service provision systems   
Limited human resources 
Inefficient financial control processes     
Lack of a Directorate General/Financial Management 
Institution in the MSBES 
Centralization of the budget execution process 
Centralized and excessively large governance structure 
without intermediate management entities 
Hospital-based health service provision system  
 
Opportunities Threats 
Availability of financial resources for the health system 
Decentralization of budget execution            
Development of a planning cycle         
Health earnings through cost-effective investments         
Not Linking economic growth to development 
Maintenance of the new facilities and equipment 
Maintenance of the current situation        
Nonachievement of the MDGs 
Infrastructure construction without proper planning    
F. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.37 Equatorial Guinea has the financial resources to improve the health of its entire population, 
but the system needs to be reformed. Unlike most countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, Equatorial Guinea 
has the financial means to improve the health of its population. However, the concentration of 
expenditure on investments has yet to produce any visible impacts, either in improved health conditions 
or in the quality and quantity of health services. Although these conditions, especially with respect to 
infrastructure, might significantly improve in the medium term, it will be difficult to improve the 
population’s epidemiological status during the current phase of underdevelopment. Greater allocation of 
financial resources will not necessarily result in higher quality health services or improved health 
indicators if the health system is not reformed to increase efficiency.  
5.38 There is an urgent need to approve and implement a detailed health sector strategy in 
keeping with the MDGs. The lack of such a strategy and the planning to implement it limits decision 
making by the MSBES and suitable budget allocation. Since the goals set by the NDP are too generic, the 
2002 HDP must be updated and action plans developed for each MSBES institution, clarifying their 
respective principles (universal, general, and free access) and spelling out health sector needs for 
infrastructure, equipment, and human resources. This strategy of relating goals to means through an 
action plan is vital because increased financing by itself does not guarantee better performance.  
5.39 Development of the epidemiological information system can benefit from prior experience 
with similar systems such as the one used in the malaria control program. The lack of information 
systems at the central or decentralized level is a serious problem since limited data that have been 
validated by internationally recognized methodologies are available. Development of an integrated 
information system is therefore fundamental to increasing health system efficiency, and would help 
redefine the state’s role in the sector by strengthening its regulatory function through supervising the 
collection and processing of information provided by decentralized reporting institutions. To speed up 
formation of the national system, experience with the information system used in the malaria control 
100 
 
program on the island of Bioko should be used as a guide.
120
 Although the ideal in the medium to long 
term is to have personalized information that allows for specific medical analysis of each patient, the 
following objectives must be fulfilled in the short term: 
 Obtain information on the operations of MSBES entities 
 Automate the information gathering, processing, and analyzing processes 
 Integrate and standardize the information produced 
 Create databases for tracking demographic and epidemiological changes in the health status of 
populations (mortality and morbidity) 
 Respond to the various information needs of different actors in the system 
 Introduce control and support mechanisms for operation of health sector institutions. 
 
5.40 Resource allocation must focus on primary care rather than hospital and administrative 
expenditure. The current system is based on the provision of curative services at the hospital level rather 
than primary care for disease prevention and health promotion. In keeping with WHO recommendations, 
health policies, planning, and budget allocations must be reoriented toward a more cost-effective service 
delivery level that reaches the entire population and focuses on primary care. Furthermore, the current 
system devotes excessive resources to administrative overhead. Streamlining administration would free 
up resources for direct provision of health services, resulting in better patient care. 
5.41 More balanced growth is needed in health sector investment, with an increase in human 
resources to match improvements in infrastructure. The health PIP is the sector’s primary investment 
vehicle, financing numerous facility construction, rehabilitation, and expansion projects or the purchase 
of technical equipment. However, the government’s commitment to improve health infrastructure will 
only be effective if sufficient human resources are added to operate and maintain it. The current shortfall 
in human resources requires investment in training physicians, nurses, and other health professionals. 
This can be accomplished through professional training programs to qualify new personnel and through 
courses to upgrade the skills of currently employed professionals. Additional financing must also be 
allocated in coming years to ensure maintenance of the new infrastructure. The MSBES must also 
strengthen its recently established Secretariat for Infrastructure with sufficient resources to increase 
investment expenditure efficiency in the health sector. This includes, in particular: 
 Properly managing projects, ensuring that initial programming targets for time frames, budget, 
and quality are met 
 Directing investments toward the most cost-effective care, that is, investments focused on 
primary care or on management programs for prevalent diseases (such as AIDS and malaria) 
 Standardizing medical and technical equipment to facilitate their use and maintenance 
 Possibly outsourcing the maintenance of infrastructure and equipment. 
 
5.42 Strong financial management is essential to improve health sector results. At present the 
financial unit of MSBES has only two professionals, which adversely affects management of financial 
resources. In keeping with the 2002 HDP, an Administrative and Financial Directorate must be 
                                                          
120 Other existing information systems supervised by external entities, such as the HIV/AIDS program, also should be borne in 




established to assume the financial functions that are currently shared by various MSBES institutions (see 
Annex XII). This directorate will basically seek to ensure the financial sustainability of the system by 
implementing a plan to improve the collection and use of funds (see table in Annex XII). To accomplish 
this, progress must be made in four key areas: (a) preparation of a financial management plan, (b) 
decentralization of budget execution, (c) improvement in the control of cost recovery, and (d) 
development of an accounting and reporting system.  
5.43 The goal of the financial management plan in the medium term must be to support the HDP 
that defines health sector strategy. The financial management plan must define the health system’s 
main strategic and operational guidelines in terms of efficient use of its financial resources. Preparation of 
this new financial process must be an MSBES-led project and should be realized simultaneously with the 
HDP, encouraging a broad discussion among the various health system actors to ensure its legitimacy. 
This financial management plan must have the following objectives: 
 Define the financial role of MSBES in relation to other government institutions to achieve a 
cohesive financial policy and the activities and procedures that support that policy 
 Increase efficient health care delivery by promoting positive individual and institutional 
behaviors 
 Support the programming of MSBES activities to better integrate their planning and financing 
 Facilitate supervision, control, and assessment of financial performance.  
 
5.44 The gradual decentralization of budget execution to health care providers would facilitate 
health expenditure efficiency. At present, control of fixed costs (wages) is centralized while cost 
recovery is used for health care provider maintenance. This adversely limits the ability of service 
providers to meet urgent and unexpected needs. It is therefore essential to begin decentralization of 
budget execution by the MSBES Directorate-General of Financing toward health care providers. This 
process must be carefully paced; first strengthening the Directorate-General of Financing and then the 
district-level institutions to assure that financial control is maintained to prevent undue cost increases or a 
decline in service quality. Decentralization would positively affect the following: 
 Procurement control of goods and services since the decentralized institutions are best placed to 
determine whether purchased items have been delivered and contract terms fulfilled 
 Budget management accountability 
 Financial resource allocation since the heads of the institutions are better placed to know local 
needs and how they can be met 
 Speeding up budget execution and cutting bureaucratic red tape. 
 
5.45 Gradually improve control of cost recovery. Health care providers presently must generate 
their own revenues to cover current expense gaps. Although this income represents merely 1 percent of 
total public sector financing, it is the only discretionary funding over which decentralized institutions 
exert authority. Although the Bamako Initiative must not be implemented in the short term, the following 
improvements should be gradually introduced: 
 Rules governing exemption from payment by vulnerable groups (economically or 




 The income and expenditure control system for co-payments should be improved, starting with an 
estimated budget based on services provided in previous years, making it easier to spot the most 
significant deviations while facilitating integration of this information into the aggregate accounts 
of the MSBES. 
 The requirement for co-payments should be replaced with collective protection mechanisms 
(insurance) to cover treatment of illness. However reasonable rates must be kept to guard against 
the risk of moral hazard and control the demand for health care. 
 
5.46 Coordination between INSESO and MSBES could be attained by pooling existing resources 
while the financing and health service provision functions are separated in the medium term. A 
high degree of inefficiency and inequality comes with parallel health service provision by two state 
entities. A first step to improve coordination between INSESO and MSBES is joint management of the 
Malabo hospital complex. Follow-up steps toward integration would involve separating the financing 
functions (which can be performed in part by INSESO for its subscribers) from health care delivery, and 
integrating the service provider units of MSBES and INSESO into a single national network in the 
medium term. This system must be accompanied by insurance mechanisms for citizens not covered by 
INSESO, which would reduce the financial risk for users, increase the total amount available for the 
health sector, and better stabilize the sources of financing for the health system. 
5.47 Development of an accounting system in the medium term would facilitate greater control of the 
system and better inform decision making. From an epidemiological and accounting standpoint, the 
current information system seriously impedes analysis and decision making by national health system 
managers. Accounting records are maintained manually, based on cash payments and revenues, 
preventing determination of the system’s internal efficiency since the production unit cost for each health 
care provider cannot be calculated. It is also impossible to determine the net worth of MSBES assets. This 
situation is aggravated by the state MSBES accounts, which are kept independent of budget execution. To 
improve the recording of transactions and ensure procedural uniformity throughout MSBES, an 
accounting system must be implemented that accomplishes the following: 
 Adoption of  generally accepted accounting principles (International Standards of Accounting) 
 Creation of an Official Accounting Plan for the Ministry of Health (structured on a base that can 
be integrated with other public sectors) 
 Development and implementation of an internal accounting system (analytical) that allows for the 
identification of production cost 
 Regular and systematic preparation of the National Health Accounts 
 Regular audits of activities carried out by public health care providers 
 Definition of a pricing system, identifying the most expensive illnesses or benchmarking among 





Issues to be Resolved   Actions to be Taken 
The health sector’s information system does not allow for 
determination of the status of the health system and 
decision making. 
 Develop an epidemiological information system based on the 
experience of existing programs such as the malaria control 
program. 
 Coordinate the Directorate of Planning and the Directorate of 
Hygiene and Epidemiology, clarifying their responsibilities. 
Improvements in health indicators will not be sustainable 
unless accompanied by improvement in the population’s 
living conditions.  
 Increase public expenditure in areas related to improvement in the 
standard of living, such as housing, water, and sanitation. 
The health sector’s strategy has not been approved, leaving 
the MSBES without clear guidelines for action to achieve 
the MDGs. 
 Update the 2002 HDP, including an action plan up to 2015 and a 
financial management plan consistent with the MDGs.  
Health indicators are in line with the rest of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with a high incidence of malaria and HIV/AIDS. 
 Strengthen the implementation of malaria and HIV/AIDS control 
programs. 
There is an excessive amount of funding for administration 
overhead and hospital treatments, which does not meet 
public needs.  
 Reallocate resources for primary care rather than expenditure on 
hospitals and administration.  
The health sector’s infrastructure has fallen into a state of 
disrepair, and improvement plans may not be suitable.  
 Strengthen the recently created Secretariat for Infrastructure for the 
health sector to increase the efficiency of investment expenditure in 
the sector. 
The paucity of human resources in the health sector will be 
exacerbated by the construction of new infrastructure. 
 Ensure more balanced growth in the health sector with an increase 
in human resources to match the improvement in infrastructure.  
 Develop a hiring and human resource development strategy 
(especially for physicians and nurses).  
 Increase resources for the purchase of medication and clinic 
supplies, and outsource maintenance.  
Given the lack of public sector coverage, private sector 
involvement in the health sector is extensive. 
 Strengthen the role of the MSBES as regulator of the health sector 
to ensure private sector providers of health services are adequately 
licensed. 
The regional distribution of resources is not uniform, 
which affects the epidemiological picture for each region. 
 Focus the malaria and HIV/AIDS control programs on areas of 
special impact while an accounting system is developed to calculate 
production unit costs per province.  
Medium Term 
Issues to be Resolved Actions to be Taken 
INSESO is financed by subscribers and contributors, but 
services are only provided to subscribers. 
 Improve coordination between INSESO and MSBES, starting with 
the joint management of the Malabo hospital complex. 
 Take steps to separate financing from the provision of health 
services. 
The structure of the MSBES is very bureaucratic and 
requires further decentralization toward health care 
providers. 
 Strengthen the Directorate-General of Financing and the district-
level institutions to implement decentralization gradually.  
External donors are essential for the financing of key 
health projects, but the lack of coordination with MSBES 
affects system efficiency. 
 The MSBES must ensure better coordination of all donors around 
the HDP to be adopted.  
Cost recovery generates inefficiencies in the system and 
inequality in access to health services. 
 
 Define the rules for payment exemptions by vulnerable groups. 
 Improve the revenue and expenditure control system for co-
payments.  
 Replace co-payments with collective protection mechanisms 

















Annex: I. Alternative Population Estimates in Equatorial Guinea 
According to the 2001 Demographic Census in Equatorial Guinea, total population in 2001 was 1.015 
million, of which 47.3 percent were below 15 years of age. According to the demographic projections of 
the United Nations,
121
 total population in 2000 was 530,000 people, of which 44.2 percent were below 15 
years of age. Although both sources are in rough agreement about the age and sex structure of the 
population the overall population estimates are radically different, and as of today, they have not been yet 
reconciled. These discrepancies have obvious consequences in terms of policy analysis as for instance, 
meeting the 2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on child mortality and universal primary 
education will much more costly and difficult if Equatorial Guinea had one million people in 2001. 
This note compares the UN medium variant demographic projections for the years 2010, 2015 and 2020 
with projections for the same years based on the 2001 census. This will provide a framework for 
analyzing the impact of alternative demographic projections upon public expenditure programs in health 
and education. The UN medium variant and the census projections presented here are illustrative and 
sensitive to the underlying assumptions on fertility, mortality and migration and alternative projections 
may be easily considered. 
Population projections based on UN medium variant data  
The UN medium variant projections are based on assumptions about the evolution of total and age 
specific fertility rates, sex ratio at birth, life expectancy and mortality rates.
122
 The impact of HIV/AIDS 
on mortality is included for all countries where the HIV prevalence rate among population aged 15–49 
exceeded one percent at any time between 1980 and 2007, as is the case in Equatorial Guinea. The main 
assumptions for Equatorial Guinea are given in Table A1.1. 
In addition, the UN medium variant includes migration assumptions based on past migration estimates 
and the stance on migration policies in each country. The assumed net migration rate underlying the UN 
medium variant projection is 5.3 per thousand people in the period 2000–2005, 3.1 per thousand in 2005–
10, and zero thereafter.  
  
                                                          
121  Medium variant, http://esa.un.org/unpp/, June 8, 2009 
122 Detailed data and assumptions can be found in http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=3. 
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Table A1.1. Equatorial Guinea: Assumptions in the UN Medium Variant Demographic Projection
123
 
Infant mortality rate   Under-five mortality 
Period Total Male  Female  Period Total Male  Female  
2000-2005 105.6 113.3 97.7 2000-2005 180 189 171 
2005-2010 99.6 106.9 92 2005-2010 168 177 160 
2010-2015 90.9 97.9 83.7 2010-2015 153 161 144 
2015-2020 82.2 88.8 75.5 2015-2020 137 145 128 
Life expectancy at birth by sex (years) Total fertility rate    
Period Total Male Female Period TFR    
2000-2005 48.8 47.4 50.2 2000-2005 5.64    
2005-2010 50.1 48.9 51.3 2005-2010 5.36    
2010-2015 52.1 50.9 53.3 2010-2015 5.08    
2015-2020 54.1 52.8 55.4 2015-2020 4.68    
Age-specific fertility rates 
Period 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
2000-2005 128.77 262.51 257.66 165.76 154.26 107.57 51.08 
2005-2010 122.81 255.15 256.43 162.24 139.2 92.59 43.19 
2010-2015 116.9 247.1 254.1 158.13 124.92 78.61 35.85 
2015-2020 108.25 232.79 244.49 149.82 108.72 64.05 28.28 
  
The UN medium variant demographic projection for the years 2010, 2015 and 2020, is given in the World 
Population Prospects, 2008 revision,
124
 and uses 2000 as the base year. Results per five year age groups 
are shown in Table A1.2 and allow for drawing population pyramids. According to these projections, the 
average yearly growth rate of the population between 2000 and 2010 is 3 percent; between 2010 and 
2015, 2.4 percent; and between 2015 and 2020, 2.3 percent. In addition, the proportion of children aged 
0–14 is projected to remain at 40 percent of the total population in 2010–20 slightly below 44 percent 
proportion in 2000. The population under 25 years old will remain almost unaltered at around 60 percent 
of the total population. 
  
                                                          
123 The data in this report is based on the available information at the time of preparation (2008 and 2009). 


































Table A1.2. UN Medium Variant Projection of Population by Five-Year Age Group and Sex (thousands) 
2010    2015   2020   
Age Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
0-4 108 55 54 122 61 61 131 66 65 
5-9 91 46 46 103 52 51 116 58 58 
10-14 83 41 41 90 45 45 101 51 50 
15-19 75 38 38 81 41 41 88 44 44 
20-24 66 33 33 74 37 37 80 40 40 
25-29 47 23 24 64 32 32 72 36 36 
30-34 33 16 16 45 22 23 62 31 31 
35-39 35 17 18 31 16 16 43 21 22 
40-44 39 19 20 33 17 17 30 15 15 
45-49 38 18 19 37 18 19 31 16 16 
50-54 30 15 16 35 17 18 35 17 18 
55-59 19 9 10 28 13 15 33 16 17 
60-64 10 5 5 17 8 9 25 12 13 
65-69 7 3 4 8 4 4 15 7 8 
70-74 6 3 3 6 3 3 7 3 4 
75-79 4 2 2 4 2 2 4 2 2 
80-84 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
85-89 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 
90-94 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95-99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
100+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 























Table A1.3. 2001 Census Population by Five-Year Age Group 
and Sex (thousands)  
Age Both sexes combined Male Female 
0-4 168 85 83 
5-9 162 82 80 
10-14 150 76 74 
15-19 100 49 51 
20-24 82 39 43 
25-29 61 29 32 
30-34 52 24 28 
35-39 48 22 26 
40-44 43 20 23 
45-49 34 16 18 
50-54 32 15 17 
55-59 25 13 12 
60-64 23 10 13 
65-69 15 7 8 
70-74 11 5 6 
75-79 5 2 3 
80-84 3 1 2 
85-89 1 0 1 
90-94 0 0 0 
95-99 0 0 0 
100+ 0 0 0 
Total 1,015 495 520 
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Demographic projections based on the 2001 Equatoguinean census 
The age and sex composition of the population in the 2001 census by five-year age groups was published 
as a population pyramid,
125
 without the actual figures for each age group and is reproduced below. 
 
 
Figures inferred from this pyramid are given in Table A1.3, and are in line with total population of 1,015 
million and a population of 480,000 (47.3 percent) below 15 years of age. While inferring the numerical 
values underlying the population pyramid undoubtedly contains errors the sensitivity of the results to 
changes is not too large. 
 
Based on the age and sex composition of the population in Table A1.3 and the demographic assumptions 
in Table A1.1 population projection have been calculated for 2010, 2015 and 2020 and the results are 
shown in Table A1.4. Therefore the main difference between tables A1.2 and A1.4 is the different 
population size in the base year.
126
 The UN medium variant assumptions have not been changed to 
highlight the fact that the age structure of the population (a matter on which there is no significant 
difference between the 2001 census and the UN medium variant demographic projections) weighs heavily 
upon health and education expenditures and the prospects for growth. With respect to education, these 
consequences can be worked out from Table A1.4 by breaking down the five-year figures for the age 
groups 5–19 into one-year figures and linking the projections to the educational system, as done in 
Chapter 4 of the PER on education. With respect to health, the impact of malaria, HIV/AIDS and other 
diseases on expenditure requires the use of alternative analytical tools. They also have impact on the 
structure of urban and rural population but unfortunately data are scarce to carry out projections in these 
areas. 
  
                                                          
125  (http://www.dgecnstat-ge.org, under /datos estadisticos/datos estructurales/indicadores de poblacion 





 Table A1.4. 2001 Census Demographic Projection: Population by Five-Year Age Group and Sex (thousands) 
2010       2015     2020     
Age Total  Male Female Total  Male Female Total  Male Female 
0-4 226 113 112 262 132 130 282 142 140 
5-9 181 91 90 217 109 108 253 127 126 
10-14 158 80 78 179 90 89 215 108 107 
15-19 158 80 78 156 79 77 177 89 88 
20-24 145 74 72 155 78 77 154 78 76 
25-29 96 47 49 142 72 70 153 77 76 
30-34 78 37 41 94 46 48 140 71 69 
35-39 57 27 30 76 36 40 91 45 47 
40-44 48 22 26 55 26 29 73 35 39 
45-49 44 20 24 46 21 25 53 25 28 
50-54 38 17 21 41 18 23 44 20 24 
55-59 29 13 16 35 16 19 38 17 21 
60-64 25 11 14 25 11 14 31 14 17 
65-69 18 9 9 21 9 12 21 9 12 
70-74 14 6 8 13 6 7 16 7 9 
75-79 7 3 4 9 4 6 9 4 5 
80+ 5 2 3 6 2 3 7 3 4 
Total 1327 652 675 1532 755 777 1757 871 888 
 
The number of children aged 0–14 in 2000–2001 is important for the economic development of 
Equatorial Guinea. The cost and the potential benefits of investments in their health and education depend 
in part upon how many they are. It makes a great difference whether they were 230,000, as in the UN 
medium variant demographic projection, or 480,000, as in the 2001 population census of Equatorial 
Guinea. An important aspect of the projections in Table A1.4 is the weight of the young in the population 
of Equatorial Guinea. Children (the age group 0–14) is projected to remain at 47.3 of the population in the 
base year 2000-2001, and they are projected to be about 43 percent of the population between 2010 and 
2020. In 2010, almost two-thirds of the Equatorial Guinean population is less than 25 years old. By 2020, 
the projected ratio is 60 percent. It is difficult to visualize sustained growth in Equatorial Guinea if the 
young lack health, education and job opportunities. 
Remarks on the population count in the 2001 Equatoguinean census 
The UN Population Division reliance on its own demographic projections is probably based on the 
population figures reported in Table A1.5 that shows the population in the three demographic censuses 
carried out in Equatorial Guinea to date. The 2001 census stands in sharp contrast with the ones of 1983 
and 1994, and the contrast is attributed in part to undercounting in 1994. A footnote to the 1994 census 
figures summarized that undercounting is due to omissions (of people within households, of houses and 
villages…) and to ―lack of popular participation due to the census date (a time of democratic transition).‖ 
This undercounting has been put at about half the recorded 1994 figure, and the adjusted 1994 population 





Table A1.5. Thousands of People in Three Censuses 
 1983 1994 2001 
Insular 60 91 265 
Continental 240 316 750 
TOTAL 300 406 1,015 
Source : Dirección General de Estadística y Cuentas Nacionales 
    http://www.dgecnstat-ge.org/Datos/estructurales/Poblacion.htm 
According to the adjusted census of 1994 and the 2001 census the yearly rate of growth of the Equatorial 
Guinean population between 1994 and 2001 is 7.6 percent. This would imply a net inflow of migrants of 
up to five percent of the Equatoguinean population every year between 1994 and 2001. About one-fourth 
of the 2001 population of one million would represent net immigration between 1004 and 2001. The 
plausibility of such a large inflow in such a short time is questionable. Also, the population growth rate 
between 1983 and 1994 would have been 6.2 percent, a rate that is difficult to justify by net immigration 




According to projections made available by the national statistical authorities on yearly population 
projections between 2001 and 2008 the Equatoguinean population in 2008 is 1.5 million and the implicit 
rate of population growth between 2001 and 2008 is 5.6 percent per year. Of the projected total 
population in 2008, another quarter million would be explained by net immigration between 2001 and 
2008. This means that Equatorial Guinea would have received about half a million net immigrants 
between 1994 and 2008, which is questionable. Furthermore, if this were the case, the projected 
population for 2015 in Table A1.4 would have already been reached in 2008, making the 2015 MDG for 
health and education even more difficult to reach. 
  
The discrepancies between the 2001 census data and UN demographic projections will be resolved 
through increased cooperation, and eventually, through a new census. In the meantime, it is 
understandable that the UN Population Division is reluctant to alter its projections on the basis of the 
limited data published about the 2001 census. Pending a new census, surveys are necessary. The poverty 
survey EEH 2006 published in November 2007 might be of help despite the fact that coverage of 
education, health, employment and access to public services was excluded of the survey. The following 
population pyramid from this survey is reproduced: 
 
                                                          
127Even if there had been no return migration between 1979 and 1983, and if 100,000 people had returned between 1983 and 




This pyramid differs radically from the one reproduced above from the 2001 census. The hypothesis 
advanced in the survey publication (page 15) is that this change could be explained by the return 
migration of Equatoguineans and by foreign immigration. This hypothesis cannot be assessed on the basis 
of the survey itself, but cohort changes with respect to the 2001 census pyramid are too drastic to be 
explained by migration. The implied migration patterns by age and sex would be very peculiar: 
preponderance of women aged 15–50 and unusual structure in the first four age groups. Children in the 
age group 5–9 were 0–4 in 2001, and the EEH pyramid reports 100,000 children less in the age group 0–4 
that corresponded according to the 2001 census. What happened to these children? There are also around 
100,000 fewer children in the age group 0–4 in the EEH than were in the 2001 census. Has fertility 
changed that much in five years to account for this difference? It looks convenient to revisit the design 




Annex: II. Selected Indicators and Data 
Table A2.1. Selected Indicators 
 
  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Est.
Production, prices, and money
Real GDP 38.0 9.7 1.3 21.4 11.3
Oil and gas GDP (excluding hydrocarbons secondary production) 40.4 6.7 -6.4 11.9 8.2
Non-oil GDP (including hydrocarbons secondary production) 28.4 22.8 29.8 47.2 17.6
GDP deflator 16.9 42.6 14.4 -1.2 23.7
Consumer prices (end of period) 5.1 3.2 3.8 3.7 6.0
External sector
Exports, f.o.b. 65.4 52.2 16.6 23.7 40.9
Hydrocarbons exports 66.9 53.3 16.7 23.5 41.3
Oil primary exports 68.1 52.8 14.7 14.3 38.5
Hydrocarbons secondary exports 51.6 60.9 44.5 126.5 57.2
Hydrocarbons secondary exports
Imports, f.o.b. 27.7 34.3 -4.8 17.1 70.2
Non-oil sector imports 106.1 48.9 57.9 15.6 90.4
Terms of trade 11.1 33.1 16.6 3.2 22.2
Nominal effective exchange rate (depreciation -) 5.1 -0.1 0.4 5.0 ...
Real effective exchange rate (depreciation -) 7.0 2.7 2.1 7.1 ...
Investment and savings
Gross investment 43.7 39.9 32.5 35.3 26.7
Public 13.1 10.3 15.1 16.9 16.8
Private 30.6 29.6 17.3 18.4 9.9
         Of which: oil sector 24.4 25.0 13.5 13.6 8.8
Gross national savings 22.1 33.6 39.5 39.6 36.5
      Public 25.4 30.9 36.8 34.7 32.1
      Private -3.3 2.7 2.8 4.8 4.4
Government finance
Revenue and grants 29.8 34.7 40.8 38.3 36.8
Hydrocarbons revenue 26.4 31.7 37.5 33.9 34.4
Expenditure and net lending 17.4 13.8 17.2 20.3 21.5
Overall balance after grants (cash basis) 12.2 20.4 23.4 19.2 15.3
Non-oil primary balance (cash basis, percent of non-oil GDP) /1 -64.2 -60.9 -54.6 -49.7 -66.8
External sector
Current account balance (including official transfers; deficit -) -21.6 -6.2 7.1 4.3 9.8
Outstanding medium- and long-term public debt 5.6 3.1 1.5 1.0 0.7
Exports, f.o.b. 4,673 7,113 8,290 10,252 14,443
Hydrocarbons exports 4,591 7,040 8,217 10,151 14,344
Imports, f.o.b. -1,580 -2,121 -2,020 -2,365 -4,025
Non-oil sector imports -636 -947 -1,495 -1,728 -3,292
Current account balance (deficit -) -1,134 -511 679 542 1,808
Overall balance of payments 652 1,384 685 389 600
Outstanding medium- and long-term public debt 323 245 156 136 117
Gross official foreign assets 1,648 2,911 5,078 7,057 7,641
     Of which: Reserve assets at the BEAC 945 2,102 3,067 3,846 4,206
                      Government bank deposits abroad 703 808 2,011 3,211 3,435
   Gross official foreign assets (months of next year's imports) 5.5 11.0 16.0 14.2 21.2
Memorandum Items
Nominal GDP (billions of CFA francs) 2,769 4,334 5,021 6,027 8,296
Non-oil GDP (including hydrocarbons secondary production) 571 752 1,062 1,578 2,095
Atlas GNI per capita (US$) 3,250 5,210 6,870 9,710 14,980
Exchange rate (average; CFA francs/U.S. dollar) 528 527 523 479 448
Sources: EQG authorities; IMF and World Bank estimates.
(Annual percentage change, except where indicated)
(Percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)
(Millions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise specified)
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Table A2.2. Growth by Sector, 1990–99 (percent) 
 
 
Table A2.3. Growth by Sector, 2000–2007 (percent) 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture 53 -6.8 -3 -11.2 21.6 10.7 7.3 18.7 -5.9 -0.4
Forestry 53 -0.3 4.7 -15.3 39.5 36.5 33.2 41.8 -38.7 86.9
Fishing 80 -12.6 -55.5 -10.5 4.9 4.1 -0.5 2.9 -20 28.2
Manufacturing 64 9.4 8.4 0.2 5 5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5
Utilities 89 3.9 2.8 11.2 5.5 2.7 2 -15 35 13
Construction 94 36.6 6 -15.6 35 5.6 2 8 8 15
Trade and commerce 98 17.3 9 -22.9 31.9 4 5 3 6 23.6
Transport and communications 103 9.4 1.8 -85.6 4 3.5 3 4 16.7
Finance and housing 118 4.7 2.9 -9.9 13.8 1.8 1.4 1.9 1.9 28.1
Public administration 49 -8.1 27.7 -21 34.8 3.8 13.7 8 7 35
Other services 71 16.6 3 -1.7 6 2.4 2.2 0.1 7.2 19.8
Total NON-OIL GDP -1.1 2.4 -2.5 12.2 14.1 14 21.4 -14.4 30.7
Memorandum items  
NON-OIL 35 36 36 37 47 61 74 95 81 103
OIL Derivatives 
 OIL 0 0 4 7 13 16 60 197 168 337
Total GDP (billion FCFA) 35 36 41 44 61 77 134 292 248 440
Source:World Bank
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture 0.3 -3 15.3 -1.1 8.4 6.4 4
Forestry -7.9 4.5 5.7 3.2 13.2 0 18.8
Fishing 55.6 41.9 9.4 6.9 6.4 5.2 5.3
Manufacturing 15.2 13.6 17.3 20.6 17.7 17.7 14.4
Utilities 29 21.4 18.2 41.8 35.2 44.2 20
Construction 76.5 39.4 11.1 107.8 29.5 77.8 30.8
Trade and commerce 31.4 20.9 15.4 27.3 10.8 6.8 4.4
Transport and communications 15 24.8 17.9 3.5 10.8 6.8 -0.3
Finance and housing 42 16.1 19.7 55.3 62.6 10.9 15.9
Public administration 20.5 14.6 13.9 1 22.2 9.3 22.3
Other services 48.8 13 50.2 3.1 11.1 6.8 6.5
Total NON-OIL GDP 18.3 14.6 14.2 35.1 21.3 39 22.4
Memorandum items  
NON-OIL 153 194 239 269 388 463 668 837
OIL Derivatives 13 75 92 110 152 259 355 694
 OIL 700 982 1,142 1,306 2,197 3,582 3,959 4,448








Table A2.5. Deflators by Sector of Origin, 1990–99 (2000 = 100)  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Agriculture 53 58 60 67 62 84 85 69 82 86
Forestry 53 47 45 56 96 94 102 123 104 94
Fishing 80 82 80 79 55 61 57 85 399 108
Manufacturing 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 65 66 66
Utilities 89 89 89 89 89 93 93 93 97 99
Construction 94 94 94 113 96 98 103 105 107 103
Trade and commerce 98 98 98 127 105 101 107 110 111 95
Transport and communications 103 103 103 15 107 101 103 103 102 91
Finance and housing 118 118 118 131 118 118 118 118 118 96
Public administration 49 49 49 62 45 50 70 84 97 99
Other services 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 73 71 96
Total NON-OIL GDP
Memorandum items  
NON-OIL 35 36 36 37 47 61 74 95 81 103
OIL Derivatives 
 OIL 0 0 4 7 13 16 60 197 168 337
Total GDP (billion FCFA) 35 36 41 44 61 77 134 292 248 440
Source:World Bank
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Agriculture 0.3 -3 15.3 -1.1 8.4 6.4 4
Forestry -7.9 4.5 5.7 3.2 13.2 0 18.8
Fishing 55.6 41.9 9.4 6.9 6.4 5.2 5.3
Manufacturing 15.2 13.6 17.3 20.6 17.7 17.7 14.4
Utilities 29 21.4 18.2 41.8 35.2 44.2 20
Construction 76.5 39.4 11.1 107.8 29.5 77.8 30.8
Trade and commerce 31.4 20.9 15.4 27.3 10.8 6.8 4.4
Transport and communications 15 24.8 17.9 3.5 10.8 6.8 -0.3
Finance and housing 42 16.1 19.7 55.3 62.6 10.9 15.9
Public administration 20.5 14.6 13.9 1 22.2 9.3 22.3
Other services 48.8 13 50.2 3.1 11.1 6.8 6.5
Total NON-OIL GDP 18.3 14.6 14.2 35.1 21.3 39 22.4
Memorandum items  
NON-OIL 153 194 239 269 388 463 668 837
OIL Derivatives 13 75 92 110 152 259 355 694
 OIL 700 982 1,142 1,306 2,197 3,582 3,959 4,448




Annex: III. Petroleum Accounting beyond Gross Domestic Product 
Gross Domestic Product has limitations as an indicator of economic performance and wellbeing in 
EQG. A first limitation follows from the nature of the GDP deflator, which refers to both oil and non-oil 
output and reflects mainly the volatility of world oil prices and dollar exchange rates. A second limitation 
follows from the exhaustibility of oil reserves. Exclusive focus on GDP ignores oil depletion: the higher 
the rate of oil extraction the higher is the rate of GDP growth but the faster is the rate of decline in oil 
reserves. A third limitation follows from the inclusion of the oil companies’ income in GDP. 
Net Domestic Product and Net National Income take into account oil depletion and the income of 
the oil companies. A barrel of exported oil ads to GDP, but Net Domestic Product does not change if the 
value of that barrel is counted as depletion of natural capital. In turn, Net National Income has increased 
by the government takeout from that exported oil. The value of natural capital has fallen, net domestic 
product has not changed and net national income has increased by the government intake.
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Oil Rent and Net National Income. Net National Income in EQG is the oil rent plus the net output value 
of the nonhydrocarbon sector. The oil rent is computed from panel A as hydrocarbon exports minus the 
income of oil companies. Net output in the nonhydrocarbon sector is not available: there are no estimates 
of depreciation in that sector. The Net National Income Plus calculated in panel B is net national income 
in EQG plus depreciation in the non-oil sector. Panels A and B lead to panel C, that shows the links 
between the oil rent, the value of non-oil output and its breakdown into consumption, investment (public 
and private) and the non-oil trade deficit.  
Between 2000 and 2008, EQG exported oil, gas and oil derivatives for an accumulated value of 
US$52 billion, of which US$25 billion went to the government (the oil rent) and US$27 billion to the oil 
companies. Of the 25 billion, about one-third went into foreign exchange reserves, and the rest has 
already been consumed or invested. Accumulated reserves are about the same as the accumulated value of 
output in the non-oil sector over this period, US$8.2 billion.  
Accumulated net imports by the non-oil sector over 2000–2008 are equal to the accumulated value 
of its output. Imports increased by a factor of 24, while exports remained roughly stable. Imports of 
public sector equipment, in particular, increased by a factor of 55, for an accumulated total value of 
US$6.6 billion. This suggests that the chosen pattern of growth for the non-oil sector is highly capital 
intensive and it is likely to generate little employment. Given the age structure of the population and fast 
urbanization in EQG, the generation of employment is a basic requirement for growth and the reduction 
of poverty. 
                                                          
128 Going from GDP to NDP and NNI poses important policy questions. Is it worth to extract that barrel of oil? How to value 
depletion? How to design a system of permits and fees to increase proven oil reserves? What is the best measure of net domestic 
product and net national income? Can the accumulation of capital (both physical and human) compensate for oil depletion? 
Answers to these questions have a long history in the theoretical and applied literature on the economics of exhaustible resources. 
A formal solution to the problem of optimal extraction when there is a backstop technology to replace the resource is in 
Weitzman, M.L, Income, Wealth and the Maximum Principle, (Harvard U. Press, 2003, pages 157–170). Another treatise on 
depletion, and of exhaustible resources in general is Dasgupta, P.S. and Heal, G.M., Economic Theory of Exhaustible Resources 
(Cambridge Economic Handbooks, 1979). A treatment of a strictly oil exporting economy is in Hartwick, J.M, National 
Accounting and Capital, (E. Elgar, 2002, pages 84-88), who proposes a sustainability criterion different from the utilitarian 
interpretation of NNP in early papers by Weitzman and his 2003 book. Both sustainability criteria, though, require extraction to 
be on an optimal path. Whether this necessary condition is roughly met in Equatorial Guinea has yet to be established. 
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Consumption in the non-oil sector is output minus investment and net imports, and this calculation is 
carried out in panel C
129
. The oil rent has had a very large impact: consumption in the non-oil sector grew 
in real terms at an average yearly rate of 20 percent between 2000 and 2008. Indications are that this 
increase has not been widely shared across the population and that the reduction of poverty is not yet 
significant.  
Investment in the non-oil sector, measured in U.S. dollars, increased at the average rate of 36 
percent between 2000 and 2008, broken down into a 20 percent for private and 46 percent for public 
investment. The rate of return on this accumulation of capital is open to question, given that the statistical 
and administrative capacity in EQG is at early stages of development. 
A. Balance of Payments Items, 2000–2008 (US$ million) 
Items 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Hydrocarbons                      
    Exports 1136 1673 2049 2750 4591 7040 8217 10151 14344 51951 
    Imports 367 665 306 929 944 1174 525 636 733 6279 
Nonnhydrocarbons                      
    Exports 83 66 64 75 81 73 73 101 99 715 
    Imports 136 144 202 309 636 947 1495 1728 3292 8889 
       Petroleum products 26 27 28 38 62 95 114 149 253 793 
       Public sector equipment 45 89 127 204 481 697 1189 1319 2486 6638 
       Other 65 27 47 66 93 155 192 260 552 1457 
Net Imports of Services 549 769 591 985 1251 1392 1117 1397 1872 9924 
Oil Companies Income 337 826 940 1504 2831 3878 4293 5782 6675 27066 
FDI 154 945 323 1444 1652 1869 1739 1716 -570 9273 
 
B. Net National Income Plus, 2000–2008 (US$ million) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Oil Rent 799 847 1109 1246 1760 3162 3924 4369 7669 24885 
Nonhydrocarbon GDP 215 264 343 463 735 877 1277 1747 2287 8209 
Net National Income Plus 1014 1111 1452 1709 2495 4040 5202 6116 9956 33094 
  
                                                          
2This is true if all net imports of services in panel A refer to the hydrocarbon sector only. Ignoring trade in services in the non-oil sector is 
probably not a serious omission.  
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C. Nonhydrocarbon Sector, 2000–2008 (US$ million) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Value                    
Output 215 264 343 463 735 877 1277 1747 2287 8209 
  Consumption 125 156 190 241 445 710 984 900 1883 5634 
Investment 143 186 291 455 844 1041 1715 2476 3596 10748 
    Public 64 128 182 292 687 846 1453 2126 3107 8885 
     Private 79 58 109 163 157 196 262 350 489 1863 
Trade deficit -53 -78 -138 -234 -555 -874 -1422 -1628 -3192 -8173 
Shares in Output (%)                    
  Consumption 58 59 55 52 61 81 77 51 82 69 
Investment 67 70 85 98 115 119 134 142 157 131 
                        Public 30 49 53 63 94 96 114 122 136 108 
                        Private 37 22 32 35 21 22 21 20 21 23 
Trade Deficit -25 -30 -40 -51 -76 -100 -111 -93 -140 -100 
Memorandum items             
Non-Oil GDP (FCFA billion) 153 194 239 269 388 463 668 837 1024   
Average FCFA per US$ 712 733 697 581 528 527 523 479 448   
Oil Price (US$ per barrel) 26 22 23 27 34 49 60 67 93   
Real Consumption  89 105 113 112 180 271 356 290 536   
Consumer Price Index 100 109 117 126 131 138 145 149 157   
Sources: WB, IMF and official data 
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Annex: IV. The Permanent Income Hypothesis Model—Key Assumptions and Data 
The PIH model used in this chapter is calibrated on the basis of the one currently developed by the 
IMF (the IMF model is used as the base case scenario). In a nutshell, the permanent income consists of 
two components: the annuity that is expected from the net present value of the lifetime oil revenue flows 
and the return from accumulated savings. In a PIH model, government spending is determined by the 
projected level of permanent income plus any non-oil revenues, and government savings are equal to oil 













The key oil production data used to construct the PIH model are taken from the Equatorial 
Guinea’s Ministry of Mining. The Ministry projection is that that the country’s oil reserves will start 
declining in 2013 and will be completely depleted by 2035 leaving future generations only with the assets 
and savings accrued during the petroleum era and income derived from non-oil economic sectors. 
Therefore, efficiently managing its oil wealth is critically important for Equatorial Guinea, a country 
where the oil sector contributes to around 90 percent of GDP
130
 and more in total central government 
revenues. Uncertainty about potential petroleum prices negatively affects the capacity of the authorities to 
adequately plan and implement the National Development Strategy. In our model, we estimate as a 
component of permanent income the return on accumulated savings as of December 31, 2007. In addition, 
the overall balance and the non-oil primary balance were projected based on government budget for 2008 
and 2009, assuming that public investment descends along oil and derivatives revenues. It is also assumed 
that non-oil revenue will progressively increase to balance the decline of oil revenue. The model forecasts 
for the period 2009–50. 
From the IMF base case scenario of the PIH model, three more cases have been developed to draw 
policy implications for oil revenue management in Equatorial Guinea. The IMF baseline scenario of 
the PIH model developed for Equatorial Guinea relies on the following key assumptions. Oil reserves will 
                                                          
130 Taking into account petroleum derivatives, which are obviously oil and gas related.  
Box A4.1. Equatorial Guinea: Permanent Income Model 
ORt + NRt – Gt = St                               (1) 
Gt = YP + NRt                                            (2) 
















         (4) 
Where: OR:  Government oil revenue 
 NR: Government non-oil revenue  
 G: Government spending 
 S:  Overall balance is equal to government savings   
 YP: Permanent income (perpetual income) related to oil revenues   
 A: Stock of savings funds at the end of previous year 
 X: Real government oil revenues  
  r:  Real rate on return on oil wealth  
 T: The year when he oil production is depleted 
 
S urce:  IMF, TA Program Quarterly Report July – September 2008. 
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completely deplete in 2035 (in line with the government’s projection). In line with the WEO, oil price is 
forecasted at US$58/barrel adjusted downward by a fixed US$3.75/barrel for Equatorial Guinean oil due 
to its lower quality. Real rate of return on investment and real discount rate are assumed to be 1.5 percent 
until 2012 and 2 percent onward. Two more scenarios are developed to test the impact of various 
projected oil prices. The worst case scenario assumes 25 percent lower oil price than the oil in the base 
case scenario, that is, it reflects a conservative case scenario with average oil real price around 
US$41/barrel in line with the real long-term historical average oil price of US$35/barrel.
131
  
Symmetrically, the best case scenario assumes a 25 increase in annual oil price compared with the IMF 
projected prices, that is, it assumes that even if hydrocarbon prices improve they remain at an average of 
approximately US$68/barrel. The model incorporates uncertainty into the valuation of oil resource flows 
by using a real discount rate that reflects the values of real risk adjusted interest rate, U.S. inflation, and 
risk premium with higher discount rates being used for the later years of the projection. For simplicity, the 
rate of return on the stock of oil savings is assumed to be the same as the discount rate used in the 




PIH model results 
The PIH’s sustainable fiscal envelope, projected on prudent forecast of primarily the rate of oil 
reserve depletion and oil prices, is substantially smaller than the government-budgeted 
expenditures. 
Tables A4.1–3 summarize the PIH model results in three case scenarios (for the purpose of presentation 
only the projections for 2009–20 are shown). It is worth noting that the overall balance of government 
expenditures is consistent to the PIH is similar across three different case scenarios. The underlying PIH 
assumption that the government expenditures are determined by the level of permanent income, 
regardless of the volatility in oil price or rate of return of investment may help explain such consistency 
and similarity of the pattern of overall fiscal balance as a share of the GDP. 
A similar pattern of the projected expenditures related to the permanent income level is also 
observed with the sensitivity analysis that allows for the rate of return to investment to vary. Table 
A4.4 indicates when the rate of return to investment rises, the PI consistent level of expenditures as a 
share of GDP will also increase and vice versa.  
  
                                                          
131 It reflects a conservative case scenario with average oil real price around US$41/barrel  in line with the real long-term 
historical average oil price of US$35/barrel. 
132 For concise discussion on the discounting for PIH, see for example, Sweder van Wijnbergen (March 2008), The Permanent 
Income Approach in Practice (mimeo). 
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Table A4.1. Base Case Scenario  
 
 
Table A4.2. Best Case Scenario (Oil Price up 25 percent compared with Base Case Scenario)  
 
Expenditure related 




Year % of GDP % of GDP Bn CFA Bn CFA
2009 12.8 24.9 634 1,233
2010 11.8 22.6 710 1,359
2011 11.4 22.7 776 1,547
2012 11.3 21.3 846 1,591
2013 13.3 16 1,026 1,241
2014 14.3 12.4 1,108 958
2015 14.5 11.5 1,152 909
2016 14.5 11.1 1,180 902
2017 15.1 9.2 1,237 753
2018 15.3 7.8 1,254 642
2019 15.2 6.9 1,278 577
2020 15.4 5.1 1,296 425
Expenditure related 




Year % of GDP % of GDP Bn CFA Bn CFA
2009 12.8 24.9 634 1,233
2010 11.8 22.6 710 1,359
2011 11.4 22.7 776 1,547
2012 11.3 21.3 846 1,591
2013 13.3 16 1,026 1,241
2014 14.3 12.4 1,108 958
2015 14.5 11.5 1,152 909
2016 14.5 11.1 1,180 902
2017 15.1 9.2 1,237 753
2018 15.3 7.8 1,254 642
2019 15.2 6.9 1,278 577
2020 15.4 5.1 1,296 425
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2009 14.1 24.8 567 995
2010 12.8 22 633 1,087
2011 12.2 22 685 1,230
2012 12.1 20.4 746 1,264
2013 13.7 15.5 878 996
2014 14.4 12 943 785
2015 14.5 11.1 985 755
2016 14.4 10.7 1,021 756
2017 14.8 8.9 1,070 642
2018 14.9 7.5 1,098 555
2019 14.7 6.6 1,130 508
2020 14.8 4.9 1,159 384
Year Base Case Scenario
If Return 





If Return decreases 
by 1 percentage 
point (compared 
with base case 
scenario)
2009 12.8 16.4 9.2
2010 11.8 14.7 8.9
2011 11.4 13.9 8.9
2012 11.3 13.6 9.1
2013 13.3 15.3 11.2
2014 14.3 16.4 12.3
2015 14.5 16.4 12.6
2016 14.5 16.4 12.7
2017 15.1 16.9 13.4
2018 15.3 17 13.6
2019 15.2 16.8 13.6
2020 15.4 17 13.9
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Annex: V. Millennium Development Goals 
 
Millennium Development Goals Equatorial Guinea
With selected targets to achieve between 1990 and  2015
(estimate closest to date shown, +/- 2 years)  
Goal 1: halve the rates for extreme poverty and malnutrition 1990 1995 2000 2007
   Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP, % of population)   .. .. .. ..
   Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (% of population)   .. .. .. ..
   Share of income or consumption to the poorest qunitile (%)  .. .. .. ..
   Prevalence of malnutrition (% of children under 5)   .. .. 15.7 ..
Goal 2: ensure that children are able to complete primary schooling
   Primary school enrollment (net, %) 96 .. 91 87
   Primary completion rate (% of relevant age group)   .. 50 56 58
   Secondary school enrollment (gross, %)   .. .. 33 ..
   Youth literacy rate (% of people ages 15-24) .. .. 95 ..
Goal 3: eliminate gender disparity in education and empower women
   Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)   .. .. 86 ..
   Women employed in the nonagricultural sector (% of nonagricultural employment)   11 .. .. ..
   Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)   13 9 5 18
Goal 4: reduce under-5 mortality by two-thirds
   Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000)   170 187 200 206
   Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)   103 112 120 124
   Measles immunization (proportion of one-year olds immunized, %) 88 81 51 51
Goal 5: reduce maternal mortality by three-fourths
   Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)   .. .. .. 680
   Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)   .. 5 65 ..
   Contraceptive prevalence (% of women ages 15-49)   .. .. .. ..
Goal 6: halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and other major diseases
   Prevalence of HIV (% of population ages 15-49)   .. .. 3.7 3.4
   Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)   102 153 222 256
   Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)   .. 85 83 74
Goal 7: halve the proportion of people without sustainable access to basic needs
   Access to an improved water source (% of population) 43 43 43 43
   Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 51 51 51 51
   Forest area (% of total land area)   66.3 .. 60.9 58.2
   Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)   .. .. .. 16.2
   CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)   0.3 0.3 0.6 11.5
   GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2005 PPP $ per kg of oil equivalent)   .. .. .. ..
Goal 8: develop a global partnership for development   
   Telephone mainlines (per 100 people)   0.4 0.7 1.4 2.1
   Mobile phone subscribers (per 100 people) 0.0 0.0 1.2 43.3
   Internet users (per 100 people)   0.0 0.0 0.2 1.6
   Personal computers (per 100 people)   .. .. 0.5 1.9
Note: Figures in italics are for years other than those specified.  .. indicates data are not available. 4/6/09
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Measles immunization (% of 1-year olds)
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Annex: VI. List of Autonomous Institutions 
 
























































by the  
2007 NDS 
SEGESA 100% Public Enterprise Electricity Partly NO 
GECOTEL 100% Public Enterprise        Telecom Partly NO 
SONAPESCA 100% Public Enterprise Fishing 100% YES 
Empresa Nac. Peages y Manten. Carret. 100% Public Enterprise Infrastructure 100% YES 
CEIBA 100% Public Enterprise Transport 100% YES 
SONAGAS 100% Public Enterprise Hydrocarbons 100% YES 
GEPETROL 100% Public Enterprise Hydrocarbons 100% NO 
GETESA Parastatal Enterprise         Telecom NO NO 
ADG Parastatal Enterprise Transport NO NO 
INPYDE Central Government body* Promotion of SMEs 100% NO 
INPAGE Central Government body Agriculture Partly NO 
GEPROYECTOS Central Government body Infrastructure 100% NO 
CICTE Central Government body Technology 100% NO 
UNGE Central Government body Education 100% NO 
INSESO Central Government body Social Security Suspended* NO 
Adminisitracion de Puertos Central Government body Infrastructure Suspended NO 
INDEFOR-AP Central Government body Forestry 100% YES 
O.R.TEL. Central Government body         Telecom 100% YES 
ENPIGE Central Government body Housing 100% YES 
Corporaciones Locales Municipalities Public sector Partly NO 
Cámaras de Comercio  ( Malabo - Bata ) Public  Private sector Partly NO 
Federaciones Deportivas Nonprofit organization Sport 100% NO 
Source: Directorate of Autonomous Institutions, Public Companies, Joint ventures and Privatization of the Ministry of Finance.  




Annex: VII. Ministries and Public Institutions Grouped by Function 
 
 






















Camara de los representativos 
Poder judicial 
Tribunal constitucional 
Presidencia del Gobierno 
Asuntos exteriores y cooperacion 
international 
Justicia y culto 
Función publica y reforma administrativa 
Interior y corporaciones locales  
Defensa, Orden Púb.y Seguridad Defensa nacional 
Securidad nacional  
Servicios económicos 
 
Planificación y desarrollo economico 
Economia, commercio y promoción 
Agricultura y bosque 
Minas, industria y energia 
Información, turismo y cultura 
Pesca y medio ambiente 
Infrastructura y urbanismo 
Transporte 
 
Tranportes, tecnologia y communicaciones 
Salud Sanidad y bienestar social 
Educación 
 
Educacion, cienca y deportes 
Promoción y Protección Social 
 
Promoción de la mujer 




Annex: VIII. Illustration of the Impossibility of Following PIP Execution 
(Example taken from the education sector) 
The following table compares the public investment program for the education subsector prepared by the 
MoPD with project execution data prepared by Geproyectos and recorded by the Treasury for 2007. Data 
from both lists cannot be reconciled because (a) project names differ and there is not a single number to 
identify a project; and (b) there is hardly any project in Geproyectos’ list that was budgeted in the PIP 
(that also includes an important amount of recurrent expenditure). In fact, the list from Geproyectos is a 
list of payments to contractors and is not used for monitoring and reporting on the projects as, (a) a 
contractor’s payment can include several projects or part of a project; and (b) there is no information on 
the total budgeted cost or the contractual cost of the project. 
Public investment program (PIP) 2007  
Execution 2007 
(investments by Geproyectos; recorded by the Treasury) 









Alfabetización de Adultos 16,0 TECNOBAT Acondicionamiento Inem Mbini 6,67 
Apoyo Económico de los Becarios 
en el Exterior 
350,0 GRAL,WORK Centro Formacion Profesional Mongomo 563,33 
Asistencia Técnica Cubana 175,0 APSOGESA 
Const Coleg Santa Cruz Ikund 2 aulas y 
despach Dirección 
36,71 
Atland: Construccion y Formacion 




Constr 1 Edificio 20 aulas de clases en 
Bata 
3 292,51 





Constr 1 Edificio 20 aulas de clases en 
Malabo 
3 292,51 
Cons. 60 vivien. Docent. centros 
ambito nacional (E.S.) 
1 666,6 APSOGESA 
Constr Colegio Santa Cruz Ikunde 4 aulas 
(ampliacion) 
45,05 
Const. 60 vivien. Docent.centros 
ambito nacional (E.P.) 
766,6 CONGESA 
Constr Lectrin Perforac Poz Coleg Nac 
Micom 
53,18 
Const. de una residencia 




Constr. 2 Edific. Internado Escuela  
Agricola Alep Bata 
767,54 
Constr. CAMPUS universitario en 




Construc Escue Prim Consejo Pobl Ebebe 
-Nsomo 
9,51 
Constr. CAMPUS universitario en 
Malabo (5.000 estudiantes) 
27 750,0 PROMAGRO 
Construcción 3 Escuelas y Casas de 
Maestros Bioko-Sur 
45,39 
Constr. Facultad de Letras y CCSS 




Construcción Escuela Agricola Alep Bata 885,96 





Construcción Vall INEM Bonifico Ondo 
Edú Evinayong 
87,43 
Construc. Centro de Formación 




Construción un Bloque 20 Aulas Clase 
Mongomo 
2 822,15 
Construc. Centro de Formación 
Profesional de Malabo 
176,5 EAMAU 
Contribuc G.E. en concept Estud Becarios 
dicha Escuela 
271,47 
Construc. de18 Aulas de Clase 
Enseñanza Media (4 en  Okong 
Oyec, 4 en Nsang, 4 en Rio Campo, 
4 en Annobon y 2 en Luba) 
166,6 ATEC 
Control Superv Rehab Edif Coleg Nac 
Lumumba Mongomo 
8,79 
Construc. Y Puesta en Marcha 
Primer año Cinco Centros de 
Formacion en: Bata, Evinayong, 
Mongomo y Ebibeyin. SUPERIOR 
343,0 ATEC 
Control Superv Rehabilit Edif Coleg 
Antiguo Ministerio Industria Malabo 
7,60 
Construccion de aulas de clases 300,0 MACIAS Contrucción  Facultad Medicina de Bata 513,65 
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Public investment program (PIP) 2007  
Execution 2007 
(investments by Geproyectos; recorded by the Treasury) 









para enseñanza superior CONST 
Construccion de Centros 




Curso de Formación Unidad Malabo 1 156,12 
Construcción Escuelas 





Delegacion  Regional Educacion  40,67 
Diseño curr. enseñ. Presecolar y 




Estudio Cento de Reeducación de 
Meneores de Riaba 
24,08 
Diseño curr. Enseñ. Profesional y 




Formac  diez Mecanico Tecnicos 
Obtencion  Calificac Avion  
95,54 
Diseño de curr. de enseñ. media y 




Formac Unidad Bata 5 Instruct Unidad 
Mongomo 
1 618,57 
Educación de la Niña y Reducción 
de Sobreedad  
166,0 UCRANIANA 
Formacion 16  Estudiantes Ecuato 
Guineanos Aviacion  
367,12 
Educación para la Paz 4,6 
BANEY 
GLOBAL 
Formacion del personal 1 802,53 
Elaboracion del Mapa escolar 750,0 IMPAGE Funcionario del Invocado Instituto 2 255,89 
Enseñanza Prescolar  375,2 UCRANIANA 
Identificación reclutamiento y formación 
Pilotos LAIGE 
225,91 
Enseñanza Primaria  942,3 ANDOGA INEM de Mongomeyén 29,00 
FONDO SOCIAl MIU: adquisicion 
de mobiliario para aula de nivel pre-
escolar 
85,0 EDITORIAL 
Libros textos fabricados M° Educac, C  y 
D 
178,54 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: 





Pag varias  Facturas; formacion Pers 
Camiones  Contenedores 
13 
078,18 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: 





Pintado Complejo Centro Pres-Escolar 
Micomeseng 
2,10 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: 





Pintado Completo Colegio Naser Vall 
Ebebiyin 
28,00 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: 
construccion de baños y letrinas 
612,0 APSOGESA 
Reha. y Acond. Letrin. Pozo agua  Pre-
esolar Santa Cruz  
26,87 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: 
construccion de baños y letrinas 




Rehab Edific Alber Direc INEM Dele 
Policia  
9,80 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: 
construccion de posos de agua para 
escuelas de nivel pre-escolar 
734,0 SOMBRA 
Rehab. Colegio Nacional Alén 
Concentrad. Ebibeyín 
25,44 
FONDO SOCIAL MIU: instalacion 
de posos de agua en patios de 
juegos de escuelas primarias 
1 326,0 CIGESA 
Rehab.M° Sanidad y B Social y M° Educ 
C y Dep Malabo 
2 910,42 
FONDO SOCIALMIU: adquisicion 
de mobiliario para aula de nivel 
primario 
1 249,0 MBAYE S.A. Rehabi vivi  Maestro plaza  Acurenam 4,42 
FONDO SOCIALMIU: adquisicion 
de mobiliario y materiales de 
enseñanza profesional 
106,0 CONGESA Rehabilit Colegio Inmaculada Bata 112,12 
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Public investment program (PIP) 2007  
Execution 2007 
(investments by Geproyectos; recorded by the Treasury) 









Formación de Recursos Humanos 
del Ministerio Pesca y M.A. 
40,0 MARTARAL 
Rehabilit Colegio Nacional BENITO 
NSANG (okong oyek) 
18,74 
Formación Personal Técnico 





Rehabilit y Acond Colegio Nacional 
Teguete 
17,21 





Rehabilita Coleg Patric Lumumba  
Mongom Vall y Urbaniz 
125,51 





Rehabilitac INEM Bonifacio Ondo Edú 177,22 





Rehabilitac. y Acond Colegio Nacional 
Municipio Bikurga 
35,61 
Mejora de las capacidades de la 
Facultad de Medicina de la UNGE 
1 068,3 MBAYE S.A. 
Rehabilitación  Colegio Nacional 
Micomeseng 
60,94 
Mejora de las capacidades de los 
docentes del nivel secundario 
1 675,2 MBAYE S.A. 
Rehabilitación Completa   Vivienda 
Profesores Micomeseng 
92,69 
Mejora de las capacidades del 
Centro Nacional Formación 
Profesional  
770,6 MBAYE S.A. 
Rehabilitación Completa INEM 
Micomeseng 
81,53 
P.N.D. Educación para Todos. 
Enseñanza Secun. General 
238,8 MBAYE S.A. Rehabilitacion del INEM de Acurenam 5,30 
Plan de desarrollo de enseñanza 
tecnica y profecional G.E 
173,3 PREGUIS Rehabilitación del INEM de Añisok 163,30 
Plan Nacional Formación de 





Rehabilitación INEM de Mongomo 238,27 
Programa de abastecimineto de 
agua potable a las escuelas 
1 444,6 SOGECO Rehabilitación INEM de Riaba 219,13 
Programa de capacitación para 
agricultores zona rural 
25,0 MARTARAL 
Reheb Escuela Consejo Poblad 
Nkumekieñ concentrado 
126,97 
Programa de enseñanza del idioma 
frances - edicion textos 
100,0 MARTARAL 
Rehebilit Escuela Consejo Poblad Engong 
concentrado 
126,97 
Programa de primeros auxilios en el 
aula 
3 884,6 MARTARAL 
Rehebilit Escuela Consejo Poblad Moka 
concentrado 
126,97 
PROMAGRO: construccion 3 





Reparación Colegio Consejo Movo 
Concentrado 
35,61 
Promoción y Capacitación Mujeres 233,3 FILYAL.S.A. 
Reparacion Pintado Colegio Nacional 
Inem Nsok Nsomo 
43,63 
Proyecto continuo  Formacion 
docente con UNESCO 
100,0 PROSER 
Sup.Obras const 1 Bloq edif 20 aulas en 
Bata 
92,19 
Reab. y acondic. de varios centros 
en mal estado de conserv.Ambito 
Nal. SECUNDARIA 
333,3 PROSER 
Sup.Obras const 1 Bloq edif 20 aulas en 
Malabo 
92,19 
Rehab. Acondic. Sede MINEDUC 
en Malabo 
200,0 PROSER 
Sup.Obras const 1 Bloq edif 20 aulas en 
Mongomo 
92,19 





Term 1 edif Adm y Const 1 Bloq edif 
Adm Aulario Univ. Malabo 
589,57 
Rehabilitacion Comlpejo 
Rasidencia Universitaria de Malabo 
200,0 ANDOGA 





Public investment program (PIP) 2007  
Execution 2007 
(investments by Geproyectos; recorded by the Treasury) 









Reorganización de la Formación  
Profesional en G.E. 
391,0 ECUADOR 
Terminación Const 1 Centro educat. 2 
Plantas 
65,80 
Reorganización de la Formación 
Profesional en G.E. 
  SOMBRA 
Vall Colegio Nac Consejo Pobl Alen 
Connc Ebebiyin 
13,46 
Salud Escolar 16,7 PROCONS 
Vallado de la Escuela Inglesa de Ela-
Nguema 
5,88 
  107 321,5 APSOGESA Vallado del Colegio de Santa Cruz 35,80 
  MARTARAL 
Vallado del Colegio Pastor Juan Esono de 
Acurenam 
41,29 




Vallado Delegación Regional de 
Educación 
60,05 
  PREGUIS Vallado INEM de Añisok  114,23 
      39 746,2 
 
 
Annex: IX. Examples of Reporting Tools 
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Annex: X. School-Age Population Projections 
Official population source. According to the National Population and Housing Census completed by the 
General Directorate of Statistics and National Accounts in the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Development, the first census conducted in 1983 registered 300,000 inhabitants; another done in 1994, 
406,151 inhabitants (later adjusted to 595,995, that is, almost 50 percent higher); and finally, a third 
census in 2001, which indicated that the number had risen to 1,014,999 inhabitants. This means that 
between the first and second censuses, the average annual growth rate was 2.8 percent when compared to 
the original rate and 6.4 percent when compared to the corrected one. Between the second and third 
censuses, the average annual growth rate was 14 percent and 7.9 percent, depending on the figure used as 
the point of departure. The arguments advanced by the official source in favor of an average annual 
growth rate of 7 percent—which is far above the regional average of around 3 percent—between the 
censuses of 1983 and 2001 are the high birth and fertility rates, declining mortality, and, owing to strong 
economic growth and improvements in the domestic political climate, repatriation and immigration, 
although the relative importance of any of these factors cannot be established. 
 
Population distribution by region and district. The results of the official census of 2001, indicating 
population distribution by region and district, are shown in Table A10.1. In addition to density, the table 
shows the high and growing concentration of people in the districts of Malabo and Bata (a combined total 
of 44.9 percent against 27 percent in 1983 and 33.5 percent in the first version of the 1994 census), and 
that 26.2 percent live in the insular region. It should also be noted that 49.4 percent of the population is 
male and 38.8 percent lives in urban areas. 
 
Table A10.1. Population by Region and District 
Region/District Population Land Area Density 
Insular Region 265,470 2,034 131 
   Malabo 211,276 345 612 
   Baney 20,152 431 47 
   Luba 23,870 843 28 
   Riaba 5,164 398 13 
   Annobón 5,008 17 295 
Continental Region 749,529 26,017 29 
   Bata 244,264 1,910 128 
   Mbini 28,586 2,514 11 
   Kogo 25,564 2,241 11 
   Evinayong 51,867 4,338 12 
   Niefang 53,734 2,339 23 
   Acurenám 20,255 3,254 6 
   Mongomo 69,154 1,415 49 
   Añigok 52,684 1,718 31 
   Nsork 16,037 1,237 13 
   Akomibe 20,105 1,108 18 
   Ebibeyín 88,891 1,095 81 
   Micomeseng 45,409 2,037 22 
   Nsok Nsomo 32,979 811 41 
TOTAL 1,014,999 28,051 36 
Source: Official Census of 2001 
When viewed by age group, the official census indicates the distribution in Table A10.2, in which 57.6 
percent of the population is under 19 years of age. 
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Table A10.2. Population by Age Group 
 
Age group Total Percentage 
0-4 years 187,907 18.5 
5-9 years 149,575 14.7 
10-14 years 127,533 12.6 
15-19 years 119,188 11.7 
20 years and over 430,796 42.4 
TOTAL 1,014,999 100 
Source: Official Census of 2001 
 
Population projections of the official census. The official census used the average annual growth rate of 
7.9 percent established between the last two censuses as the basis for its projections, a rate that appears 
high when compared to the regional average (around 3 percent). Projections can be further extended to 
the year 2015, with a low average annual growth rate (2.5 percent), yielding the results in Table A10.3. 
Table A10.3. Population Projections and Annual Growth Rate (percentage) 
Year Population Percentage 
2001 1,014,999   
2002 1,085,000 6.9 
2003 1,157,005 6.6 
2004 1,242,006 7.3 
2005 1,318,008 6.1 
2006 1,383,009 4.9 
2007 1,446,011 4.6 
2008 1,508,013 4.3 
2009 1,566,014 3.8 
2010 1,622,016 3.6 
2015 1,835,000 2.5 
Source: National Institute of Statistics 
 
United Nations demographic projections. According to the estimates of the UN Population Division, 
the results in Table A10.4 were obtained. 
 
Table A10.4. UN Population Estimates 
 
Year UN Percentage 
1995 452,000  
2000 530,000 3.23 
2005 610,000 2.85 
2007 642,000 2.58 
2010 694,000 2.63 
2015 781,000 2.39 
Source: UN Population Division. 
 
United Nations population projections by age group. Table A10.5 indicates the population data 
disaggregated by age group in five-year increments. It bears noting that the relative share of the 
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population under 19 years of age is 53 percent, which is slightly less than the figure established by the 
official source. 






0-4 years 102,000 122,000 
5-9 years 88,000 103,000 
10-14 years 80,000 90,000 
15-19 years 69,000 81,000 
20 years and over 303,000 385,000 
Total 642,000 781,000 
Source: UN Population Division 
a
 In all instances, each source uses the same average annual population growth rate for 2007 as for 2005. 
 
Population estimates by age. In order to estimate the 2007 school enrollment rate, the period for which 
there is the most enrollment data, as well as the teaching and infrastructure needs for achievement of the 
MDGs by 2015, the cohorts are disaggregated by age. The official source uses the same disaggregation 
by age group in 2007 as in 2001, whereas in 2015 the disaggregation used by the UN is applied. For both 
the official source and the UN, the following ad hoc coefficient was applied to each group: 0.21 + 0.205 + 
0.2 + 0.195 + 0.19 = 1. Table A10.6 shows that according to the estimates, the population in the 
theoretical age group for primary education rises to 236,000 in 2007 according to the official source and 
to 100,000 for the UN, and in 2015 to 271,000 and 115,000, respectively. 
 
Table A10.6. Population by Age 
Age Level 
2007 2015 
Official UN Official UN 
0   56,178 21,420 60,196 25,620 
1 Nursery school 54,840 20,910 58,762 25,010 
2 Nursery school 53,502 20,400 57,329 24,400 
3 Nursery school 52,165 19,890 55,896 23,790 
4 Kindergarten 50,827 19,380 54,463 23,180 
5 Kindergarten 44,638 18,480 50,821 21,630 
6 Kindergarten 43,576 18,040 49,611 21,115 
7 1st Grade 42,513 17,600 48,401 20,600 
8 2nd Grade 41,450 17,160 47,191 20,085 
9 3rd Grade 40,387 16,720 45,981 19,570 
10 4th Grade 38,261 16,800 44,407 18,900 
11 5th Grade 37,350 16,400 43,349 18,450 
12 6th Grade 36,439 16,000 42,292 18,000 
13 1st Year 35,528 15,600 41,235 17,550 
14 2nd Year 34,618 15,200 40,177 17,100 
15 3rd Year 35,528 14,490 39,966 17,010 
16 4th Year 34,683 14,145 39,014 16,605 
17 5th Year 33,837 13,800 38,063 16,200 
18 6th Year 32,991 13,455 37,111 15,795 
    Source: World Bank, based on official and UN projections. 





 When considering the population distribution by district, it is difficult to estimate the impact of 
migration from rural areas to the cities, mainly to Malabo and Bata. The pace of population 
growth in both districts, which is greater than the country's average, could be used as a reference, 
but this raises questions regarding its origin. 
 
 Two arguments provide evidence in line with international estimates. First, according to the 
report ―Educational Development in Equatorial Guinea‖ (2006) by the Academy for Educational 
Development, the estimated population for the year 2005 is 529,034 inhabitants. Second, in the 
report ―Current Situation and Basic Characteristics of Primary Education Teachers in Equatorial 
Guinea‖ (2008), produced in the context of the Program for Educational Development of 
Equatorial Guinea (PRODEGE), when estimating gross and net primary enrollment rates, the 
figure used as the common denominator is 88,814 inhabitants, which is more or less in line with 
the scenario proposed by external sources. Both arguments are gaining traction considering each 
study was conducted in coordination with the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport (MECD) 
of Equatorial Guinea, which in some way would support United Nations statistics. 
 
Annex: XI. Additional Statistical Data on the Education Sector 
Table A11.1. Illiteracy by Region and District (2008) 
Region/District Number of Illiterate Persons Percentage 
Insular Region 900 5.1 
   Malabo 400 2.3 
   Baney 80 0.5 
   Rebola 80 0.5 
   Luba 188 1.1 
   Riaba 49 0.3 
   Moka 61 0.3 
   Annobón 42 0.2 
Continental Region 16,723 94.9 
   Bata 4,000 22.7 
   Mbini 496 2.8 
   Kogo 486 2.8 
   Evinayong 700 4.0 
   Niefang 117 0.7 
   Acurenám 315 1.8 
   Mongomo 800 4.5 
   Añigok 150 0.9 
   Nsork 117 0.7 
   Akomibe 260 1.5 
   Ebibeyín 2,142 12.2 
   Micomeseng 7,000 39.7 
   Nsok Nsomo 140 0.8 
Total 17,623 100 






Table A11.2. Gross Enrollment Rate 
Level Official UN 
Preschool 33.2 83.1 
Primary 34.4 80.6 
Secondary 16.7 39.5 
Total 27.8 66.2 
Source: MECD, World Bank 
 
 
Table A11.3. Teaching Staff by District and Level of Training (2007/08) 
Region/District 
Teachers 
Legally qualified  Primary Secondary No data Total 
Insular Region 380 52 290 12 734 
   Malabo 332 36 234 11 613 
   Baney 23 7 23 0 53 
   Luba 18 6 20 1 45 
   Riaba 2 3 4 0 9 
   Annobón 5 0 9 0 14 
Continental Region 985 212 952 17 2,166 
   Bata 560 32 306 0 898 
   Mbini 22 6 29 0 57 
   Kogo 21 6 30 0 57 
   Evinayong 31 29 89 1 150 
   Niefang 50 20 37 3 110 
   Acurenám 25 14 49 0 88 
   Mongomo 49 15 76 2 142 
   Añigok 46 23 63 0 132 
   Akomibe 19 10 33 0 62 
   Nsork 18 7 22 1 48 
   Ebibeyín 72 25 102 8 207 
   Micomeseng 51 18 52 1 122 
   Nsok Nsomo 21 7 64 1 93 
Total 1,365 264 1,242 29 2,900 
Source: MECD Primary Education Yearbook 
Note: The category ―legally qualified‖ includes persons holding doctorates, master’s degrees, bachelor’s degrees, and degrees or 
diplomas in education; ―primary‖ and ―secondary‖ include those who either have or have not completed these levels. 
 
 
Table A11.4. Level of Education Attained by Teachers with Under Five Years’ Seniority (2007/08) 
Seniority Legally qualified Primary Secondary Total 
1 year 45 14 67 126 
2 years 72 17 73 162 
3 years 86 10 81 177 
4 years 72 10 78 160 
5 years 77 13 87 177 
Total 352 64 386 802 
Source: Primary Education Yearbook 
Note: See Table A11.3. 
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 Table A11.5. Level of Teachers’ Educational Attainment by District 
Region/District 
Teachers 
Incomplete primary Primary Incomplete secondary Secondary Total 
Insular Region 38 72 169 7 286 
   Malabo 35 44 155 7 241 
   Baney 2 6 8 0 16 
   Luba 1 18 4 0 23 
   Riaba 0 1 0 0 1 
   Annobón 0 3 2 0 5 
Continental Region 164 394 802 9 1,369 
   Bata 10 121 305 8 444 
   Mbini 11 7 44 0 62 
   Kogo 12 5 29 0 46 
   Evinayong 17 3 60 1 81 
   Niefang 3 53 34 0 90 
   Acurenám 15 9 18 0 42 
   Mongomo 11 50 47 0 108 
   Añigok 3 27 39 0 69 
   Akomibe 26 7 26 0 59 
   Nsork 4 20 26 0 50 
   Ebibeyín 35 25 99 0 159 
   Micomeseng 2 18 52 0 72 
   Nsok Nsomo 15 49 23 0 87 
Total 202 466 971 16 1,655 
Source: Análisis de situación de la educación infantil y preescolar de Guinea Ecuatorial (2006/07) 
 
Table A11.6. Condition of the Centers, by District 
Region/District 
Type of construction material 
Permanent Semi-permanent Local materials Total 
Insular Region 63 42 2 107 
   Malabo 43 31 0 74 
   Baney 9 5 0 14 
   Luba 8 6 2 16 
   Riaba 1 0 0 1 
   Annobón 2 0 0 2 
Continental Region 163 396 73 632 
   Bata 86 60 0 146 
   Mbini 5 9 24 38 
   Kogo 4 26 0 30 
   Evinayong 9 20 0 29 
   Niefang 5 39 0 44 
   Acurenám 5 7 12 24 
   Mongomo 20 12 19 51 
   Añigok 3 49 0 52 
   Akomibe 9 15 0 24 
   Nsork 4 6 15 25 
   Ebibeyín 7 67 0 74 
   Micomeseng 5 38 0 43 
   Nsok Nsomo 1 48 3 52 
Total 226 438 75 739 




Table A11.7. Type of Classroom (2007/08) 
Region/District 
Classroom 
Permanent Temporary Total 
Insular Region 484 44 528 
   Malabo 379 33 412 
   Baney 52 3 55 
   Luba 35 8 43 
   Riaba 10 0 10 
   Annobón 8 0 8 
Continental Region 1,394 417 1,811 
   Bata 484 129 613 
   Mbini 53 10 63 
   Kogo 58 1 59 
   Evinayong 82 34 116 
   Niefang 81 50 131 
   Acurenám 55 14 69 
   Mongomo 136 11 147 
   Añigok 122 18 140 
   Akomibe 48 8 56 
   Nsork 39 2 41 
   Ebibeyín 133 60 193 
   Micomeseng 68 36 104 
   Nsok Nsomo 35 44 79 
Total 1,878 461 2,339 
  Source: MECD Primary Education Yearbook 
Table A11.8. Equity Indicators B (2007/08) 
District Colegio Nacional (%) Permanent classrooms (%) Students per classroom 
   Acurenám 80.2 79.7 21 
   Akomibe 69.5 85.7 18 
   Annobón 100.0 100.0 65 
   Añigok 71.8 87.1 19 
   Baney 89.6 94.5 25 
   Bata 93.3 79.0 47 
   Ebibeyín 73.4 68.9 28 
   Evinayong 67.8 70.7 23 
   Kogo 65.7 98.3 24 
   Luba 96.7 81.4 30 
   Malabo 92.3 92.0 51 
   Mbini 62.7 84.1 22 
   Micomeseng 69.7 65.4 28 
   Mongomo 87.5 92.5 23 
   Niefang 75.0 61.8 23 
   Nsok Nsomo 66.8 44.3 19 
   Nsork 71.5 95.1 19 
   Riaba 80.1 100.0 18 
Total 86.2 80.3 35 
  Source: Primary Education Yearbook, MECD 
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Table A11.9. Relative Share of Education Expenditure (Millions of CFA francs) 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Total public expenditure 69,200 84,382 100,918 158,141 
Total education expenditure 3,745 3,099 3,855 6,399 
GDP 286,200 422,000 885,300 1,180,300 
TEE / TPE 5.4 3.7 3.8 4 
TEE / GDP 1.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 
  Source: General State Budget, World Bank and IMF 
 
 
Table A11.10. Total Public Expenditure, Education Expenditure, and GDP  
(Millions of CFA francs) 
Concept 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total current expenditure (TCE) 98,978 101,615 154,828 204,337 352,819 
Total capital expenditure 159,785 200,825 427,000 979,436 1,300,000 
Total public expenditure (TPE) 258,763 302,440 581,828 1,183,773 1,652,819 
Current education expenditure  9,083 9,695 10,860 14,251 14,786 
Capital education expenditure 46,948 8,791 8,681 107,322 20,886 
Total education expenditure (TEE) 56,031 18,486 19,541 121,572 35,673 
GDP 2,757,400 4,253,500 4,927,300 5,850,900 7,890,400 
TPE / GDP 9.4 7.1 11.8 20.2 20.9 
PEE / TPE 21.7 6.1 3.4 10.3 2.2 
CEE / TCE 9.2 9.5 7.0 7.0 4.2 
TEE / GDP 2.0 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.5 




Table A11.11. Education Expenditure (Millions of constant CFA francs in 2008) 
Heading 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Current expenditure 13,867 10,455 10,278 13,926 14,786 
Capital expenditure 71,674 9,480 8,216 104,875 20,886 
Total education expenditure 85,541 19,936 18,493 118,801 35,673 





Table All.12. Budget Execution of Current Expenditure (Millions of current CFA francs) 
Category 2007 2008 
Personnel 7,600 52.8 6,392 24.2 
Goods and services 1,206 8.4 2,166 8.2 
Transfers 5,590 38.8 17,866 67.6 
Total 14,395 100 26,424 100 








Table A11.13. Personnel Expenditure by Function (Thousands of current CFA francs) 
Function Q Amount Additional Responsibilities Miscellaneous expenses Total 
Management personnel 22 122,294 13,920 80,604 265,256 
Teachers 3,583 5,889,161 194,868 20,000 6,107,612 
   Wages - civil servants 3,583 4,307,161 194,868 20,000 4,525,612 
   Contract personnel   500,000     500,000 
   Seniority   532,000     532,000 
   Extra allowance   550,000     550,000 
Total 3,605 6,011,455 208,788 100,604 6,372,868 





Table A11.14. Actual Wages, 2007/08 (Thousands of CFA francs) 
Wage Scale Q W Básico Seniority Grade Total 
A 9 16,737 6,169 1,594 24,500 
B 499 726,823 301,133 66,232 1,094,189 
C 810 889,646 231,562 85,858 1,207,066 
No payment or no data available 269 0 0 0 0 
Total 1,587 1,633,206 538,864 153,684 2,325,754 





Table A11.15. ―Theoretical‖ Wages, 2007/08 (Thousands of CFA francs) 
Wage Scale Q W Básico Seniority Grade Total 
A 9 16,737 6,169 1,594 24,500 
B 499 726,823 301,133 66,232 1,094,189 
B (assumption) 1,079 1,571,628 344,730 135,086 2,051,444 
Total 1,587 2,315,189 652,032 202,911 3,170,132 











Annex: XII. Institutional Strengthening of the MSBES for Budgeting 
 
An improvement in the financial operation of the MSBES would strengthen the system and the capacity 
to improve the provision of health services as it would be expected that there would be greater capacity 
for intervention and negotiation by the MSBES with external donors and other ministries. It would 
increase the possibility of generating efficiency by concentrating assets and resources, coordinating all the 
institutions, and standardizing procedures. The increase in the MSBES’s capacity to spearhead the budget 
preparation and execution process would be supported by greater flexibility in the management of funds 
and a gradual decentralization of the system. This would also help with the separation of the service 
provision and financing functions of the system. 
The organizational chart of the MSBES and the description of the functions of the Administrative and 
Financial Directorate would be the following: 
 
Departments Main Functions 
Management of Sources of 
Financing 
 Collection of funds for the MSBES 
 Responsibility for relationships with external donors 
 Coordination of self-management funds 
 Coordination of National Health Insurance 
Budget Management  
 Responsibility for the control of financing       
 Earning on the available financing resources 
 Preparation of the General Budget of the MSBES (consolidated) 
Distribution of Funds  Responsibility for the financing of health care providers  
 Supervisor of the budget execution process 
Administrative and Financial 
 Ensuring the standardization and implementation of accounting 
procedures 
 Consolidation of economic and financial information  
 Preparation of the National Health Accounts 
 Cash management 
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